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Abstract
Yulia Plaksina
CEO social status and corporate decision making
This thesis investigates the role of CEO social status in corporate decision making and
explores the associated firm value consequences. Building on insights from sociology, I
distinguish between ascribed (inherited) and achieved (earned) social status in order to
distinguish the varying influence of status origin and provide a richer picture of the mech-
anisms through which social status can affect CEO behaviour. Utilising a large sample
of S&P 500 executives, I find evidence of statistically and economically significant rela-
tionships between the level and the nature of CEO social status and firm-level outcomes,
establishing the importance of CEO social status in strategic decision-making. My overall
findings are consistent with a hypothesis that executives value their social status position
and associated membership within elite social groups, leading to strategic decisions that re-
flect a desire to preserve their social standing. In particular, I find that both high ascribed
and elevated achieved social status are associated with reduced M&A activity, but only
high achieved social status results in significant value destruction around deal announce-
ments. In addition, both types of CEO status are positively related to the firms’ corporate
social responsibility (CSR) performance, although the specific strategies are different be-
tween executives with high ascribed and high achieved social status. These CSR influences
based on social status are shown to neither harm nor benefit the firm. This research opens
a new strand of literature on social status in corporate finance, and suggests that we need
to look deeper into behavioural concepts that we adapt from other disciplines.
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Introduction
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1.1 Background and motivation
In trying to understand why organisations act in certain ways, traditional theories
have centred explanations of organisational behaviour on economic and technologi-
cal factors. From this perspective, firms base their strategic decisions on the avail-
able information regarding relevant contextual conditions, such as market signals,
competitive environment and available technologies, with the role of management
largely omitted from the strategic process (Augier and Teece, 2009; Teece and Win-
ter, 1984). In addition, the effect of company leaders on organisational outcomes
has been argued to be minimal as managers are greatly constrained by the industry
pressures and the powerful influences of the broader environment (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972).
Loosening this perspective through the introduction of agency theory allows that
managers of publicly-held corporation can inject their personal preferences into the
strategic process, potentially resulting in organisational outcomes that have nega-
tive implications for shareholder value (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Agency theory is premised on the presence of a separation of ownership and con-
trol in publicly-held corporations, with the key argument that managers can choose
decisions that maximise their own utility rather than act in the best interest of
shareholders. The agency literature identifies various reasons that can lead to a
conflict between the goals of managers and owners (such as risk attitudes and time
horizons), and provides evidence of common tendencies among corporate managers
serving their personal interests but not those of the company shareholders (such
as empire building and shirking) (Harford, 1999; Jensen, 1986, 1993). These prac-
tices give rise to the challenge for owners to employ internal and external gov-
ernance mechanisms that can effectively constrain predictable managerial misbe-
haviour (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Under the logic of agency
theory, therefore, variation in organisational policies and outcomes can be traced to
differences in monitoring arrangements and incentive schemes (Rediker and Seth,
1995).
Similar to the agency view, upper echelons theory argues that corporate man-
agers have a significant role in strategic decision-making and can have a substantial
13
influence on organisational outcomes (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
However, agency theory assumes that managers are universally driven towards com-
mon self-benefiting practices that are based on rational decisions to maximize their
personal utility. In contrast, upper echelons theory acknowledges the role of man-
agers’ bounded rationality in the process of strategic choice, arguing that complex
decisions associated with determining corporate policies are likely to be influenced
by personalised behavioural factors (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). As a result, the
upper echelons perspective suggests that organisational outcomes can vary depend-
ing on managerial characteristics, and strategic decisions can be largely explained
by experiences, values and perceptions of company executives.
The seminal work of Hambrick and Mason (1984) was followed by a stream of
studies examining the influence of CEO personal characteristics on firm risk tak-
ing, strategy and outcomes. This research has diverged into multiple directions,
providing considerable support to the argument proposed by upper echelons the-
ory. In particular, studies on observable demographic CEO characteristics show
that factors such as age (Serfling, 2014), tenure (Simsek, 2007) and gender (Huang
and Kisgen, 2013) are significantly related to organisational strategy and outcomes.
Another stream of literature finds evidence of a link between corporate policies and
CEO psychological attributes, such as overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008),
narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) and envy (Goel and Thakor, 2010). In
addition, research examining the influence of CEO past experiences shows how early-
life exposure to fatal disasters (Bernile et al., 2017) and military service (Benmelech
and Frydman, 2015) can shape CEOs’ attitude to risk and manifest across various
aspect of corporate strategy. Further studies also find evidence of a significant role
of executives’ values, showing how cultural beliefs (Frijns et al., 2013) and political
ideologies (Chin et al., 2013) can affect organisational outcomes.
Among the multitude of examined CEO characteristics, one of the factors that
has received little research consideration is executive social status, despite the ev-
idence of a profound status influence on individuals’ behaviour in the fields of so-
ciology, psychology and organisational behaviour (Côté, 2011; Fiske and Markus,
2012; Liu et al., 2004; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). In addition, the limited ex-
isting literature examining CEO status in finance often employs a singular concept
14
of ’social status’, lacking clarity regarding the varying influence of social status de-
pending on its origin. For example, Palmer and Barber (2001) regard CEO social
status as a dimension of the class system to which executives are born and which
remains constant. In contrast, Shemesh (2017) considers CEO social status to be
related to executives’ reputation relative to their peers, implying a quality which can
vary throughout CEO career. While individually informative, these studies produce
evidence of CEO social status influence whose understanding can be improved by
addressing the meaningful differences in status effects depending on its source.
Social status is a complex construct which can originate from different sources.
Two distinguishing sources are ascribed status which is assigned to individuals at
birth and does not depend on their innate abilities, and achieved social status which
is attained throughout the life of an individual and is based on personal effort and
exercise of volition (Foladare, 1969). Due to different underlying characteristics, as-
cribed and achieved social status types are likely to influence CEO decision making
through separate processes, and the two routes to status have long been differen-
tiated in sociological research, and acknowledged in management theory (Foladare,
1969; Lin, 1999; Linton, 1936; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014).
To address the existing conceptual gap in finance research, I distinguish through-
out this work between ascribed and achieved social status, and consider the various
mechanisms through which these two routes to status can influence CEO decision
making. To my knowledge, the only similar examination of differentiated ascribed
and achieved status in a finance context was in Lucey et al. (2013) who analysed ac-
quisitiveness of CEOs of large UK companies, which was published out of my initial
research in this topic. This thesis is a significant advance on that initial research,
particularly through incorporating a broader review of the ways in which social sta-
tus can affect CEO behaviour, developing a model of status influence, and analysing
status influence on several aspects of corporate policy as well as performance im-
plications of decisions made by CEOs with varying social status characteristics.
In addition, I investigate a much larger dataset with comprehensive controls, and
address the unique methodological concerns related to the measurement of status
influence. My analysis, therefore, provides a rich understanding of the role of CEO
social status in corporate decision making.
15
1.2 The persistent influence of ascribed status
I define ascribed status as individuals’ relative position within the economic hier-
archy at the time of their birth. As such, individuals’ ascribed status is assigned
based on the socioeconomic standing of the families into which they are born, and it
reflects differences in environmental conditions and access to material resources dur-
ing the early periods of a person’s life (Côté, 2011; Linton, 1936). Ascribed status is
generally viewed as an irreversible characteristic which remains constant even if an
individual experienced a subsequent movement into a different social class during
adulthood.
Despite early assignment, research indicates the enduring influence of individ-
uals’ social class origins across various aspects of their life. For example, research
in biology suggests that ascribed status continues to have a significant effect on
individuals’ health even in cases where they experienced a movement into higher
social class during adulthood (Kittleson et al., 2006; Marin et al., 2008). Miller
et al. (2009) argue that early-life social experiences reflected in the varying ascribed
status characteristics can have a long-term influence on individuals’ biological pro-
gramming. This perspective and the related findings suggest that ascribed status
might leave a ’biological residue’ that can endure despite a subsequent change in
environment (Miller et al., 2009).
Similar to the persistent biological effects of ascribed status, it can also leave
an enduring ’cognitive residue’ (Côté, 2011). Research in social psychology argues
that individuals adopt cognitive and behavioural patterns by processing cues from
their environment, and childhood experiences play a particularly important role in
shaping people’s perception of the world (Stephens et al., 2014). In line with this
perspective, the theory of imprinting suggests that individuals develop personal char-
acteristics that "reflect prominent features of the environment" during susceptible
periods in their lives (such as childhood and periods of significant transitions), and
such characteristics will persist despite future changes in environmental conditions
(Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013, p.199). Therefore, ascribed status has the potential to
have a lasting effect on individuals’ mental models of decision making, and the vary-
ing environmental conditions associated with different ascribed status can assist in
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explaining the variation in executives’ approach to the complex process of strategic
choice.
A particular channel through which ascribed status can leave a ’cognitive residue’
is its affect on individuals’ risk perception and preferences. Upper class background
is characterised by a superior perceived position in society, which has been shown
to be related to higher levels of optimism and self-esteem, as well as increased
perception of control (Kraus et al., 2012; Twenge and Campbell, 2002). Upper
social class is also associated with an abundance of material resources, resulting in
greater feelings of economic and psychological security among high status individuals
compared to those from lower class background (Fiske and Markus, 2012). Such
favourable early life environmental conditions can shape individuals’ attitude to
risk, and direct their attention towards opportunity rather than threat in times of
uncertainty.
In line with the argument that ascribed status can have an enduring influence on
individuals’ risk preferences, Kish-Gephart and Campbell (2015) find evidence of a
higher level of strategic risk taking among CEOs from upper social class background.
The authors base their measure of risk taking on the level of R&D expenditure,
capital expenditure and the value of the long-term debt, and argue that upper class
upbringing is likely to affect CEO risk-taking through increased confidence, similar
to the effects of CEO optimism and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).
However, while the influence of CEO overconfidence on risk taking tends to be
consistent across different corporate strategies and appears to be persistent in differ-
ent market environments (Hsieh et al., 2014; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008), the
effect of ascribed status are likely to be more context-specific. For example, Côté
(2011) argues that relationship between upper class background and the amount
of risk taking is dependent on the favourableness of the external conditions. In
favourable conditions, higher self-esteem and optimism among individuals with up-
per class upbringing will be associated with greater willingness to take risks. How-
ever, in the face of adversity, higher class individuals are likely to reduce their risk
taking and make safer decisions, compared to individuals with lower status back-
ground (Goldman and Smith, 2002; Griskevicius et al., 2011). This perspective sug-
gests that the effect of CEO ascribed status on strategic risk taking might, at least,
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be different in times when the economy is strong and during periods of economic
adversity such as financial crises.
In addition to being dependent on economic conditions, the effect of CEO as-
cribed status is likely to vary across different corporate policies because upper class
upbringing has implications not only for individuals’ attitude to risk, but also for
their social group identity. Research suggests that firms and their managers can
engage in certain activities for social rather than economic reasons, supporting the
idea that economic behaviour is socially embedded at individual and organisational
levels (Granovetter, 1985; Haunschild, 1992; Palmer and Barber, 2001). A particu-
lar implication of upper class upbringing for corporate executives is that such elite
background provides membership within the "inner circle" of corporate elite (Useem,
1984). This prestigious network differs from the rest of the corporate elite with re-
spect to social and educational characteristics of its members, and the existence of
this social stratification is generally recognised by corporate managers themselves
(Domhoff, 2002; Useem, 1984; Useem and Karabel, 1986). Membership within the
inner circle can yield multiple personal and professional benefits, such as superior
access to information and scarce resources, as well as personal and strategic support
from members of the network (Galaskiewicz, 1985; McDonald and Westphal, 2010,
2011). In addition, CEO and director embeddedness within the core elite is often
viewed as an intangible firm asset, providing members of the inner circle with more
power with their organisations and protecting them from dismissal (D’Aveni, 1990;
Flickinger et al., 2016; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). However, as with any social
group, the inner circle is governed by a set of norms and can exercise social pressures
for members to conform (Kang and Kroll, 2014; Sauerwald et al., 2016). Compa-
nies with strong links to the inner circle collectively own the social and reputational
capital of this elite network, and reputation of individual members of the network
can have a spillover effect on the associated firms, both in positive and negative
directions (Kang, 2008; Pollock et al., 2009; Sauerwald et al., 2016). In addition,
members of the network are expected to share a sense of social solidarity and follow
the norms of reciprocity, as well as refrain from elite-threatening actions (Sandefur
and Laumann, 1998; Westphal and Khanna, 2003).
High ascribed status executives are argued therefore to be constrained by the
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normative expectations of belonging to the inner circle and have little incentive to
pursue risky strategies that might harm their reputation and jeopardise their identi-
fication with the elite social group. Lower status CEOs, on the other hand, have the
flexibility of deviating from accepted business practice and are more motivated to
take chances: they can attain status if their strategy is successful but have little rep-
utational concerns in case of failure (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Stearns and Allan,
1996). Indeed, director and CEO membership within the inner circle of the corpo-
rate elite has been shown to influence corporate practices and strategies, including
board structure decisions (Westphal and Khanna, 2003) and acquisition behaviour
(Palmer and Barber, 2001).
Throughout this thesis I adopt this perspective, at least as a testable hypothesis,
of high ascribed status executives being reluctant to pursue risky strategies that
might harm their reputation and being conscious of the norms of their social group.
Thus in my first set of studies I argue this acts as a constraint on merger and
acquisition behaviour, while in the second I link the social attractiveness of CSR
investment to hypothesise higher levels of CSR investment by high ascribed status
CEOs.
1.3 The contest for achieved status
I define achieved social status as the level of individuals’ reputation relative to their
peers. In contrast to ascribed social status, achieved status is earned on the basis of
personal merit, and it reflects individuals’ skills and effort (Linton, 1936). Therefore,
individuals have a level of control over their achieved social status and can experience
positive and negative shifts in this personal attribute over time and depending on
relative performance.
While most models in a financial setting define achieved social status based on
individuals’ relative wealth (see, for example Hong et al., 2014; Roussanov, 2010),
recent research indicates that relative reputation can be an important source of sta-
tus among corporate executives, and reputational shifts can be useful in explaining
the variation in executives’ risk attitudes, corporate policies and associated firm
outcomes (Ammann et al., 2016; Koh, 2011; Raff and Siming, 2017; Shemesh, 2017;
Siming, 2016).
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Among existing studies, there are two main contrasting perspectives regarding
the specific influence of CEO reputation on corporate behaviour. One stream of
literature argues that superior managerial reputation, often indicated through me-
dia attention or prestigious business awards, leads to CEO entrenchment and op-
portunistic CEO behaviour, resulting in generally negative firm outcomes, such as
poorer quality of financial reporting, engagement in rent extraction activities and
financial underperformance (Ammann et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2008; Malmendier
and Tate, 2009; Wade et al., 2006). Another strand of literature posits that increases
in CEO reputation are likely to better align their interests with those of other firm
stakeholders due to CEO desire to preserve their elevated status position, leading
to beneficial firm outcomes, such as lower incidence of earnings management, more
conservative accounting practices and a decrease in firm-specific risk (Koh, 2011;
Shemesh, 2017).
Among the first studies to use prestigious awards as an indication of CEO reputa-
tion, Wade et al. (1997, 2006) investigate the impact of CEO celebrity status on firm
performance and executives’ compensation. The authors find that while abnormal
firm returns are positive in the days following the award conferral, the longer-term
impact of such certifications on firm performance is generally negative. At the same
time, executives tend to extract higher compensation around the time of the award,
although they subsequently experience greater pay-performance sensitivity (Wade
et al., 2006)1.
While the analysis in Wade et al. (1997, 2006) employs results from a single
certification contest (Financial World’s ’CEO of the year’), Malmendier and Tate
(2009) expand the proxy for CEO reputation to include a range of prestigious busi-
ness rewards. The authors report a similar pattern of general underperformance
among celebrity CEOs following the award conferral, and suggest several channels
for this trend. First, higher reputation can increase executives’ power within the or-
ganisation, leading to reduced supervision and giving CEOs more freedom to shape
corporate policies to their advantage (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Gong and Guo, 2014;
Muttakin et al., 2016). In addition, Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that award-
1Greater pay-performance sensitivity among highly reputable CEOs remains evident when other proxies
of CEO reputation are used, including CEO tenure, the number of CEO-related articles, outside-firm
appointments and firm performance during CEO tenure (Milbourn, 2003).
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winning CEOs increasingly engage in private activities (such as writing books) that
have little firm value and distract executives from their core corporate responsibil-
ities. Finally, consistent with the evidence of higher expectations and greater pay-
performance sensitivity among highly-reputed CEOs (Milbourn, 2003; Wade et al.,
2006), Malmendier and Tate (2009) suggest that in order to preserve their position
of power and use their superior status to extract rents, award-winning executives
will try to meet optimistic analyst forecasts by engaging in detrimental earnings
management activities.
Another mechanism through which CEO reputation might have an adverse effect
on corporate outcomes is its potential impact on CEO hubris. Kubick and Lock-
hart (2017) argue that prestigious recognition associated with winning an award
can cultivate overconfidence among executives, leading them to underestimate the
risks of their actions and overestimate their ability to control the outcome. In
line with prior evidence of riskier corporate policies among overconfident executives
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008), the authors find that
award-winning CEOs exhibit greater tax aggressiveness after the award conferral,
providing some support to the argument that positive shocks to CEO reputation
might be related to hubris.
In contrast, Shemesh (2017) argues that CEO social status, indicated by repu-
tation relative to peers, will be negatively associated with risk-taking. The author
posits that CEOs obtain utility from their social status relative to others, and exec-
utives who experience a positive status shift will make business decisions aimed at
preserving their elevated position. Since firm performance can have a pronounced
impact on CEO reputation (Milbourn, 2003), executives with higher social status
are expected to hedge against future status uncertainty by decreasing firm-specific
risk and increasing the correlation with the systematic industry risk. In line with his
predictions, Shemesh (2017) finds that CEOs with high social status significantly
reduce their R&D expenditure, while increasing investment in fixed assets.
In a similar logic, Koh (2011) argues that executives that experience an increase
in their reputation will be motivated to preserve their elevated status and engage in
corporate behaviour consistent with this objective. However, rather than limiting
CEO reputational concerns to their link with firm performance, Koh (2011) takes
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a broader perspective and argues that highly-reputed executives will generally seek
to align their actions with the interests of firm’s stakeholders. In support of this
idea, Koh (2011) finds that award-winning CEOs improve the quality of financial
reporting by engaging in more timely loss recognition and refraining from earnings
management activities in the several years following the award conferral. In addition,
the author finds that firm performance improves in the years following the increase
in CEO reputation, and this trend is consistent for accounting performance measures
as well as abnormal market returns.
Koh (2011) and Shemesh (2017) take a different approach to examining the
influence of CEO reputation-based status on corporate behaviour, but both studies
argue that executives value their social status position and will try to preserve
their superior social standing. The idea that CEO status has intrinsic value is also
supported by research in social psychology (Huberman et al., 2004), and is consistent
with recent evidence showing that honorary awards conferred to corporate executives
can act as a substitute for monetary compensation (Siming, 2016). If executives
indeed value their relative social status, they are likely to become more risk averse
and refrain from actions that jeopardise their positive state (Isen and Geva, 1987).
My key research questions related to achieved social status take this perspective as
a starting point in developing hypotheses, and this is expanded upon in more detail
in the following section.
1.4 Objectives and methodology
The existing literature provides contrasting theoretical and empirical evidence re-
garding the influence of CEO social status characteristics on risk taking and the
focus of corporate policies. Ascribed status has the potential to shape CEO values,
risk preferences and behavioural patterns due to the lingering effect of childhood en-
vironment (Côté, 2011; Fiske and Markus, 2012; Kish-Gephart and Campbell, 2015).
In addition, varying social group identity associated with different ascribed status
has implications for social bases of corporate policies, and can influence executives’
motivation to conform to the normative expectations within the core corporate elite
(Haunschild, 1992, 1993; Palmer and Barber, 2001; Stearns and Allan, 1996). These
channels can provide conflicting predictions regarding ascribed status influence on
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certain aspects of corporate policy, and the dominant effect remains unclear.
Similarly, the research on CEO reputation suggests several mechanisms through
which achieved social status might influence CEO behaviour and attitude to risk,
with different perspectives often leading to conflicting outcomes. For example, the
literature that links CEO reputation to power and overconfidence generally predicts
greater risk taking and higher incidence of opportunistic behaviour among higher
status executives (Kubick and Lockhart, 2017; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). In
contrast, research focusing on the intrinsic and long-term value of achieved status
suggests that executives who earned superior social standing will make safer deci-
sions, and preserve their reputation by aligning their interests with those of other
firm stakeholders (Koh, 2011; Shemesh, 2017).
In addition to conflicting predictions regarding the influence of CEO social status
characteristics on strategic decisions, there is also mixed evidence related to firm-
level performance implications of CEO status. Stronger identification with the core
corporate elite among executives with high ascribed status can be a source of firm
value, as their external social ties can provide access to scarce resources, information,
and strategic help, ultimately enhancing firm performance (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Mc-
Donald et al., 2008; McDonald and Westphal, 2010). However, the degree to which
organisational strategy reflects conformity to social influences of external ties can
have varying implications for firm performance, and strategic decisions motivated by
social concerns are not universally advantageous (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997).
There is also a continuing debate on whether CEO achieved reputational status
should be viewed as an asset or a liability to the firm. Superior executive reputa-
tion can increase organisational legitimacy and provide signalling benefits (D’Aveni,
1990; Pollock et al., 2009). In addition, high status CEOs have been shown to make
strategic decisions consistent with higher alignment of their interests with those of
firm shareholders, resulting in higher average firm performance (Koh, 2011). How-
ever, there is evidence of opportunistic behaviour among highly-reputed CEOs which
has been shown to diminish firm value (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Wade et al.,
2006).
The existing mixed findings regarding strategic and performance implications of
CEO status characteristics suggest that social status is a complex construct, and
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indicate a need for further analysis of this personal attribute within the corporate
finance setting. To put prior evidence in context, Table 1.1 provides a summary
of the geographical origins and time frames within related empirical research. The
vast majority of prior studies investigate status influence within the United States,
and almost all data originates from one of the Anglo-Saxon countries, suggesting
that the conflicting predictions regarding the influence of social status on corporate
behaviour are unlikely to be a result of cultural differences. In addition, the time
frame in most related studies includes some period in the 1990s and/or several years
from the early 2000s, overlapping with my sample period.
Table 1.1: Related empirical research on the influence of social status on corporate strategy
and outcomes
Author (year) Related status dimension Data origin Data time frame
Kubick and Lockhart (2017) Achieved United States 1994 - 2011
Raff and Siming (2017) Achieved New Zealand 1997 - 2011
Shemesh (2017) Achieved United States 1992 - 2003
Ammann et al. (2016) Achieved United States 1992 - 2008
Cho et al. (2016) Achieved United States 1988 - 2000
Flickinger et al. (2016) Ascribed Germany 2002 - 2011
Siming (2016) Achieved Sweden 1972 - 1977
Kish-Gephart and Campbell (2015) Ascribed United States 2002 - 2011
2013 Lucey et al. (2013) Ascribed, achieved United Kingdom 2001 - 2010
Koh (2011) Achieved United States 1987 - 2003
McDonald and Westphal (2011) Ascribed United States 1998 - 2006
McDonald and Westphal (2010) Ascribed United States 2002 - 2004
Pfarrer et al. (2010) Achieved United States 1991 - 2005
Malmendier and Tate (2009) Achieved United States 1975 - 2002
Francis et al. (2008) Achieved United States 1992 - 2001
Wade et al. (2006) Achieved United States 1992 - 1996
Milbourn (2003) Achieved United States 1993 - 1998
Westphal and Khanna (2003) Ascribed United States 1999 - 2001
Palmer and Barber (2001) Ascribed United States 1963 - 1968
Wade et al. (1997) Achieved United States 1990 - 1994
In order to advance the understanding of the role of social status within organ-
isations, I investigate the influence of the level and the nature of CEO status on
two aspects of corporate strategy, both of which provide unique opportunities for
unravelling the conflicting mechanisms through which CEO social status can affect
strategic decision-making. In addition, I examine the value implications of decisions
made by executives with varying social status characteristics, contributing to the ex-
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isting debate on whether high CEO status is beneficial or detrimental to shareholder
wealth.
First, I analyse how the level of CEO ascribed and achieved social status influ-
ences the propensity to engage in merger and acquisition deals, and investigate the
value created through M&A investments by high status executives. Acquisitions are
different to regular firm activities in the extent of unknown potentials. Particularly,
acquisitions have highly uncertain outcomes that are frequently negative (Moeller
et al., 2005), and can involve negative perceptions of CEO behaviour due to the
likelihood of, for example, job losses post-acquisition (Conyon et al., 2001). In ad-
dition, major acquisition failures tend to be highly visible and can endanger CEOs’
position despite their power and status within the organisation (Lehn and Zhao,
2006). However, engaging in mergers and acquisitions can also provide executives
with substantial personal gains, including superior status, higher compensation and
more diverse future career opportunities (Brown and Sarma, 2007; Harford, 1999;
Jensen, 1986, 1988).
If superior CEO ascribed social status is associated with higher overconfidence,
as suggested by the research of Kish-Gephart and Campbell (2015), I would ex-
pect to see a higher level of acquisitiveness among high ascribed status executives,
as CEO overconfidence has been shown to be positively related to engagement in
M&A activities (Liu and Taﬄer, 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). However, if
high ascribed status executives value their standing within the core elite, the extent
of uncertainty regarding the potential financial and reputational outcomes of acqui-
sitions is likely to decrease their incentives to engage in M&A activities, consistent
with prior findings of lower acquisitiveness among CEOs with upper class origins
during the 1960s (Palmer and Barber, 2001).
Similarly, if increases in CEO achieved status cultivate overconfidence, as pre-
dicted by Kubick and Lockhart (2017), or if executives with superior status use their
power to engage in opportunistic behaviours (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), I would
expect to see a higher level of acquisitiveness among CEO with elevated achieved
social status. In contrast, if executives value their high status position and desire
to protect their reputational capital, they are likely to decrease their engagement in
risky M&A activities (Koh, 2011; Shemesh, 2017).
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To develop hypotheses related to this, I rely on a model developed in Chap-
ter 2 based on the prior evidence. This model suggests that social status concerns
over unsuccessful acquisitions should outweigh the potential for personal gains from
acquisitions, and therefore high social status of either type should reduce acquis-
itiveness. The model also develops the claim that possessing both types of social
status simultaneously should reduce acquisitiveness more than just possessing one
type of social status. I am therefore guided by this in my hypothesis development,
but reflect after testing on the appropriateness of the model and the hypotheses.
Second, I investigate the role of the level and the nature of CEO social status
in determining firm’s investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR), and also
examine the value created through such investments. CSR can be both a signifi-
cant cost to the firm and a significant use of time for top management, yet finance
researchers do not frequently focus on CSR despite these investment aspects. In-
vestment in CSR is considered a risky strategy due to its long-term pay-off nature
and a high level of outcome uncertainty (Mahapatra, 1984; Oh et al., 2016; Orl-
itzky et al., 2003). However, acting in a socially responsible manner is an important
way of addressing diverse stakeholder demands and building a responsible corporate
image (Creyer, 1997; Du et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2003). Disengagement from
CSR activities can therefore have an adverse effect on companies’ relationship with
stakeholders, and involves negative implications for firms’ reputational and moral
capital (Godfrey, 2005; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2016). Since CEOs have been shown
to have a significant influence in shaping firm’s CSR strategy (Bonini and Chênev-
ert, 2008; Muttakin et al., 2016; Werbel and Carter, 2002), decision regarding the
level of firm’s investment in socially responsible behaviours can reflect executives’
preferences and priorities regarding financial and reputational risks.
If superior CEO social status (ascribed or achieved) is related to overconfidence,
I would expect a generally lower level of social performance among high status ex-
ecutives. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their abilities (Hayward and
Hambrick, 1997) and are likely to underestimate the resources required for strate-
gic initiatives (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). As a result, hubristic executives will
underestimate their dependence on firm stakeholders and are less likely to devote re-
sources to improving social performance. Indeed, Tang et al. (2015) finds evidence of
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significant negative relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm engagement
in CSR.
If, on the other hand, executives with high social status value their elevated
position (primarily relevant for achieved status dimension) or standing within pres-
tigious social groups (primarily relevant for ascribed status dimension), they are
likely to take advantage of the reputational benefits associated with engagement in
social initiatives, and are more likely to pay attention to insurance-like benefits of
acting in a socially responsible manner (Du et al., 2007; Godfrey et al., 2009; Koh
et al., 2014; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). Therefore, I would expect a higher level
of CSR investment among CEOs with high ascribed or high achieved social status.
The complexity of investments in corporate social responsibility provides an op-
portunity to gain further insight into the motivations and objectives of corporate
executives. Existing research examining the financial, strategic and reputational
outcomes from firm’s engagement in socially responsible activities suggests that in-
vestments in CSR can have varying implications for organisational outcomes depend-
ing on the specific strategies adopted by companies. For example, investments in
responsible behaviours have been shown to have a more pronounced positive impact
on firm performance compared to preventing irresponsible behaviours (Servaes and
Tamayo, 2013). In addition, social activities related to companies’ primary stake-
holders, such as employees, customers and suppliers, tend to improve shareholder
value, while CSR investments targeting society at large reduce shareholder wealth
(Hillman and Keim, 2001). However, a focus on social strengths and issues related
to primary stakeholders can be perceived as a benefit-seeking behaviour rather than
a genuine attempt to increase the social good. Therefore, concentrating on prevent-
ing irresponsible behaviour as well as investing in social issues that benefit a wider
community can have greater reputational benefits and provide firms with a moral
capital to withstand the consequences of future crises (Bermiss et al., 2013; Godfrey
et al., 2009; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2016; Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013).
The balance between financial and reputational benefits from various CSR strate-
gies is particularly interesting in investigating the effect of CEO achieved social sta-
tus. If executives view the level of financial performance as the dominant factor
in maintaining their reputational status (as suggested by Shemesh, 2017), they are
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likely to focus their CSR strategy on improving social strengths and engaging in
social activities targeting primary company stakeholders. If, on the other hand,
CEOs with superior status preserve their reputation by aligning their actions with
company stakeholders (as suggested by Koh, 2011), they are more likely to invest
in social issues that address a more diverse range of stakeholder demands, yielding
higher long-term reputational benefits. This balancing act is what is investigated in
the sections of this thesis related to CSR.
I explore the role of CEO social status characteristics using a sample of S&P
500 firms’ executives between 1992 and 2012. This sample provides an opportunity
to understand the influence of social class origins (ascribed status) and varying
reputational achievements (achieved status) among a group of individuals that share
a similar current position within the societal hierarchy and have significant attained
status with regards to their occupational prestige. In addition, the 1990s correspond
to the longest documented period of growth in the United States (Hall et al., 2001),
and the period between 2001 and 2012 includes two of the most recent recessions2.
Thus, my dataset includes periods of significant economic growth as well as periods
with a more adverse financial environment, allowing to further the understanding of
social status influence under different economic conditions (Côté, 2011).
I use the level of educational prestige to indicate CEO ascribed status because
elite educational background is viewed as a primary criteria for social categorisation
and is likely to be indicative of upper-class upbringing (Domhoff, 1970; Karabel and
Astin, 1975; Palmer and Barber, 2001). Specifically, a CEO is defined as having high
ascribed status if he or she received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League
universities as attendance in these institutions has been historically associated with
social elitism and selectivity3 (Domhoff, 1970; Mullen, 2009; Useem and Karabel,
1986).
Using attendance at one of the Ivy League schools to proxy ascribed social status
has a limitation in that it assumes that an elite undergraduate degree is indicative
2The list of business cycle expansions and contractions in the United States is available via the National
Bureau of Economic Research at www.nber.org/cycles/.
3The vast majority of CEOs in my sample received their education in the United States, making Ivy
League universities an ideal choice for indicating social elitism. The United Kingdom is the second most
popular source of bachelor degrees in my sample and the Russell Group is considered to encompass the most
elite institutions within the UK. Therefore, I verify that my findings are robust to considering attendance
at one of the Russell Group universities as also being indicative of high ascribed status.
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of upper class background even though places in these universities can also be at-
tained through educational achievement. However, research in intergenerational
mobility and educational stratification within the United States indicates that there
is a strong link between upper class background and attendance at highly selective
institutions such as Ivy League schools.
First, differences in values and expectations experienced by individuals from
different economic backgrounds lead to high status individuals being more likely
to apply to top universities, compared to those with lower class origins (Kingston
and Lewis, 1991; McDonough, 1997; Mullen, 2009). Second, since the most selective
universities tend to have the highest tuition costs, upper class individuals are more
likely to be able to afford prestigious education (Davies and Guppy, 1997). Third,
individuals from high status families tend to attend elite high schools which increase
students’ chances of admission at prestigious undergraduate institutions through
rigorous academic training and likely long-standing relationships with elite colleges
(Cookson and Persell, 1985; Karabel, 2005). Prestigious private high schools provide
an additional advantage to upper class individuals by supplying them with a form
of socialization that helps them prepare for being in a top-tier university (Cookson
and Persell, 1985; Mullen, 2009).
As a result, individuals from higher socioeconomic background tend to be over-
represented in the most selective U.S. universities, such as Ivy League schools, while
students from lower class background (even those possessing exceptional academic
credentials) are considerably less likely to attend a university from this elite group
(Kingston and Lewis, 1991; McDonough, 1997; Mullen, 2009; Roksa et al., 2007).
This pattern appears to endure through time, contributing to the persistence of
relatively low intergenerational educational and economic mobility within the United
States (Andrade and Thomsen, 2018; Chetty et al., 2014; Corak, 2013). Specifically,
72% of students enrolled at Ivy League universities between 2001-2002 remain from
the highest family income quintile, while only 5% of students come from the lowest
income quintile (Winston and Hill, 2005).
Building on these arguments, I consider an undergraduate degree from one of the
Ivy League universities to be an acceptable proxy for CEO ascribed social status,
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similar to the approach in several related studies4 (see, for example, Westphal and
Khanna, 2003; Westphal and Stern, 2006). My sample includes firms that are asso-
ciated with a single level of CEO ascribed status during the tested period, as well
as companies that were run by both high and lower ascribed status executives. This
allows me to estimate the effect of ascribed status across firms, and also analyse
the influence of this type of CEO status on the within-firm variation in strategic
initiatives.
Within the achieved status dimension, I build on the recent research examining
the effects of CEO status attainment on different areas of financial decision making
(Cho et al., 2016; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Shemesh, 2017), and use a range of
prestigious business awards to indicate positive shifts in CEO achieved social sta-
tus. I then examine the within-firm changes in investment practices and associated
outcomes before and after executives experience a significant status increase. To
address the concern that firms with award-winning CEOs might be systematically
different from other companies (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), I compare the within-
firm changes among award winners to those in similar firms whose executives did
not win an award, allowing an isolation of status influence from the selection effects.
Using these measures, I identified 150 CEOs with high ascribed social status,
accounting for approximately 15% of firm-year observations within my dataset; and
172 award-winning executives who, between them, received 299 nationally recognised
prestigious business awards during the sample period. Among these CEOs, a total of
37 have been, at some point, associated with high social status within both ascribed
and achieved status dimensions, leaving 113 executives that had only high ascribed
social status (and not achieved), and 135 CEOs that had only high achieved social
status (and not ascribed).
In my analysis of CEO status influence on acquisitiveness, I consider both the
frequency and the relative size of M&A transactions. The main tests follow the
common approach of considering only deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Morck et al., 1990), both this is verified as being
robust to alternative specifications, particularly because there is no evidence in prior
4While using elite secondary education would likely provide a more precise indicator of ascribed status,
this approach suffers from significant incomplete data availability.
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literature that 5% is a valid cut-off for acquisitions that receive board attention.
In addition, the testing of the market response to acquisitions by executives with
varying social status characteristics includes alternative specifications for measuring
abnormal returns, and verifies the results using several event windows.
I use data from MSCI ESG Stats (formerly known as Kinder, Lyndenberg, Do-
mini and Company or KLD) to construct measures that reflect firms’ engagement
in socially responsible initiatives. The dataset provided by KLD has been widely
used in recent scholarly research (Adhikari, 2016; Cahan et al., 2017; Harjoto and
Laksmana, 2016; Petrenko et al., 2016), and has become accepted as the standard
for measurement of corporate social actions (see, for example, Chatterji et al., 2009;
Mattingly and Berman, 2006). In line with the observed evolution in research on
corporate social responsibility (Attig et al., 2016; Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Wang
et al., 2016), I supplement the analysis related to the aggregate measure of CSR with
investigations of specific elements of social activities, such as examining the relative
importance of CSR investments towards primary versus peripheral stakeholders, and
considering the differences in firms’ decisions regarding the improvement of social
strengths compared to the reduction in social weaknesses.
1.5 Findings and contribution
Overall, my findings show that the level and the nature of CEO social status have
significant implications for corporate policy, and can affect firm value. The results
suggest that executives value their social status position and associated membership
within the core elite, leading to strategic decisions that reflect a desire to preserve
their social standing. An important distinction emerging from the findings is that
the influence of ascribed status is constant while the impact of achieved social status
follows changes in the status position and the effect is limited to several years.
In particular, higher ascribed and achieved CEO social status is significantly
associated with reduced M&A activity, consistent with a motivation on the part of
CEOs with high social status to avoid taking risks that can endanger their social
status position. Possessing high ascribed status results in a 30% lower level of M&A
activity compared to marginal status CEOs. Within the achieved status dimension,
executives with higher status are approximately two to four times less acquisitive
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compared to lower status CEOs in the several years following a positive status shift.
In addition, the influence of status is strongest among executives who possess both
status types simultaneously.
Investigations on the value consequences of acquisitions made by executives with
varying social status characteristics reveal that ascribed status has no significant
impact on immediate announcement returns. However, the stock price reaction
to M&A announcements is particularly negative for CEOs with recently elevated
achieved social status, perhaps reflecting the existing ’burden of celebrity’ among
award-winning executives who are faced with heightened performance expectations
following prestigious awards (Wade et al., 2006).
The analysis of CEO status influence on the firm’s engagement in CSR shows
that both high ascribed and high achieved CEO social status are associated with
superior overall social performance. This suggests that, unlike overconfident execu-
tives, CEOs with higher social status understand the risks associated with failing to
address social demands of company’s stakeholders, and realise the reputational ben-
efits related to engagement in social initiatives. In particular, having an executive
with high ascribed status results in approximately 45% higher social performance
compared to the average level of CSR among companies with lower ascribed sta-
tus CEOs. Within the achieved status dimension, the overall social performance
increases by approximately 57% between one year before and one year after the
positive status shift.
Further investigations of the specific CSR strategies adopted by CEOs with vary-
ing status characteristics show that high achieved status executives improve their
social performance primarily through a reduction in irresponsible behaviours related
to firms’ primary stakeholders. High ascribed status CEOs, on the other hand, dis-
play a different approach. These executives tend to invest in proactive responsible
activities associated with the primary company stakeholders, while somewhat reduc-
ing irresponsible behaviours related to society at large. While the effect of ascribed
and achieved CEO status on the focus of CSR strategy is different, both types of
status appear to be related to finding a balance between increasing firm financial
value and strengthening the company’s moral capital and responsible image (Bermiss
et al., 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Servaes and Tamayo,
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2013).
I find no evidence of a negative (or a positive) moderating status influence on
the link between social and financial firm performance, despite the fact that the
motivation for higher CSR among high status executives is likely to be, at least
partially, driven by their personal interests. This suggests that, with regards to
the firm’s CSR, personal motivations of high status executives do not necessarily
misalign their interests with those of other stakeholders, and the adopted balanced
CSR strategy can be advantageous to the CEO as well as the firm. These findings
lend some support to the argument that strategic or opportunistic use of CSR does
not necessarily lead to poorer organisational outcomes (Petrovits, 2006).
The core contribution of this thesis is to the growing body of literature that
highlights the importance of CEO personal characteristics for corporate policies
(Baxamusa and Jalal, 2016; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015) and firm value (Chen
et al., 2014; Levi et al., 2014). My analysis determines the particular importance of
social status influence on behaviour. Social status is a unique characteristic in that
it is bestowed upon the decision maker by others and its maintenance is subject
to hard-to-gauge social group approval, making it distinct from prior studies which
have primarily concentrated on personal traits. Social status is also one of the few
CEO characteristics studied that can reduce CEO risk-taking and lead to strategic
decisions that are in line with the interests of organisational stakeholders. This
thesis therefore represents an evolution of our understanding of the influence of
CEO characteristics on their behaviour.
A key conceptual contribution of this thesis is theorising how dual social status
paths can individually and in combination distort CEO behaviour, thus showing
the benefit of building detailed behavioural hypotheses from the source literature.
My findings reveal the complexity of social status influence and show that status
concerns can manifest through more nuanced mechanisms than financial risk pref-
erences. In particular, executives with recently elevated achieved social status tend
to follow strategies that are beneficial to their reputational capital. High ascribed
status CEOs, on the other hand, are likely to be concerned with the external social
group approval of their strategic choices. As a result, status concerns are not uni-
versally reflected in differences in financial risk taking, and achieved and ascribed
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social status can have varying implications for corporate policy. This research opens
a new strand of literature on social status in corporate finance, and suggests that we
need to look deeper into behavioural concepts adapted from other disciplines - the
distinction between ascribed and achieved status is trivial in sociology, but novel in
finance.
This thesis also yields significant empirical contributions within several strands
of literature. First, my findings contribute to the research on the causes of corporate
acquisitions (Bernile et al., 2017; Elnahas and Kim, 2017) by providing evidence of
a significantly lower level of M&A activity among executives with high ascribed or
high achieved social status. In addition, this thesis adds to the literature examining
the value consequences of acquisitions (Cho et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2014) by showing
a significantly more negative market response to deals made by CEOs with recently
elevated achieved social status.
Furthermore, the findings in this thesis add to research on the determinants
of firms’ engagement in CSR (Moussu and Ohana, 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016) by
providing evidence of a significantly positive relationship between CEO status and
investments in socially responsible behaviours, and further examining the specific
elements of CSR (similar to Attig et al., 2016; Bouslah et al., 2013; Dupire and
M’Zali, 2016) that have a more pronounced link with CEO social status characteris-
tics. In addition, this thesis contributes to the literature on the value consequences
of CSR engagement (Harjoto and Laksmana, 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) by
showing that, in contrast to the impact of other CEO characteristics (Petrenko et al.,
2016), CSR activities initiated by high status executives do not diminish the positive
impact of such investments on firm value.
1.6 Thesis structure
This remainder of this thesis is structured in the form of four studies that investigate
the influence of the level and the nature of CEO social status on corporate policies
and associated value outcomes.
Chapter 2 explores the role of CEO ascribed and achieved social status in deter-
mining the level of M&A activity. This chapter introduces the status measurement
methodology used throughout the thesis, and develops a utility-based model of sta-
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tus influence on CEO acquisitiveness. The results of this analysis show that CEO
social status has a significant impact on firm’s M&A activities.
Chapter 3 examines the value consequences from acquisition deals announced
by executives with various status levels. This chapter implements an event-study
methodology to evaluate the abnormal returns from 1,612 M&A announcements,
and finds that social status has implications for the value created through corporate
acquisitions.
Chapter 4 analyses the influence of CEO ascribed and achieved social status
on firms’ engagement in CSR, and determines the specific CSR strategies followed
by executives with varying status characteristics. This chapter provides a detailed
analysis of the outcomes associated with various aspects of investments in corporate
social responsibility and relates these outcomes to CEO social status.
Drawing on the findings from Chapter 4, the last study in this thesis in Chapter
5 investigates the financial performance implications of the CSR strategies adopted
by executives with high ascribed and high achieved social status. The findings
suggest that CSR initiatives by high status executives do not diminish (or improve)
firm value.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the analysis of the role of CEO social status
characteristics in corporate decision making and organisational outcomes. In his
chapter, I review the key insights emerging from my empirical investigations, discuss
the limitations in my research, and suggest potential avenues for future research that
can further enrich our understanding of social status influence in a corporate finance
setting.
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CHAPTER 2
CEO social status and M&A investments
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2.1 Introduction
The behavioural finance literature has provided new explanations for takeovers that
focus on the personal characteristics of company executives, including overconfidence
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008), envy (Goel and Thakor, 2010), early life experiences
(Bernile et al., 2017), cultural beliefs (Frijns et al., 2013) and political beliefs (Elna-
has and Kim, 2017), as well as demographic characteristics such as age (Yim, 2013)
and gender (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). This research is important as it can help
explain why firms might engage in the types of acquisitions that have been shown to
destroy firm value (Moeller et al., 2005). This study demonstrates that incentives
to pursue acquisitions can also vary depending on CEO social status. I show that
both the level and the nature of social status have implications for the propensity to
engage in M&A deals as well as for the value created through these investments. My
overall hypothesis is that CEOs with elevated social status will be keen to reduce
risky acquisitions so as not to endanger their social status position.
I am motivated in this study by findings in sociology and related fields showing
that individuals’ behaviour can vary depending on their social status position (Fiske
and Markus, 2012; Kraus et al., 2012; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014; Stephens et al.,
2014). Despite this, examinations of status influence in a corporate finance setting
are scarce. Palmer and Barber (2001) provide some initial evidence of a lower level
of diversifying acquisitions among higher status executives in the 1960s. There have
also been findings of higher financial risk taking among lower status individuals
(DeMarzo et al., 2004; Hong et al., 2014) in their general financial decision mak-
ing. Other research shows a significant impact on CEO financial behaviour following
winning awards which involve a boost to social status (Kubick and Lockhart, 2017;
Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Shemesh, 2017), although this is largely linked in the
prior literature to the propensity for overconfidence of award winners rather than
instilling social status. As a wider perspective, some recent research finds that be-
longing to social groups built around religiosity and civic norms influences corporate
behaviour (Dyreng et al., 2012; Hasan et al., 2017), supporting the idea that mem-
bership of social groups matter. Thus there is preliminary evidence of a potential
link between social status and CEO propensity to engage in M&As, and it is within
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this potential that my research is situated.
Social status can be usefully contrasted with overconfidence, with the latter be-
ing the most widely-studied CEO trait investigated to date across a wide range
of financial behaviours (Banerjee et al., 2017; Hsieh et al., 2014; Humphery-Jenner
et al., 2016; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). While the overconfidence literature gener-
ally argues that overconfidence acts as an impetus for risk-taking, my social status
argument goes in the opposite direction for the domain of acquisitions. Holding
elevated social status might lead to increased confidence in outcomes and therefore
risk-taking due to having experienced a background where risks usually turned out
positively or were minimized (Kish-Gephart and Campbell, 2015), but acquisitions
are different to regular firm activities in the extent of unknown potentials. Par-
ticularly, acquisitions have highly uncertain outcomes that are frequently negative
(Moeller et al., 2005), and can involve negative perceptions of CEO behaviour due to
the likelihood of, for example, job losses post-acquisition (Conyon et al., 2001). The
model developed in the next section therefore contrasts the potential gains from such
an uncertain activity with the risk of status loss following failure, and hypothesises
a decreased incentive to engage in acquisitions.
One issue I particularly focus on in this study is that existing financial research
addressing social status tends to employ a singular concept of ’social status’ with-
out distinguishing between different types of this personal attribute. However, social
status is a complex construct which can originate from different sources. Two dis-
tinguishing sources are ascribed status which is assigned to individuals at birth
and does not depend on their innate abilities, and achieved social status which is
attained throughout the life of an individual and is based on personal effort and
exercise of volition (Foladare, 1969; Linton, 1936). Due to different underlying char-
acteristics, ascribed and achieved social status types are likely to influence decision
making through separate processes and the two routes to status are, therefore, com-
monly differentiated in sociological and management research (Kish-Gephart and
Campbell, 2015; Lin, 1999; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014).
In order to capture the precise nature of social status influence this study there-
fore is one of the first studies to distinguish between ascribed and achieved social
status. The only similar examination of differentiated ascribed and achieved sta-
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tus in a finance context was in Lucey et al. (2013) who analysed acquisitiveness of
CEOs of large UK companies. Compared to this study, my analysis offers a number
of improvements, particularly by developing a model of status influence, applying
nearest neighbour matching to identify suitable comparison firms, testing a much
larger dataset with comprehensive controls, and investigating the market impact of
acquisition announcements dependent on status. I thus arrive at a more conclusive
answer as to whether social status influences CEO acquisition decision making.
I explore the influence of both status types on CEO acquisitiveness separately
and further consider the combined impact of possessing high inherited as well as high
attained status simultaneously. The developed hypotheses are tested using CEOs
from S&P 500 companies between 1992 and 2012. Since receiving an elite education
is often argued to be indicative of an upper-class origin (see, for example, Karabel
and Astin, 1975; Palmer and Barber, 2001), the level of university prestige is used
to measure CEO ascribed social status. Building on the works of Malmendier and
Tate (2009) and Cho et al. (2016) in different areas of financial decision making,
prestigious business awards are used to proxy achieved social status, and I follow
the nearest-neighbour matching approach adapted from (Abadie and Imbens, 2011)
to isolate status influence from the selection effects.
The results show that higher social status is significantly associated with reduced
M&A activity, consistent with a motivation on the part of CEOs with high social
status to avoid taking risks that can harm that status. An important distinction
emerging from the findings is that the influence of ascribed status is constant while
the impact of achieved social status follows changes in the status position and the
effect is limited to several years. In particular, possessing high ascribed status results
in a 30% lower level of M&A activity compared to marginal status CEOs. Within
the achieved status dimension, executives with higher status are approximately two
to four times less acquisitive compared to lower status CEOs in the several years
following elevation in status. Finally, the influence of status is strongest among
executives who possess both status types simultaneously, and the effect of higher
achieved social status appears to be stronger and more consistently robust across
various model specifications compared to the influence of ascribed status. This
pattern is in line with the argument that achieved social status is a more important
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factor in determining individuals’ ultimate attained status (Blau and Duncan, 1967;
Lin, 1999), leading to a more pronounced observable impact on decision-making.
This study contributes firstly to the growing literature highlighting the impor-
tance of CEO personal characteristics for corporate policies (Baxamusa and Jalal,
2016; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015) by providing novel empirical evidence that
shows how the dual social status paths can individually and in combination distort
CEO behaviour with regards to their M&A strategy. Social status is a unique char-
acteristic in that it is bestowed upon the decision maker by others, and it is also one
of the few CEO traits studied that reduces CEO risk-taking. This analysis therefore
provides important insights that contribute to our understanding of the influence of
CEO characteristics on their behaviour.
2.2 Modelling social status
Due to contrasting characteristics, ascribed social status is likely to influence de-
cision making through different underlying processes compared to achieved status.
Ascribed status is assigned at birth independently of individual’s personal qualities
and remains constant. Achieved social status, on the other hand, can change de-
pending on personal merit and volition and is accumulated throughout the life of an
individual (Linton, 1936; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). The influence of ascribed
status on M&A decision making is, therefore, likely to be constant while the impact
of achieved social status should follow changes in the status position.
Acquisitions generally provide strong financial incentives since CEO compensa-
tion tends to increase with firm size (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), and executives
are often rewarded more for good performance than they are penalized for poor
market returns (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006). Recent research directly shows the
compensation benefits of acquisitions for CEOs (Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog, 2017).
Apart from monetary benefits, CEOs can be motivated to pursue acquisitions due
to the status these activities can generate. Social status has been shown to be
an intrinsically valued resource that provides powerful motivation to perform and
generates direct utility independently of financial consequences (Fiske and Markus,
2012; Huberman et al., 2004).
Assuming executives with high and lower social status (within both ascribed
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and achieved dimensions) face similar monetary costs and benefits associated with
M&A1, the difference in acquisitiveness between these two groups can be analysed
through the utility derived from social status consequences of M&A. The utility
from pursuing an acquisition for a CEO with ascribed status i and achieved status
j is given by the difference in the social benefits it provides and its social costs:
Ui,j = ui,j(a)− ci,j(a) (2.1)
Where i=L for a CEO with lower ascribed status and i=H for a CEO with high
ascribed status, and similarly, j=L for a CEO with lower achieved status and j=H
for a CEO with high achieved social status. Social costs, ci,j(a), are associated with
normative expectations surrounding acceptable M&A behavior within the business
community, while social benefits from pursuing acquisitions, ui,j(a), come in the
form of a potential positive shift in achieved status.
Pursuing acquisitions can provide an increase or a decrease in CEO achieved
social status, both directly and through their impact on company performance. The
direct impact is mainly dependent on whether the deal is successful, increasing CEO
status in case of acquisition completion and decreasing it when negotiations fail. The
indirect influence is a function of the perceived acquisition quality that is evident
from the company’s stock performance around a specific deal. Acquisition quality
incorporates the market’s reaction to deal characteristics, such as payment type
and attitude as well as the anticipated future success of the merger. If a company
underperforms following an acquisition, its CEO is less likely to experience an award-
based status increase in the following period since winners of several prominent
awarding publications are at least partially based on company’s past performance.
Social benefits from pursuing acquisitions, ui,j(a), can, therefore, be expressed as
follows:
ui,j(a) = ui,j(G(a))pq − ui,j(L(a))(1− p)q (2.2)
1It is possible that high status CEOs can extract higher financial benefits from acquisitions. High
status, in particular achieved, can provide CEOs with more power within their companies which is likely
to increase their influence on decisions regarding M&A bonuses (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). However,
I assume that status concerns dominate marginal differences between high and lower status executives in
terms of monetary incentives.
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Where p is the probability that the deal is completed and q is the quality of an
acquisition. G(a) is the achieved status gain in case of deal completion and L(a) is
the status loss in case negotiations fail and the acquisition does not proceed.
The marginal utility from pursuing an acquisition is given by:
∂Ui,j
∂a
= u
′
i,j(a)− c
′
i,j(a) (2.3)
Or:
∂Ui,j
∂a
= u
′
i,j(G(a))pq − u
′
i,j(L(a))(1− p)q − c
′
i,j(a) (2.4)
First, I consider the difference in social incentives faced by CEOs with low and
high ascribed social status. CEOs with high ascribed social status are individuals
who are born into elite families and are brought up surrounded by the normative
expectations of possessing an upper class origin. Their high social class combined
with a position of the highest company’s officer provides membership within the
inner circle of the corporate elite. As any social group, the inner circle has a specific
established cultural model and a system of norms that dictate what behaviour is
acceptable for members. Engaging in acquisitions can conflict with accepted business
practice, and pursuing this risky strategy might jeopardise CEOs’ identification with
the elite social group. Executives with lower ascribed status, on the other hand, have
the flexibility of deviating from accepted business practice and are more motivated
to take chances: they can attain status if their strategy is successful but have little
reputational concerns in case of failure (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Palmer and
Barber, 2001; Stearns and Allan, 1996). Therefore, the marginal social cost of
pursuing acquisitions is always higher for upper class CEOs, giving c′H,j(a) > c
′
L,j(a).
In addition, executives with high ascribed social status are likely to place less
value on a potential achieved status increase since they already occupy a high status
position within the ascribed dimension. As a result, their utility function, uH,j(a), is
flatter than uL,j(a) and their marginal benefit from pursuing acquisitions is always
lower, giving u′H,j(a) < u
′
L,j(a). Since c
′
H,j(a) > c
′
L,j(a) and u
′
H,j(a) < u
′
L,j(a),
the marginal net utility from pursuing an acquisition is lower for CEOs with high
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ascribed social status:
∂UH,j
∂a
<
∂UL,j
∂a
(2.5)
Hypothesis 1: CEOs with high ascribed social status have a lower level of
acquisitiveness compared to CEOs with lower ascribed status.
Within the achieved status dimension, executives with low and high achieved
social status are assumed to have similar normative costs associated with deviating
from acceptable M&A behaviour, ci,j(a), so that ci,L(a) = ci,H(a). Therefore, their
net utility from pursuing an acquisition is given by the potential achieved status
gain or loss:
Ui,j = ui,j(a) = ui,j(G(a))pq − ui,j(L(a))(1− p)q (2.6)
Where the marginal utility is given by:
∂Ui,j
∂a
= u
′
i,j(G(a))pq − u
′
i,j(L(a))(1− p)q (2.7)
Similar to the traditional wealth utility function, I assume that ui,j is increasing
and concave in a. Therefore, a positive shift in achieved social status decreases the
marginal benefit of additional status attainment and increases the marginal cost of
potential status loss. So, u′i,H(G(a)) < u
′
i,L(G(a)) and u
′
i,H(L(a)) > u
′
i,L(L(a)). As
a result, an increase in CEO achieved social status reduces the marginal net utility
from pursuing acquisitions:
∂Ui,H
∂a
<
∂Ui,L
∂a
(2.8)
A similar pattern of behaviour can also be predicted based on tournament in-
centives. Assuming CEOs value status and are competitive, the US business arena
can be considered to involve an underlying tournament-like behaviour with payoff in
terms of social status. In a laboratory experiment of risk taking behaviour in a two
person tournament setting, Nieken and Sliwka (2010) find that trailing contestants
tend to make riskier choices, while leading players tend to favour a safer strategy
when the outcomes of available strategies are uncorrelated. As a result, following
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a positive status shift, high status CEOs can be expected to reduce risky M&A
activities relative to lower status executives who have higher incentives to pursue
acquisitions.
Hypothesis 2: A positive shift in CEO achieved social status results in reduced
acquisitiveness compared to CEOs with no status change.
Finally, I consider the difference in acquisitiveness between CEOs who possess
high ascribed and high achieved social status simultaneously and all other executives.
Given the relationship between the marginal net utility of CEOs with low and high
ascribed social status presented in equation 2.5, the following relationships should
hold when achieved status is fixed: ∂UH,L
∂a
<
∂UL,L
∂a
and ∂UH,H
∂a
<
∂UL,H
∂a
. Similarly,
given the relationship between the marginal net utility of CEOs with low and high
achieved social status presented in equation 2.8, the following relationships should
hold when ascribed status is fixed: ∂UL,H
∂a
<
∂UL,L
∂a
and ∂UH,H
∂a
<
∂UH,L
∂a
. As a result,
the marginal utility from pursuing an acquisition is lowest for CEOs with dual high
status characteristics:
∂UH,H
∂a
<
∂UL,H
∂a
<
∂UL,L
∂a
(2.9)
∂UH,H
∂a
<
∂UH,L
∂a
<
∂UL,L
∂a
(2.10)
Hypothesis 3: Following a positive shift in achieved social status, CEOs with
high ascribed social status reduce their acquisitiveness more than all other CEOs.
My model predictions are in line with the prior evidence of a negative link be-
tween social status and corporate risk taking. Using secondary school prestige to
proxy ’social status at birth’ (or ascribed status), Palmer and Barber (2001) find
that CEOs with elite background exhibit less risk taking with regards to M&A
decisions and engage in fewer M&A transactions compared to marginal-status ex-
ecutives. Similarly, Koh (2011) and Shemesh (2017) demonstrate that CEOs with
elevated achieved social status, measured through prestigious business awards, re-
duce their risk taking through more conservative accounting practices and lower
R&D investments.
Although the balance of literature contemplates that higher social status is as-
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sociated with reduced risk taking, it is worth noting that there is also research
suggesting that attaining status can lead to riskier strategies. First, some literature
suggests that higher achieved status might cultivate overconfidence (Kubick and
Lockhart, 2017); and overconfidence has been linked to more aggressive corporate
policies (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate, 2008). If CEOs become overconfi-
dent following an increase in achieved social status, they are likely to overestimate
the probability of a successful acquisition, p, as well as the quality of the deal, q, re-
sulting in an increased expected benefit from pursuing acquisitions. Second, Thaler
and Johnson (1990) argue that decisions are influenced not merely by the potential
future outcome but by prior outcomes as well. The authors present evidence of
’the house money affect’ through which gains facilitate risk seeking by individuals.
Applying Thaler and Johnson (1990) conclusions to social status concerns would
imply that CEOs’ utility function is convex in a, resulting in higher marginal status
benefits from potential acquisitions. While these scenarios are possible, they run
contrary to both theoretical models of social status influence on risk taking as well
as the majority of findings from prior empirical studies of social status.
2.3 Data and status measurement
2.3.1 Sample and data collection
My sample consists of yearly-rebalanced S&P 500 constituents between January
1992 and December 2012 and includes all companies except utilities, financial firms,
conglomerates2 and companies with complex governance structures (e.g. multiple
simultaneous CEOs) (similar to the approach in Duso et al., 2014; Hirshleifer et al.,
2012). The usable dataset is comprised of 660 companies and includes all observa-
tions for which financial and M&A information is available.
The list of companies’ CEOs and data on their age, tenure and gender are ex-
tracted from Compustat ExecuComp database. For the ascribed status indicator,
educational background information is collected from Marquis Who’s Who, Thom-
son One Banker, EDGAR listings, Notable Names Database, and annual reports,
where available. For identifying achieved status shifts, award data is hand-collected
2Utilities: SIC codes 4900 - 4999; financial firms: SIC codes 6000 - 6999; conglomerates: SIC code 9997.
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from a variety of publications that conferred prestigious CEO awards during the
sample period. Publications include Business Week, Financial World, Forbes, In-
dustry Week, Chief Executive, Electronic Business Magazine, Time, Time & CNN,
Harvard Business Review, and Morningstar.com.
Financial controls and firm-specific characteristics are obtained from Compustat.
These include firm size, Tobin’s Q, return on assets, cash holdings, book leverage
and industry codes for all sample companies. In addition, monthly stock prices
are collected from CRSP in order to estimate companies’ prior performance. Fi-
nally, M&A data is gathered from Thomson One Banker SDC database, including
transaction size, toehold and the number of acquired shares.
CEO acquisitiveness is analyzed using the frequency and relative size of M&A
transactions. Following Levi et al. (2014), M&A deals are included if they take the
form of a merger (SDC deal form M), an acquisition of majority interest (AM), or
an acquisition of assets (AA). I require the bidding company to hold less than 51%
of the target company’s shares before the transaction and to acquire at least 51% of
the target, providing the bidding firm with control (Levi et al., 2014; Malmendier
and Tate, 2008). In addition, only transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s
value are included in the main analysis in order to avoid deals that may not require
active involvement of the acquirer’s CEO (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Morck et al.,
1990). However, robustness tests also include M&A deals worth more than 1% of
acquirer’s value3.
2.3.2 Ascribed status measurement
Ascribed social status is assigned to individuals at birth and is dependent on family
background and resources. Family resources, in turn, can be related to obtaining
a more prestigious education (Karabel and Astin, 1975) and there is a range of
elite academic institutions in the United States that have a history of providing
admissions primarily to descendants of families with high social prominence. As
a result, attending an elite secondary school or receiving a bachelor degree from a
3While 5% remains the most commonly used cut-off point, including M&A deals worth over 1% of
acquirer’s value might capture deals that are likely to receive less board oversight and might be more
influenced by CEO personal characteristics. There is also no evidence in prior literature that 5% is a valid
cut-off for acquisitions that receive board attention.
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prestigious university is often argued to be indicative of an upper-class origin and
can be used to determine individual’s ascribed social status (Domhoff, 1970; Palmer
and Barber, 2001; Useem and Karabel, 1986; Westphal and Khanna, 2003) .
Building on these conclusions, I use the level of university prestige to measure
CEO ascribed social status and distinguish between lower and higher status CEOs
based on the type of university that awarded their bachelor degree4. The majority
of CEOs in my sample received their education in the United States, with United
Kingdom being the most popular source of bachelor degrees among internationally
educated executives. Within the United States, Ivy League5 universities have been
historically associated with social elitism and students with low ascribed status
(even those possessing exceptional academic credentials) are considerably less likely
to attend a university from this elite group (Karabel, 2005; Kingston and Lewis,
1991; Mullen, 2009; Roksa et al., 2007). Similarly, the Russell Group6 is considered
to encompass the most prestigious higher education institutions within the United
Kingdom (see, for example, Chevalier and Conlon, 2003). Therefore, my binary
ascribed status measure equals to one if a CEO holds a bachelor degree from one of
the Ivy League or Russell Group universities, and equals to zero otherwise7.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the ascribed status data. The fraction
of high ascribed status CEOs remains between 10% and 20% throughout the sample
period, with an average of 15%. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both indicators of
acquisitiveness show a lower average among firms with high ascribed status CEOs,
suggesting that upper-class executives are less acquisitive. While the difference in the
frequency of M&A is only approaching significance with a p-value of 0.11, the average
4While second-level schooling would likely provide a better indicator of ascribed status, as university
prestige places can also be attained by educational achievement, this approach suffers from significant
incomplete data availability.
5The members of the Ivy League are as follows: Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell Uni-
versity, Darmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania and Yale
University.
6The members of the Russell Group are as follows: University of Birmingham, University of Bristol,
University of Cambridge, Cardiff University, Durham University, University of Edinburgh, University of
Exeter, University of Glasgow, Imperial College London, King’s College London, University of Leeds,
University of Liverpool, London School of Economics & Political Science, University of Manchester, New-
castle University, University of Nottingham, University of Oxford, Queen Mary (University of London),
Queen’s University Belfast, University of Sheffield, University of Southampton, University College London,
University of Warwick, University of York.
7Since the Russell Group can be considered too broad in comparison to the Ivy League, I confirm that
the results remain virtually unchanged if only Oxford and Cambridge universities are considered to be
indicative of higher ascribed social status in the United Kingdom.
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value of M&A investment is 38% lower for high ascribed status CEOs compared to
the average among lower status executives, and the difference is significant at the
5% level.
In terms of firm characteristics, companies with elite executives, on average, tend
to have lower book leverage and slightly higher cash holdings. While the difference
in leverage is significant at the 1% level, higher average cash among firms with high
ascribed status CEOs is only significant at the 5% level and the medians are very
similar between the two groups (0.067 versus 0.060), suggesting that a minority
of outliers drives the difference in means. Table 2.1 also shows that there is no
significant difference in size, past returns, Tobin’s Q or return on assets between
companies with CEOs from varying status backgrounds.
As expected, there are some significant differences in terms of CEO characteris-
tics. While average age does not appear to vary between CEOs with different status
levels, upper-class executives tend to have longer tenure and are more likely to be
female. Higher proportion of females among upper-class executives is not surprising
considering that women tend to be disadvantaged in terms of achieving a CEO posi-
tion relative to men, and are more likely to need higher social status and associated
personal connections in order to be appointed as a company executive (Doldor et al.,
2012).
2.3.3 Achieved status measurement
Achieved social status is attained throughout the life of an individual and is assigned
based on merit and personal efforts. While most models in a financial setting define
achieved social status based on individuals’ relative wealth (see, for example, Hong
et al., 2014; Roussanov, 2010), recent research indicates that relative reputation
can be an important source of status among corporate executives, and reputational
shifts can be useful in explaining the variation in executives’ risk attitudes, corpo-
rate policies and associated firm outcomes (Ammann et al., 2016; Koh, 2011; Raff
and Siming, 2017; Shemesh, 2017). Building on this perspective, I use a range of
prestigious business awards received by CEOs in order to assess the impact of higher
status attainment on corporate investment decisions (similar to Malmendier and
Tate, 2009).
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Table 2.1: Ascribed status summary statistics
High ascribed Lower ascribed Difference
status CEOs status CEOs in means
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. p(high-low)
M&A variables
5% M&A frequency 880 0.118 0.000 0.366 5,146 0.141 0.000 0.395 0.114
5% M&A investment 880 0.021 0.000 0.097 5,146 0.034 0.000 0.158 0.020**
Firm controls
Firm size 880 9.005 8.930 1.355 5,146 8.988 8.931 1.223 0.693
Past returns 880 0.199 0.203 0.539 5,146 0.188 0.189 0.535 0.576
Tobin’s Q 880 2.409 1.748 2.244 5,146 2.285 1.766 2.084 0.107
ROA 880 0.165 0.160 0.087 5,115 0.165 0.158 0.087 0.813
Cash holdings 880 0.125 0.067 0.144 5,146 0.115 0.060 0.140 0.048**
Book leverage 880 0.218 0.203 0.139 5,138 0.234 0.227 0.152 0.003***
CEO controls
CEO age 880 56.086 57 7.582 5,146 56.171 57 6.332 0.723
CEO tenure 880 9.468 7 7.000 5,146 7.512 6 6.116 0.000***
CEO gender 880 0.028 0 0.166 5,146 0.018 0 0.135 0.051*
The table provides summary statistics for ascribed status data. Sample of CEOs consists of chief exec-
utive officers from S&P 500 constituents between 1992 and 2012. The measure of ascribed social status
defines a CEO as having a high ascribed status when he or she received a bachelor degree from one of
the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities. 5% M&A frequency is a variable indicating the number of
deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value. 5% M&A investment is a variable indicating the total value
invested in acquisitions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value where each deal is scaled by firm’s mar-
ket capitalization two months prior to the transaction. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase
of at least 51% of target’s shares. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization, calculated as share
price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound returns for two years
prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus book
value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as operating income before
depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by
book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. CEO age and tenure are
measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals
to zero otherwise. The column p(high-low) shows the p-values of t-tests that the differences in means be-
tween high status CEOs and lower status CEOs are zero. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The core of the achieved status data is a hand-collected list of award-winning
CEOs between 1992 and 2012. Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2009), an award is
only included if it is prominent enough to affect CEO status and any US executive
has a possibility to win it. Therefore, all awards used in this study are national
and are not subject to any constraints such as CEO age, gender or industry. Ten
publications have been selected according to these criteria: Business Week, Financial
World, Forbes, Industry Week, Chief Executive, Electronic Business Magazine, Time,
Time & CNN, Harvard Business Review and Morningstar.com. Figure 2.1 presents
a histogram of CEO awards in my sample by year and publication, indicating that
Financial World, Business Week and Forbes proceed each other as predominant
awards throughout the sample period8.
I identify award-winning CEOs within S&P 500 companies and merge award
8More details on each award are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.1: CEO awards by year and publication
The figure shows the annual number of awards conferred by selected publications between January 1992
and December 2012 to CEOs of the sample companies.
data with additional CEO characteristics, annual financial information, M&A data,
and monthly performance. Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of the achieved
status data, distinguishing between companies with award-winning CEOs and other
sample firms. It is evident that award winners significantly differ from non-winners
along most firm and CEO characteristics. Companies with winning CEOs tend to
be larger with an average market capitalization of $53.5 billion compared to $14.2
billion among non-winners. Substantially lower book-to-market ratios among award
winners suggest that these companies enjoy greater market expectations compared
to other sample firms. Award-winning companies tend to have higher cash holdings,
lower leverage and higher market value of assets. Significantly higher past returns
among winning CEOs are not surprising considering that several awards consider
prior performance in the selection process (for example, Forbes’ ‘Best Performing
CEOs’ ). Finally, award winners tend to be younger CEOs with more experience
and are more likely to be females. However, the differences in age and gender are
only significant at the 10% level and the values between winners and other sample
firms differ only by about 1% - 2%.
The simple utility model presented in Section 2.2 predicts that award winners
only reduce their acquisitiveness following a positive shift in achieved social status.
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Since the descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 utilise the last available information
before award conferral (for winners), I do not expect significant differences in fre-
quencies and values of M&A investments between award winners and other sample
firms at this point. Consistent with expectations, both indicators of acquisitiveness
show similar values for both groups of companies.
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Table 2.2: Achieved status summary statistics
CEO award-winners (W) All non-winners (A) Predicted winners (P) Difference in means
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. p(W-A) p(W-P)
M&A variables
5% M&A frequency 299 0.161 0.000 0.472 58,765 0.144 0.000 0.407 299 0.124 0.000 0.340 0.487 0.228
5% M&A investment 299 0.036 0.000 0.139 58,765 0.034 0.000 0.156 299 0.025 0.000 0.129 0.861 0.294
Firm controls
Firm size 299 10.132 10.012 1.240 58,765 8.604 8.602 1.081 299 9.654 9.549 1.212 0.000*** 0.000***
Book-to-market 299 0.262 0.222 0.182 58,765 0.423 0.366 0.314 299 0.252 0.211 0.189 0.000*** 0.495
Cash holdings 299 0.185 0.120 0.180 58,765 0.105 0.060 0.132 299 0.168 0.074 0.210 0.000*** 0.242
Equity leverage 299 -0.610 0.291 12.711 58,765 0.770 0.540 8.378 299 -3.258 0.427 33.616 0.005*** 0.204
Tobin’s Q 299 3.908 2.648 5.547 58,765 2.108 1.693 1.512 299 3.037 2.410 2.384 0.000*** 0.004***
Returns_2_3 299 0.023 0.017 0.110 58,765 0.004 0.009 0.107 299 0.038 0.047 0.107 0.002*** 0.065*
Returns_4_6 299 0.034 0.046 0.133 58,765 0.008 0.018 0.152 299 0.042 0.064 0.145 0.004*** 0.448
Returns_7_12 299 0.117 0.115 0.222 58,765 0.024 0.045 0.240 299 0.139 0.126 0.234 0.000*** 0.204
Returns_13_36 299 0.393 0.346 0.546 58,765 0.151 0.169 0.499 299 0.336 0.316 0.673 0.000*** 0.186
CEO controls
CEO age 299 55.829 57 7.760 58,765 56.496 57 6.699 299 56.749 58 7.009 0.086* 0.138
CEO tenure 299 8.736 7 6.661 58,765 6.542 5 6.484 299 8.241 5 7.669 0.000*** 0.413
CEO gender 299 0.023 0 0.151 58,765 0.012 0 0.110 299 0.040 0 0.197 0.077* 0.226
The table provides summary statistics for achieved status data. The sample includes all firms in all months in which a CEO award is conferred. Firm size is market
capitalization (calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding) which is measured two months prior to the award month and is in log form.
Book-to-market ratio is calculated as stockholder’s equity over market capitalization and is measured at the end of the last fiscal year that ended at least six months
prior to the award month. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets. Equity leverage is calculated as total debt divided
by shareholder’s equity. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Returns_x_y are
the total compound returns from the yth to the xth month prior to the award month. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female,
and equals to zero otherwise. 5% M&A frequency is a variable indicating the number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value. 5% M&A investment is a
variable indicating the total value invested in acquisitions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value where each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two
months prior to the transaction. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares. The column p(W-A) shows the p-values of
t-tests that the differences in means between award winners and non-winners are zero. The column p(W-P) shows the p-values of t-tests that the differences in
means between award winners and predicted winners are zero. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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2.4 Ascribed status and CEO acquisitiveness
2.4.1 Empirical specification
Summary statistics presented in Table 2.1 suggest that there is no significant sys-
tematic firm-level difference between companies with high and lower ascribed status
CEOs, making a linear regression analysis appropriate for comparing M&A activi-
ties between these two groups. Therefore, I assess the relationship between ascribed
social status and acquisitiveness using the following regression specification:
Acquisitionsft = α+β1Statusft+β2Firmft−1+β3CEOft+FixedEffectsft+εft
(2.11)
Acquisitionsft is the level of CEO acquisitiveness in firm f at time t, where
acquisitiveness is measured using the frequency and investment in M&A activity.
All M&A deals are required to be worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value and
involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares9. Statusft is the ascribed status
indicator which equals to one if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of
the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals to zero otherwise.
Firmft−1 represents a set of firm control variables, including market capitaliza-
tion as a control for firm size, past returns as an indicator of firm’s performance,
return on assets as a measure of profitability, cash holdings and book leverage as
measures of available resources, and Tobin’s Q as an indicator for investment op-
portunities. All firm controls are lagged by one year.
CEOft denotes a set of CEO-related control variables. Because recent research
indicates that CEO career horizon problems can affect their propensity to engage in
mergers and acquisitions (see, for example, Yim, 2013), I control for CEO age and
CEO tenure, both of which are measured in years. In addition, there is evidence of
gender differences in M&A behaviour of corporate executives and directors (see, for
example, Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi et al., 2014), so I control for CEO gender,
9Additional robustness tests also include deals worth over 1% of acquirer’s value.
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using a binary indicator that equals to one if a CEO is female and equals to zero
otherwise.
FixedEffectsft account for time trends by including year fixed effects in all
models. In addition, I include either industry or firm fixed effects in all estimations
to account for potential inter-industry variations in M&A practices, and capture the
effect of possible unobservable firm characteristics that affect both the likelihood
of having a high ascribed status CEO and the firm’s acquisitiveness. Finally, I ac-
count for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by clustering robust
standard errors at the firm level in all regressions.
One of the considerations in my analysis is that the indicator of ascribed status
is invariant in most companies included in my analysis. 85% of sample firms only
ever have either high or lower ascribed status CEOs, leaving only 15% of companies
that had both high and lower status executives at some point during the evalua-
tion period. A fixed effects estimator relies on differencing observations within a
given firm and, according to Cameron and Trivedi (2013), it should not be used for
invariant or slow-moving variables.
A common approach to the analysis of slow-moving variables is the use of random
rather than fixed effects which allows firm-specific error terms to vary randomly over
time (see, for example, Jensen and Zajac, 2004). However, this approach requires
that there is no correlation between the independent variables and the uncontrolled
unit effects in order to provide reliable results. Utilising a test developed by Hausman
(1978), I found that this assumption does not hold within my dataset.
Since 15% of firms in my sample were run by both high and lower ascribed status
executives, fixed effects models might still provide insightful findings regarding the
within-firm variation in M&A practices. However, these results are likely to be
restricted by the fact that ascribed status appears to be, to a large degree, a fixed
firm characteristic in itself.
2.4.2 Empirical findings
Hypothesis 1 states that the marginal net utility from pursuing acquisitions is lower
for CEOs with high ascribed social status and, as a result, they have a lower level of
acquisitiveness compared to executives with lower ascribed status. This prediction
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is tested using two indicators of acquisitiveness: the frequency and investment in
M&A in each year. All deals are required to be worth more than 5% of acquirer’s
value in order to exclude deals that might not require active involvement of the
acquirer’s CEO. Further, each transaction must involve a purchase of at least 51%
of target’s shares, providing acquirer with control.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plot the average number and level of investment in M&A, re-
spectively, among high and lower ascribed status CEOs in each year of my analysis.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both indicators of acquisitiveness are lower among
high ascribed status CEOs in most years. The pattern in the average level of invest-
ment in M&A is particularly strong after 2006, with the mean among upper-class
executives at a level 65% lower compared to lower status CEOs. The period between
2002 and 2005 appears to be an exception from the overall trend: during these years,
high ascribed status CEOs exhibited greater acquisitiveness compared to marginal
status CEOs, nearly tripling the latter group’s average M&A investment in 2003 and
2005. This period coincides with the sixth merger wave that occurred between 2003
and 2007 (Alexandridis et al., 2012), which might explain the reverse behaviour of
upper-class CEOs. Prior research suggests that social constraints associated with
growth through mergers and acquisition within the corporate elite circle weaken
during the merger waves and the established elite can actually facilitate the spread
of the wave as the strategy is imitated throughout the business community following
the initial success of marginal status CEOs (Palmer and Barber, 2001; Stearns and
Allan, 1996).
Figure 2.2: Average frequency of M&A (ascribed status)
The figure displays year-by-year average number of acquisitions for CEOs with high and lower ascribed
status. For each subgroup, the average number of acquisitions is calculated as the number of acquisitions
divided by the number of CEOs in that subgroup in a given year. All M&A deals are required to be
worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value and involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares.
55
Figure 2.3: Average value invested in M&A (ascribed status)
The figure displays year-by-year average values invested in M&A for CEOs with high and lower ascribed
status. For each subgroup, the average value invested in M&A is calculated as the total value divided by
the number of CEOs in that subgroup in a given year. All M&A deal values are scaled by company’s
market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. All M&A deals are required to be worth more
than 5% of acquirer’s value and involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares.
The evidence of the unconditional relationship between ascribed social status
and acquisitiveness is formalized using multivariate regression analysis. Models 1
and 2 in Table 2.3 display the main results related to the frequency and level of
investment in M&A, respectively, providing further evidence of a negative link be-
tween having an upper class origin and acquisitiveness and supporting Hypothesis 1.
The coefficient for the frequency of acquisitions only approaches significance at the
10% level for the full sample period but further sub-period tests will show that the
relationship becomes stronger in recent years. The negative impact of high ascribed
status on acquisitiveness is more pronounced in terms of the total investment in
M&A. High ascribed status CEOs invest approximately 32% less in mergers and ac-
quisitions compared to the average among lower status executives. This relationship
is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that CEOs from elite background do not
simply engage in less acquisitions of higher value but have a lower level of investment
in M&A.
In order to account for potential endogeneity associated with possible omitted
variables, I reestimate the specifications in models 1 and 2 with firm fixed effects.
These results are presented in models 4 and 5 of Table 2.3. The coefficient of the
frequency of acquisitions remains relatively similar to that estimated using industry
fixed effects but it is not significant at the 10% level when firm fixed effects are
included. In addition, the findings reported in model 5 suggest that there is no
significant effect of ascribed social status on the level of investment in M&A activity,
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although the results using an alternative specification for acquisition investment
(presented in model 6) show an effect of a similar magnitude to that found in a
model with industry fixed effects.
The results of fixed effects estimations do not appear to support a significant
causal link between CEO ascribed social status and their acquisitiveness. Rather,
they suggest that the apparent correlation between ascribed status and the frequency
and investment in M&A activity might both be caused by an unobservable fixed firm
characteristic. However, as discussed in Section 2.4.1, the results of models with firm
fixed effects are likely to be restricted by the fact that ascribed status is generally a
fixed firm characteristic in itself.
2.4.3 Robustness
I perform several additional tests to verify that the results are robust to using
alternative specifications for M&A data. Initially, I expand the M&A dataset to
include deals worth over 1% of acquirer’s value. While the 5% cut-off point remains
the most commonly used, it is merely an arbitrary threshold. Expanding M&A
dataset to include deals worth over 1% of acquirer’s value might capture transactions
that are likely to receive less board oversight and thus be more influenced by CEO
personal characteristics. In addition, I consider an additional measure of investment
in M&A where each deal value is scaled by firm’s book assets rather than market
capitalisation.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.4 present the results of testing the effect of CEO as-
cribed social status on the frequency and investment in acquisitions worth over 1%
of acquirer’s value. Similar to the main tests, the findings in model 1 do not show
evidence of a significant relationship between ascribed status and the frequency of
M&A transactions. However, the relationship between CEO ascribed status and
M&A investment remains unchanged regardless of whether smaller deals are in-
cluded, confirming the main findings.
Interestingly, using book assets as an alternative proxy for firm size in assessing
the relative value of M&A transactions indicates a stronger relationship between
status and acquisitiveness (p-value<0.01 versus p-value<0.05 in the main tests), and
a better overall fit of the model. This pattern holds when using the traditional 5%
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Table 2.3: CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness
Industry fixed effects Firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Ascribed status -0.024 -0.011** -0.026*** -0.021 -0.000 -0.022
(0.016) (0.005) (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.015)
Firm size -0.023*** -0.009*** -0.018** -0.010 -0.014** -0.019
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.024) (0.006) (0.031)
Past returns 0.024* 0.010** 0.053* -0.012 0.002 0.046
(0.012) (0.005) (0.029) (0.015) (0.005) (0.038)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 -0.001 0.055*** 0.001 0.000 0.055**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.018) (0.004) (0.001) (0.024)
ROA -0.010 0.023 -0.374** 0.349*** 0.145** -0.069
(0.076) (0.034) (0.179) (0.121) (0.057) (0.214)
Cash holdings -0.040 -0.004 -0.093 0.463*** 0.100*** 0.133
(0.059) (0.020) (0.095) (0.111) (0.033) (0.278)
Book leverage -0.085* 0.021 0.025 -0.203** -0.050* -0.015
(0.049) (0.018) (0.038) (0.081) (0.028) (0.060)
CEO age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.005** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO tenure 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.004** -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.055** 0.035 0.029* 0.104** 0.031 0.032
(0.027) (0.026) (0.015) (0.041) (0.021) (0.031)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987
No. of firms 616 616 616 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.062 0.111 0.199 0.116 0.114
The table presents results of regressions testing the effect of possessing high ascribed social status on CEO
acquisitiveness. The dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is the number of deals worth more than 5% of
acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent variable in models 2 and 5 is the total investment in
M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled
by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. The dependent variable in models
3 and 6 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a
given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals
are required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to
1 if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and
equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization, calculated as share price multi-
plied by common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound returns for two years prior to
observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of
equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreci-
ation divided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by book
assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by
one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1
if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions include year fixed effect. Models 1 - 3
include industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Models 4 - 6 include firm fixed
effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
cut-off point for deal value (model 3 in Table 2.3) as well as for the expanded dataset
that also includes deals worth between 1% and 5% of acquirer’s value (model 3 in
Table 2.4). The results suggest that high ascribed status CEOs invest approximately
45% less in mergers and acquisitions compared to the average among lower status
executives.
Similar to the main findings, fixed effects estimations in tests involving M&A
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deals worth over 1% of acquirer’s value do not show evidence of a significant rela-
tionship between CEO ascribed social status and acquisitiveness, suggesting that
these results should be interpreted with caution.
Table 2.4: CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness: Alternative M&A specification
Industry fixed effects Firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1% M&A 1% M&A inv. 1% M&A inv. 1% M&A 1% M&A inv. 1% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Ascribed status -0.011 -0.011** -0.028*** -0.009 0.000 -0.023
(0.031) (0.005) (0.009) (0.043) (0.006) (0.015)
Firm size 0.004 -0.009*** -0.017** 0.022 -0.014** -0.017
(0.011) (0.002) (0.007) (0.029) (0.006) (0.030)
Past returns 0.069*** 0.011** 0.056* 0.006 0.003 0.045
(0.021) (0.005) (0.029) (0.022) (0.005) (0.039)
Tobin’s Q -0.007 -0.001 0.058*** -0.008 0.000 0.057**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.018) (0.005) (0.001) (0.024)
ROA -0.053 0.022 -0.368** 0.559*** 0.150*** -0.022
(0.126) (0.034) (0.171) (0.186) (0.057) (0.211)
Cash holdings -0.232** -0.008 -0.091 0.457*** 0.100*** 0.122
(0.109) (0.021) (0.097) (0.156) (0.033) (0.278)
Book leverage -0.141* 0.020 0.022 -0.381*** -0.055** -0.023
(0.084) (0.018) (0.038) (0.127) (0.028) (0.061)
CEO age -0.003 -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO tenure 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender -0.042 0.033 0.028* 0.045 0.030 0.031
(0.042) (0.026) (0.016) (0.067) (0.021) (0.031)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987
No. of firms 616 616 616 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.228 0.073 0.129 0.331 0.130 0.135
The table presents results of regressions testing the effect of possessing high ascribed social status on CEO
acquisitiveness using an alternative M&A deal specification. The dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is
the number of deals worth more than 1% of acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent variable
in models 2 and 5 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 1% of acquirer’s value
made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to the
transaction. The dependent variable in models 3 and 6 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth
more than 1% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book assets at the
beginning of the year. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares.
Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League
or Russell Group Universities, and equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization,
calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound
returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value
of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as op-
erating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term
investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. All
fiscal controls are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy
variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions include year
fixed effect. Models 1 - 3 include industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Mod-
els 4 - 6 include firm fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
To check whether the results might be distorted by the recent financial crisis, the
sample is split into two sub-periods: from 1992 to 2006 and from 2007 to 2012. Table
2.5 presents the results and shows that the relationship between ascribed status and
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M&A investment holds in both sub-periods but becomes more significant after 2007.
In addition, the link between having an elite background and the frequency of M&A
also becomes significant in the second sub-period. However, this relationship is still
weaker than the link between ascribed status and M&A investment (p-value<0.10)
and does not hold consistently through the years. Additional tests of the second
sub-period show that the influence of ascribed status on M&A investment remains
similarly strong after the end of the recent financial crisis (2009 - 2012)10, suggesting
that the increased significance of ascribed status impact after 2007 is likely to be
unrelated to the occurrence of a turbulent economic period and is probably associ-
ated with the end of the merger wave (2003 - 2007). Finally, the results of the fixed
effects estimations are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix, showing a similar
lack of ascribed status significance as in the full-period analysis.
It is evident from the descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 that M&A variables tend
to be over-dispersed with variance greater than the mean and exhibit a large number
of zero counts with over 80% of observations where CEOs made no qualifying ac-
quisitions during a year. Therefore, in order to further investigate the link between
CEO ascribed status and M&A frequency, I use a zero-inflated negative binomial
model, which is designed to model over-dispersed count variables with excess ze-
ros11. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 2.6, showing evidence
of a significant relationship between CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness. The
Vuong test results (p-value<0.01) suggest that that the zero-inflated negative bino-
mial model is a significant improvement over a standard negative binomial model,
indicating that it is beneficial to model the excess zeros separately.
2.4.4 Alternative channels
Ascribed status measure relies on university prestige being an indicator of upper-
class origin and executives who attended one of Ivy League or Russell Group uni-
versities are considered to possess an elite background. However, the significant
negative relationship between ascribed status indicator and CEO acquisitiveness
10These results are provided in the Appendix, Table A.2.
11The zero-inflated negative binomial model is only appropriate for testing count variables. Since M&A
investment is a continuous variable, this model is only used to test ascribed status impact on M&A
frequencies.
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Table 2.5: CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness: Sub-period analysis
Before the crisis start (1992 - 2006) After the crisis start (2007 - 2012)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Ascribed status -0.023 -0.008 -0.028** -0.044* -0.026** -0.023***
(0.021) (0.005) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012) (0.009)
Firm size -0.024*** -0.007*** -0.020** -0.019** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Past returns 0.019 0.010** 0.063* 0.028 0.004 0.014
(0.014) (0.005) (0.037) (0.022) (0.012) (0.013)
Tobin’s Q 0.005 0.000 0.060*** -0.035*** -0.012** -0.009
(0.003) (0.001) (0.019) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
ROA -0.062 0.012 -0.432** 0.304** 0.128* 0.143
(0.089) (0.039) (0.213) (0.126) (0.068) (0.093)
Cash holdings -0.109 -0.022 -0.119 0.162* 0.065** 0.094*
(0.074) (0.025) (0.130) (0.085) (0.029) (0.055)
Book leverage -0.117* 0.027 0.042 -0.052 -0.002 -0.016
(0.062) (0.022) (0.054) (0.069) (0.030) (0.033)
CEO age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO tenure 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.095** 0.015 0.035 0.025 0.049 0.010
(0.047) (0.013) (0.031) (0.037) (0.047) (0.016)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 4,130 4,130 4,130 1,857 1,857 1,857
No. of firms 522 522 522 411 411 411
Adjusted R-squared 0.136 0.069 0.121 0.130 0.060 0.066
The table presents results of OLS regressions testing the effect of possessing high ascribed social status on
CEO acquisitiveness. The sample is split into two sub-periods: models 1 - 3 use observations from 1992
to 2006 and models 4 - 6 use observation from 2007 to 2012. The dependent variable in models 1 and
4 is the number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent
variable in models 2 and 5 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s
value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to
the transaction. The dependent variable in models 3 and 6 is the total investment in M&A transactions
worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book
assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of
target’s shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one
of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of
market capitalization, calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns
are the total compound returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets
(ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings rep-
resent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt
divided by book assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in
years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero other-
wise. All regressions include year and industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
could potentially be a result of receiving a better education. Ivy League and Russell
Group universities are considered to be among the best universities in the world12
and well-educated CEOs might be disinclined to pursue risky M&A deals that might
12According to the Times Higher Education World University Ranking, available at
http://www.timeshigher education.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking.
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Table 2.6: CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness: Zero-inflated negative binomial model
Ascribed status -0.367**
(0.178)
Firm size -0.254***
(0.082)
Past returns 0.119
(0.099)
Tobin’s Q 0.028
(0.023)
ROA -1.297*
(0.672)
Cash holdings -0.673
(0.420)
Book leverage 0.107
(0.405)
CEO age 0.014
(0.012)
CEO tenure -0.012
(0.011)
CEO gender 0.682**
(0.330)
Industry fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
No. of observations 5,987
No. of firms 616
The table presents results of a zero-inflated negative binomial regression testing the effect of possessing
high ascribed social status on CEO acquisitiveness. The dependent variable is the number of deals worth
more than five percent of acquirer’s value made in a given year. All M&A deals are required to involve a
purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a CEO has received
a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals to 0 otherwise.
Firm size is the log form of market capitalization, calculated as share price multiplied by common shares
outstanding. Past returns are the total compound returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s
Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total
assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by book as-
sets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is
calculated as total debt divided by book assets. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions in-
clude year and industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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destroy shareholder value (see, for example, Andrade et al., 2001).
In order to explore this alternative explanation, I add an additional ‘Top 100
universities’ dummy variable that distinguishes firms with well-educated CEOs who
attended one the world’s top 100 universities (excluding prestigious Ivy League and
Russell Group institutions) and replicate the main tests. Table 2.7 reports the re-
sults with industry fixed effects13. Interestingly, attendance at both prestigious and
other world’s top 100 universities is negatively related to the frequency of M&A (p-
value<0.05) suggesting that well-educated CEOs might be less inclined to pursue
acquisitions compared to other executives. However, only attendance at the most
prestigious Ivy League or Russell Group institutions is significantly related to the
overall investment in M&A (p-value<0.01) and receiving a degree from one of the
other top 100 universities in the world has no impact on this acquisitiveness indica-
tor. The results are similarly significant regardless of whether market capitalization
or assets are used to assess the relative size of M&A deals, confirming that the re-
lationship found in this study is more likely to be caused by status influence rather
than education quality.
The findings related to the investment in M&A are in line with research suggest-
ing that CEO formal education is unlikely to affect executive’s corporate choices.
A number of studies demonstrate evidence of no significant link between CEO ed-
ucational characteristics and strategic decisions, and argue that a significant time
gap between the attainment of education and entering the position of a CEO re-
sults in the lack of educational influence on corporate decisions (see, for example,
Geletkanycz and Black, 2001).
2.5 Achieved status and CEO acquisitiveness
2.5.1 Empirical specification
Consistent with prior empirical evidence (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate,
2009), my data indicates that high achieved status assignment is not random and
13Additional results presented in Table A.4 include specifications with firm rather than industry fixed
effects. These models show a lower general significance of both attendance at one of the Ivy League
institutions as well as other top 100 world universities. However, the effect of ascribed status proxy
remains significant for the level of M&A investment scaled by firm’s book assets.
63
Table 2.7: Ascribed status vs. education
[1] [2] [3]
5% M&A 5% M&A invest. 5% M&A invest.
frequency (scaled by market cap) (scaled by assets)
Prestigious universities -0.034** -0.013*** -0.030***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.010)
Top 100 universities -0.030** -0.006 -0.013
(0.014) (0.005) (0.010)
Firm size -0.022*** -0.009*** -0.018**
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Past returns 0.024* 0.010** 0.053*
(0.012) (0.005) (0.029)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 -0.001 0.055***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.018)
ROA -0.010 0.023 -0.374**
(0.075) (0.034) (0.179)
Cash holdings -0.037 -0.003 -0.092
(0.059) (0.020) (0.095)
Book leverage -0.085* 0.022 0.025
(0.049) (0.018) (0.038)
CEO age -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
CEO tenure 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.056** 0.035 0.030*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.015)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5987 5987 5987
No. of firms 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.062 0.111
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of education quality on CEO acquisitive-
ness. The dependent variable in model 1 is the number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value
made in a given year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the total investment in M&A transactions
worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market
capitalization two months prior to the transaction. The dependent variable in model 3 is the total invest-
ment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal
is scaled by firm’s book assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are required to involve a pur-
chase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Prestigious universities is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a
CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals
to 0 otherwise. Top 100 universities is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bache-
lor degree from one of the world’s top 100 universities excluding Ivy League or Russell Group, and equals
to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization, calculated as share price multiplied by
common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound returns for two years prior to observa-
tion year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity,
divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation di-
vided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets.
Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by one year.
CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO
is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions include year and industry fixed effect, defined
based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported
in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
award-winning companies tend to be systematically different from non-winners (see
Table 2.2). Malmendier and Tate (2009) discuss how post-award financial conse-
quences could include mean reversion effects and note that winning companies may
be unobservably different from other firms, making direct comparison of these groups
problematic. To address these issues, I construct a nearest-neighbour matching esti-
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mator adapted from Abadie and Imbens (2011), and identify a sample of ‘predicted
winners’ to estimate the impact of achieved status shifts on CEO acquisitiveness14.
The control sample of predicted winners is constructed using a two-step pro-
cedure. Initially, a logit regression is estimated to identify determinants of CEO
awards based on a range of observable firm and CEO characteristics. The sample
includes firm-month observations from months in which an award is conferred. The
binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO received an award in
the respective month, and equals to zero otherwise. Given the differences evident
from Table 2.2, this award indicator is then regressed on company’s market capital-
ization two months prior to the award, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity
leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to
13th months before the award month, and controls for CEO age, tenure, and gender.
All accounting variables are measured at the end of the last fiscal year that ended
at least six months prior to the award month. The regression also includes year,
industry and award type fixed effects15.
Table 2.8 presents the results of the logit regression and confirms the patterns ev-
ident from the analysis of descriptive statistics. The coefficient estimates, displayed
as odds ratios, suggest that awards tend to be predominantly received by CEOs of
larger firms with relatively low book-to-market ratios, greater Tobin’s Q and sub-
stantially higher past returns. Particularly high odds ratios for returns within one
year prior to the award-winning month are consistent with expectations as all in-
cluded awards are conferred on an annual basis and several publications consider
prior performance in the selection process. Award-winning companies are also likely
to have higher cash holding and lower leverage, indicating lower financial risk among
this group of firms. Most firm characteristics are significant at the 1% level, with
the exception of returns from the third to the second months prior to the award
month and Tobin’s Q (significant at the 10% level).
CEO personal characteristics are also shown to have a significant impact on the
probability of winning an award, with age and tenure coefficients significant at the
14This approach is similar to Malmendier and Tate (2009), Colak and Whited (2007), and Ammann
et al. (2016), among others.
15The 48 Fama and French industries are used as industry indicators. Industries’ definitions can be
found at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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5% and 1% level, respectively. Winners tend to be younger executives with more
experience. This contradictory pattern is at least partially driven by a handful of
repeat winners who founded their respective companies at an age significantly lower
than the average CEO age and remained in office for a period far beyond the average
CEO tenure. Examples of these persistent superstars include Jeffrey Bezos, Michael
Dell, Steven Jobs and William Gates, who between them can account for nearly 10%
of all awards in my sample. Finally, the results of the logit regression also suggest
that female CEOs are more likely to win an award, although there are low numbers
of female executives in the period covered.
Table 2.8: Determinants of award winning
Market capitalization 2.532***
(14.916)
Book-to-market ratio 0.474***
(2.735)
Cash holdings 7.932***
(3.992)
Equity leverage 0.989***
(2.743)
Tobin’s Q 1.028*
(1.687)
Returns_2_3 2.934*
(1.654)
Returns_4_6 5.443***
(3.452)
Returns_7_12 4.018***
(4.467)
Returns_13_36 1.609***
(3.353)
CEO age 0.979**
(1.996)
CEO tenure 1.045***
(4.613)
CEO gender 2.443**
(2.098)
Year fixed effects Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes
Award fixed effects Yes
Pseudo R2 0.40
Observations 77,740
The table presents results of a logit regression of an indicator of award winning on observable firm and
CEO characteristics used to predict winning an award. The sample includes firm-month observations from
months in which an award is conferred. The binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO
received an award in the respective month, and equals to zero otherwise. Market capitalization (calculated
as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding) is measured two months prior to the award month
and is in log form. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as stockholder’s equity over market capitalization.
Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets. Equity leverage is cal-
culated as total debt divided by shareholder’s equity. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market
value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. All accounting variables are measured
at the end of the last fiscal year that ended at least six months prior to the award month. Returns_x_y
are the total compound returns from the yth to the xth month prior to the award month. CEO age and
tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and
equals to zero otherwise. The 48 Fama and French industries are used as industry indicators. Award fixed
effects consist of dummy variables that are equal to 1 in months in which a particular award is given, and
equal to 0 in all other months. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Absolute value of z statistics in
parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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The predicted values from the logit regression are then used to calculate propen-
sity scores for all sample CEOs and construct a sample of predicted winners. In
each award month, a non-winning CEO with the propensity score closest to the
actual winner is chosen as the predicted winner (with replacement). Following Mal-
mendier and Tate (2009), I use the propensity score as a match variable as opposed
to matching across all characteristics directly as the resulting match sample exhibits
fewer significant differences from the award winners’ sample. Since matches are not
exact, I also use a bias adjustment procedure from Abadie and Imbens (2011). The
procedure estimates the effect of matching covariates on each outcome variable (in
the control sample) and uses the estimates to adjust for remaining variation in the
match variables between award winners and predicted winners.
Summary statistics for predicted winners are presented in Table 2.2, including the
p-values of t-tests that the difference in means between award winners and predicted
winners across each variable is zero. While award-winning CEOs are significantly
different from non-winners across all twelve firm and CEO characteristics, predicted
winners show some degree of variation in only three variables. The returns from the
3rd to the 2nd month before the award and Tobin’s Q show significant differences
between winners and their matches at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. However,
in both cases, the medians are very close between these two groups, suggesting
that the variation in means is driven by a small number of outliers16. Predicted
winners also appear to be significantly smaller than actual winners. This is not
surprising considering that I analyse a sample of the largest US firms and CEOs of
larger companies were shown to be more likely to win awards. As a result, market
capitalization for several winners is too high to match significantly close. However,
the difference between winners and predicted winners is about three times smaller
than the difference between winners and all other firms, confirming the good fit of the
matched sample. In addition, the bias adjustment procedure ensures that winners
too large to match closely do not drive the results, and robustness tests include an
analysis of the subset of award winners for which predicted winners do not differ
significantly among any of the discussed characteristics. Finally, in additional tests,
16The difference in average Tobin’s Q is driven by several high-tech winners with extremely high ratios
of market to book value of assets.
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I confirm that the results are robust to using larger numbers of match samples (up
to four nearest neighbours).
Once predicted winners are identified, the influence of achieved status is assessed
using an event study methodology. The date at which the award was made public is
used as the event date17, and changes in acquisitiveness are measured from one year
prior to award until four years later, where the year prior to award ends exactly six
months before the award month. Only observations for which the award-winning
CEO is still in office at the end of each event window are included. The average
effect of a positive achieved status shift on acquisitiveness of award-winning CEOs is
estimated using a ‘difference-in-difference’ method which accounts for time-invariant
unobservable differences between companies with high and lower status executives:
τ |A=1= E(4Yi(1)−4Yi(0)|A = 1) (2.12)
A is a binary treatment indicator that equals to 1 if a CEO has received an
award, and equals to zero otherwise. 4Yi(A) denotes the change in acquisitiveness
as a function of A for observation i, relative to its value before treatment. Therefore,
(4Yi(1)|A = 1) indicates the expected difference in acquisitiveness of award-winning
CEOs before and after a status shift, which is calculated by averaging the observed
differences among the winners sample (high status CEOs). E(4Yi(0)|A = 1) in-
dicates the unobservable expected difference in CEO acquisitiveness had they not
received an award, which is calculated by averaging the observed differences among
the CEOs in the predicted winners sample (lower status CEOs).
In order to correct for any remaining differences between award winners and pre-
dicted winners, I use a bias adjustment procedure from Abadie and Imbens (2011).
The adjustment is only needed for the unobservable E(4Yi(0)|A = 1) term and it is
calculated in two steps. Initially, 4Yi(0) is regressed on a set of observable determi-
nants of award-winning, Di, identified in Table 2.8. Then, the bias adjusted estimate
of E(4Yi(0)|A = 1) is constructed as the sum of 4Yi(0) and cˆ0(Di)− cˆ0(Dj), where
cˆ0 is a vector of the estimated regression coefficients with the same dimension as
17Either the cover date of the issue in which the award recipients were announced or the first online
appearance, whichever is earliest.
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Di. The term cˆ0(Di) − cˆ0(Dj), therefore, represents the difference in the predicted
values of 4Yi(0) using the vector of determinants of award winning for the ith
award-winning CEO and the vector of determinants of award winning for his or her
corresponding match, indexed by j.
2.5.2 Empirical findings
Attaining higher achieved social status is hypothesized to decrease the marginal
net utility from pursuing acquisitions. As a result, Hypothesis 2 states that CEOs
with high achieved status, indicated by prestigious business awards, are expected
to reduce their acquisitiveness following an award, compared to their lower status
matches. CEO acquisitiveness is measured using the frequency of M&A transactions
as well as total investment in M&A in each sample year18.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot the average M&A frequency and the average M&A
investment, respectively, among winners, predicted winners and all non-winning
firms. Both indicators of acquisitiveness show a similar pattern: in the year prior to
award, winners and their matches start close to the average among all non-winning
firms, reducing their M&A activities slightly in the award year. In subsequent three
years, however, the pattern separates, with award winners decreasing the frequency
and investment in mergers and acquisitions while predicted winners exhibit a steady
rise in their acquisitiveness. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, by the end of the third
year after the award conferral, both indicators of acquisitiveness appear substantially
lower among award winners, compared to their own level of M&A activity prior to
the status increase, as well as relative to the average acquisitiveness among firms with
lower status CEOs. Interestingly, the increase in M&A frequency and investment
among predicted winners goes beyond the average among other non-winning firms in
the years after high status CEOs receive awards. This pattern lends some additional
support to the work by Ammann et al. (2016) who argue that higher CEO achieved
social status resulting from prestigious business awards can incentivise competitors
to increase their risk taking.
The observed declining trend in the frequency and investment in M&As among
18All deals are required to be worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value and involve a purchase of at least
51% of target’s shares. For monetary values of M&A, each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization
two months prior to the transaction.
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award-winning executives, together with the rise in acquisitiveness among predicted
winners result in a considerable gap in the level of M&A activity between these two
groups. By the end of the third year following the status increase, award-winning
CEOs attempt approximately three times less acquisitions compared to their lower
status matches, and reduce the total investment in M&A to almost four times below
the average among predicted winners.
Figure 2.4: Acquisitiveness of award winners vs. predicted winners (frequency of M&A)
The figure displays the differences in the frequencies of M&A transactions worth more than 5% of
acquirer’s value between award winners and predicted winners. Predicted winners sample is constructed
using a nearest-neighbour propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market
ratio, cash holdings, equity leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and
36th to 13th months before the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year,
industry and award fixed effects. Year prior to award ends exactly six months before the award month.
This graphical evidence is formalized using the difference-in-difference approach
described in Section 2.5.1. Table 2.9 presents the differences in acquisitiveness be-
tween award winners and predicted winners from one year prior to the award until
four years later. The results further confirm Hypothesis 2 and show that CEOs re-
duce their acquisitiveness following an increase in achieved social status compared to
their own pre-award average as well as relative to executives with no status change.
A significant drop in the frequency of M&A transactions among winning CEOs be-
comes evident six months after the award is conferred (at the end of award year),
and while award winners continue to decrease the volume of acquisitions in the sub-
sequent three years (with a slight rebound in year three), predicted winners exhibit
a steady rise in the frequency of M&A. In addition, a significantly lower investment
in M&A deals among award winners in the years following the award confirms that
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Figure 2.5: Acquisitiveness of award winners vs. predicted winners (value of M&A)
The figure displays the differences in the value invested in M&A worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value
between award winners and predicted winners. Each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two
months prior to the transaction. Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour
propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity
leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before the
award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects.
Year prior to award ends exactly six months before the award month.
award-winning CEOs do not substitute a larger number of smaller transactions for
less acquisitions of higher value but actually decrease their overall acquisitiveness,
thereby reducing the risks associated with M&A.
The difference-in-difference in M&A activities between award winners and their
matches remains negative for all event windows and becomes significant for both
indicators of acquisitiveness one full year after award conferral. This difference is
also economically meaningful: by the end of the second year after status increase,
the change in acquisitiveness among CEOs with high achieved status is approxi-
mately six times lower in terms of M&A frequency and three times lower in terms
of investment in M&A, compared to the change among lower status executives (p-
value<0.01). Three years after the award, the change in M&A activity among high
achieved status CEOs is about two times lower in both measures of acquisitive-
ness, compared to the change among predicted winners (p-value<0.01). Since the
matching procedure used to obtain the sample of predicted winners ensures their
pre-award similarity with award winners in terms of both firm and CEO charac-
teristics, the observed results should represent the effect of award winning rather
than mean reversion or any potential differences between winning and non-winning
companies.
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Table 2.9: CEO achieved status and acquisitiveness
Panel A: M&A frequency
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.066** -0.044* -0.022 -0.008
[-1, 0] (2.11) (1.78) (0.58) (0.20)
Event window 218 -0.069** 0.005 -0.073* -0.062
[-1, 1] (2.16) (0.16) (1.75) (1.50)
Event window 175 -0.109*** 0.023 -0.131*** -0.121**
[-1, 2] (2.89) (0.78) (2.74) (2.53)
Event window 129 -0.109** 0.109** -0.217*** -0.213***
[-1, 3] (2.37) (2.19) (3.29) (3.28)
Panel B: M&A investment
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.019** -0.014 -0.005 -0.001
[-1, 0] (2.30) (1.57) (0.47) (0.10)
Event window 218 -0.018** 0.003 -0.021** -0.017
[-1, 1] (2.16) (0.29) (1.99) (1.65)
Event window 175 -0.030*** 0.017 -0.046*** -0.042***
[-1, 2] (2.93) (1.42) (2.98) (2.73)
Event window 129 -0.031** 0.033** -0.065*** -0.065***
[-1, 3] (2.31) (2.40) (3.22) (3.25)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and pre-
dicted winners (lower achieved status). Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour
propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity
leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before
the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects.
Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before the award month. Panel A shows the dif-
ferences between award winners and predicted winners in the frequency of M&A transactions worth more
than 5% of acquirer’s value completed during the event window. Panel B displays the differences between
award winners and predicted winners in the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5%
of acquirer’s value during the event window, where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capi-
talization two months prior to the transaction. Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Consistent with the graphical evidence, the results of the difference-in-difference
estimation confirm that, by year three, the increase in acquisitiveness among pre-
dicted winners becomes significant relative to their own ’pre-award’ level. These
findings suggest that, similar to the influence of tournament incentives on corporate
policies within a company (Kini and Williams, 2012), awards can motivate compet-
ing CEOs to increase firm risk. This conclusion is in line with recent evidence of the
motivational effects of CEO achieved status shifts on their competitors (Ammann
et al., 2016), and is consistent with the argument that marginal status executives
are likely to be attracted by high profile M&A activities due to the publicity and
status they can generate (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Palmer and Barber, 2001).
Malmendier and Tate (2009) show that award-winning CEOs tend to engage
in earnings management following an award in order to prolong their ‘superstar
performance’. However, the frequency of negative earnings announcements becomes
significantly higher among award winners compared to their non-winning matches
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five years after the last award, suggesting that executives cannot follow the strategy
indefinitely. Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2009), additional tests show that the
impact of the status shift on CEO behaviour is not permanent, and both award
winners and their matches revert back to the average level of acquisitiveness among
all firms by year five19.
2.5.3 First time winners vs. repeat winners
Next, I investigate whether the effect of award winning on CEO status and their
subsequent acquisitiveness differs depending on whether a CEO is a first time winner
or has already won at least one award in the past. One (unlikely) possibility is that
every award provides a similar increase in CEO achieved social status. If that is the
case, the marginal status benefit of pursuing acquisitions should decrease with the
number of awards, leading to a greater reduction in acquisitiveness following every
subsequent award. Alternatively, the first award might provide the greatest shock
to CEO social status and elevate the market’s expectations regarding executive’s
future performance. As a result, subsequent awards would merely help to maintain
CEO’s current status position and the reduction in acquisitiveness should be the
most pronounced following the first award.
Table 2.10 shows the change in acquisitiveness of first time winners and repeat
winners. While both groups show evidence of lower frequency and investment in
M&A after an award, the magnitude of the reduction is greater following the first
award. By year three, the reduction in frequency and level of investment in M&A
is approximately one and a half time greater among first time winners compared to
repeat winners. These results suggest that the first award provides the highest shift
in CEO achieved social status and increases expectations of future performance.
2.5.4 Personal vs. company awards
Prestigious CEO awards increase firm status and the relationship is likely to work
both ways. Apart from awards conferred personally to companies’ executives, U.S.
firms have an opportunity to increase their status by appearing in prestigious an-
nual surveys and rankings, such as Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Companies’ or Busi-
19These results are reported in the Appendix, Table A.5
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Table 2.10: CEO achieved status and acquisitiveness: First time winners vs. repeat winners
Panel A: M&A frequency
First time winners Repeat winners
Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 163 -0.061 -0.048 111 0.036 0.052
[-1, 0] (1.18) (0.94) (0.68) (0.98)
Event window 133 -0.090 -0.079 85 -0.047 -0.037
[-1, 1] (1.56) (1.37) (0.81) (0.63)
Event window 111 -0.162*** -0.150** 64 -0.078 -0.069
[-1, 2] (2.67) (2.50) (1.00) (0.88)
Event window 83 -0.253*** -0.247*** 46 -0.152* -0.152*
[-1, 3] (2.80) (2.78) (1.73) (1.74)
Panel B: M&A investment
First time winners Repeat winners
Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 163 -0.009 -0.005 111 0.000 0.004
[-1, 0] (0.50) (0.27) (0.03) (0.36)
Event window 133 -0.023 -0.019 85 -0.018 -0.015
[-1, 1] (1.48) (1.24) (1.47) (1.18)
Event window 111 -0.039** -0.034* 64 -0.060** -0.056**
[-1, 2] (2.04) (1.82) (2.20) (2.08)
Event window 83 -0.075*** -0.074*** 46 -0.047* -0.049*
[-1, 3] (2.71) (2.70) (1.74) (1.83)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and pre-
dicted winners (lower achieved status). Columns on the left include first time winners only, and columns
on the right include winners who have already won at least one award in the past. Predicted winners sam-
ple is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propensity score match controlling for market capitalization,
book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th
to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well
as year, industry and award fixed effects. Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before
the award month. Panel A shows the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the fre-
quency of M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value completed during the event window.
Panel B displays the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the total investment in
M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value during the event window, where each deal value
is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Absolute value of t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
ness Week’s ‘Top 50 Performers’. Since CEOs are often viewed as an embodiment
of a company, organizational achievements are likely to be attributed to individ-
ual leaders (Hayward et al., 2004), especially considering that media coverage of
prestigious surveys often includes CEO profiles for highly-ranked firms. As a re-
sult, appearing in influential company rankings is likely to increase firm as well as
CEO achieved social status20. Since such companies were present in the control
sample, my results might have been diminished through comparing CEOs with high
achieved status due to personal awards to executives with elevated status following
company achievements. Therefore, I further collect Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Com-
20Such surveys have been used to proxy firm and CEO prestige in recent research. See, for example,
Pfarrer et al. (2010).
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panies’ and Business Week’s ‘Top 50 Performers’ company rankings and perform
additional analysis21.
In order to ensure that predicted winners sample does not contain CEOs with
status elevated due to company achievements, I exclude such firms from the control
group, re-match award winners and repeat the tests22. Table 2.11 presents the re-
sults of the difference-in-difference estimation and shows that the more restrictive
sample of predicted winners exhibits a more significant increase in their acquisi-
tiveness compared to matches used in the main model, resulting in a larger gap in
acquisitiveness among high achieved status CEOs and their lower status counter-
parts. The difference in the acquisitiveness change between high and lower status
executives is almost 25% larger in terms of M&A frequencies (about 10% increase
for M&A investment) when prestigious companies are excluded from the control
group. Thus my results suggest that CEO social status might be enhanced through
company achievements, potentially contributing to the reduction in marginal utility
from pursuing acquisitions.
21Further details on these company rankings are presented in the Appendix.
22Due to a large proportion (approximately 40% of the sample) of companies appearing in Fortune’s
‘Most Admired Companies’ and Business Week’s ‘Top 50 Performers’ surveys, a well-matched sample of
predicted winners cannot be achieved if I also include CEOs of prestigious companies in the treatment
group.
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Table 2.11: CEO achieved status and acquisitiveness: Excluding prestigious companies
from control group
Panel A: M&A frequency
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.066** 0.004 -0.069* -0.051
[-1, 0] (2.11) (0.15) (1.84) (1.39)
Event window 219 -0.064* 0.014 -0.078* -0.063
[-1, 1] (1.99) (1.39) (1.88) (1.54)
Event window 170 -0.100** 0.041 -0.141*** -0.123**
[-1, 2] (2.58) (1.35) (2.81) (2.45)
Event window 115 -0.104** 0.165*** -0.270*** -0.252***
[-1, 3] (2.23) (3.35) (3.90) (3.66)
Panel B: M&A investment
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.019** 0.005 -0.024* -0.015
[-1, 0] (2.30) (0.48) (1.90) (1.23)
Event window 219 -0.018** 0.010 -0.028** -0.021*
[-1, 1] (2.12) (1.11) (2.21) (1.67)
Event window 170 -0.025** 0.017 -0.041** -0.037**
[-1, 2] (2.45) (1.40) (2.59) (2.31)
Event window 115 -0.032** 0.040** -0.072*** -0.073***
[-1, 3] (2.43) (2.25) (3.02) (3.04)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and pre-
dicted winners (lower achieved status). Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour
propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity
leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before
the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects.
The control group excludes companies that appear in Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Companies’ and Business
Week’s ‘Top 50 Performers’ rankings during the sample period. Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly
six months before the award month. Panel A shows the differences between award winners and predicted
winners in the frequency of M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value completed during
the event window. Panel B displays the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the
total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value during the event window,
where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction.
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
2.5.5 Robustness
I perform several robustness checks to ensure that my results are not distorted by
any remaining differences between award winners and their matches, and are not
driven by a particular choice of predicted winners. Table 2.12 presents the results
excluding award winners too large to match closely and confirms that the results are
not driven by any size mismatches. Furthermore, the differences in acquisitiveness
between high and lower achieved status CEOs still hold (and are in fact stronger)
excluding observations where propensity scores between award winners and their
matches differ by over 0.1, as well as by a more restrictive limit of 0.05. Finally,
in additional tests I confirm that my results are robust to using larger numbers of
neighbours, and differences in M&A activities between award winners and predicted
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winners remain significant when using two, three or four different matches23.
Table 2.12: Achieved status robustness tests: Size and propensity score limits
Panel A: M&A frequency
Size limit PS limit (<0.1) PS limit (<0.05)
Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Diff. Bias-adj.
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 219 -0.041 -0.032 210 -0.029 -0.020 192 -0.021 -0.009
[-1, 0] (0.94) (0.74) (0.64) (0.45) (0.43) (0.20)
Event window 180 -0.067 -0.060 170 -0.088* -0.081 154 -0.078 -0.068
[-1, 1] (1.44) (1.30) (1.74) (1.59) (1.48) (1.29)
Event window 149 -0.134** -0.126** 138 -0.167*** -0.158*** 124 -0.161** -0.149**
[-1, 2] (2.51) (2.36) (2.88) (2.73) (2.60) (2.41)
Event window 109 -0.257*** -0.255*** 105 -0.257*** -0.254*** 94 -0.266*** -0.258***
[-1, 3] (3.41) (3.44) (3.59) (3.58) (3.44) (3.37)
Panel B: M&A investment
Size limit PS limit (<0.1) PS limit (<0.05)
Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj.
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 219 -0.007 -0.005 210 -0.005 -0.002 192 -0.007 -0.003
[-1, 0] (0.51) (0.39) (0.38) (0.16) (0.46) (0.22)
Event window 180 -0.023* -0.022* 170 -0.027** -0.024* 154 -0.027* -0.024
[-1, 1] (1.81) (1.77) (2.04) (1.84) (1.86) (1.63)
Event window 149 -0.045*** -0.042** 138 -0.060*** -0.056** 124 -0.062*** -0.058***
[-1, 2] (2.70) (2.57) (3.08) (2.93) (2.91) (2.72)
Event window 109 -0.077*** -0.078*** 105 -0.080*** -0.079*** 94 -0.087*** -0.085***
[-1, 3] (3.28) (3.35) (3.33) (3.31) (3.26) (3.20)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and pre-
dicted winners (lower achieved status). Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour
propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity
leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before
the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects.
Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before the award month. Panel A shows the dif-
ferences between award winners and predicted winners in the frequency of M&A transactions worth more
than 5% of acquirer’s value completed during the event window. Panel B displays the differences between
award winners and predicted winners in the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5%
of acquirer’s value during the event window, where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capi-
talization two months prior to the transaction. Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Further robustness checks verify that my results hold for different subsets of
awards. The data is re-tested including only the most influential awards (indicated
by the highest circulation), such as Financial World, Business Week and Forbes,
(I check pairwise combinations of these as well) and alternatively excluding less
prominent awards (indicated by the lowest circulation), such as Electronic Business
Magazine. The results are reported in Table 2.13 and show that the differences are
even stronger when only the most prominent awards are included as well as when
Electronic Business Magazine is excluded, confirming the intuitive expectation of
Financial World’s, Business Week’s and Forbes’ awards being the most influential
in terms of status attainment. The findings are also robust to excluding the ex-
23These results are reported in the Appendix, Table A.6
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treme years of 1995 and 1996, when the number of Financial World’s Silver awards
increased from around 10 to 70 per year.
Table 2.13: Achieved status robustness tests: Subsets of awards
Panel A: M&A frequency
Excluding 1995-1996 Including only Financial World, Excluding Electronic
Business Week and Forbes Business Magazine
Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj.
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 215 -0.037 -0.021 226 -0.027 -0.013 268 -0.030 -0.015
[-1, 0] (0.87) (0.50) (0.62) (0.29) (0.79) (0.40)
Event window 166 -0.072 -0.060 176 -0.063 -0.052 212 -0.085** -0.074*
[-1, 1] (1.48) (1.24) (1.35) (1.14) (2.03) (1.77)
Event window 134 -0.112** -0.101* 143 -0.119** -0.108** 169 -0.130*** -0.119**
[-1, 2] (2.05) (1.85) (2.24) (2.06) (2.68) (2.46)
Event window 97 -0.165** -0.160** 110 -0.227*** -0.222*** 125 -0.224*** -0.220***
[-1, 3] (2.31) (2.27) (3.13) (3.10) (3.34) (3.32)
Panel B: M&A investment
Excluding 1995-1996 Including only Financial World, Excluding Electronic
Business Week and Forbes Business Magazine
Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj.
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 215 -0.002 0.003 226 -0.006 -0.002 268 -0.006 -0.002
[-1, 0] (0.12) (0.21) (0.42) (0.13) (0.54) (0.17)
Event window 166 -0.018 -0.014 176 -0.021* -0.017 212 -0.024** -0.020*
[-1, 1] (1.54) (1.20) (1.69) (1.43) (2.18) (1.82)
Event window 134 -0.031* -0.027 143 -0.045** -0.041** 169 -0.043*** -0.039**
[-1, 2] (1.87) (1.65) (2.57) (2.38) (2.85) (2.59)
Event window 97 -0.042** -0.043** 110 -0.070*** -0.069*** 125 -0.066*** -0.067***
[-1, 3] (2.55) (2.55) (3.02) (3.03) (3.21) (3.24)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and
predicted winners (lower achieved status) using subsets of the awards data. Predicted winners sample is
constructed using a nearest-neighbor propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-
to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th,
and 36th to 13th months before the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year,
industry and award fixed effects. Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before the award
month. Panel A shows the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the frequency of
M&A transactions worth more than five percent of acquirer’s value completed during the event window.
Panel B displays the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the total investment in
M&A transactions worth more than five percent of acquirer’s value during the event window, where each
deal value is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Absolute
value of t- statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Similar to the robustness checks within the ascribed status dimension, additional
tests verify that the findings for achieved social status are robust to using alternative
specifications for M&A data. Table 2.14 shows differences in M&A changes between
high and lower status CEOs using M&A deals worth more than 1% of acquirer’s
value (1% M&A). The differences in M&A investment (Panel B) are extremely sim-
ilar regardless of which cut-off point is used. The differences in 1% M&A frequency
(Panel A) between winners and predicted winners, however, display a slightly differ-
ent pattern. Including smaller deals shows evidence of a significant status influence
on M&A frequency as early as six months after status is elevated (at the end of
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award year), but the difference between high and lower status CEOs is weaker at
the end of the third year compared to the results obtained with 5% M&A deals.
The earlier evidence of a significant difference in M&A activities among high and
lower status CEOs could be due to the fact that following the status increase, it is
easier for award-winning CEOs to initially influence their M&A-related risks using
smaller transactions that receive less board oversight. Panel C also confirms that
the findings hold when deal values are scaled by book assets, showing an even higher
magnitude of the difference between award winners and their matches compared to
the main results.
Finally, I verify that the influence of achieved social status on acquisitiveness is
not distorted by the financial crisis. Table 2.15 shows differences in M&A changes
between high and lower status CEOs before and after the start of the crisis. While
the pattern holds for both sub-periods, the difference in acquisitiveness (particularly
in terms of M&A investment) is more significant before the recent financial crisis.
The lower reduction (among high status CEOs) in risks associated with M&A activ-
ities after the start of the crisis is likely to be caused by stronger external pressures
on CEO behavior during this period.
2.5.6 Alternative channels
The achieved status indicator considers CEO awards to be indicative of their at-
tained social status. Such awards may also be a reflection of skills and the reduction
(on average) in value-destroying M&A activities among award-winning CEOs might
represent the influence of having a better skilled rather than a higher status execu-
tive. However, descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.2 show that award winners
do not significantly differ from other firms in terms of their average acquisitiveness.
Rather, the difference occurs specifically following an elevation in social status, sug-
gesting that the reduction in M&A activities is motivated by the desire to preserve
status through lower risk-taking. In addition, companies with award-winning CEOs
have been documented to underperform following the award, both relative to their
own prior performance, as well as compared to the performance of similar companies
with non-winning executives (Ammann et al., 2016; Malmendier and Tate, 2009).
Therefore, the observed influence of receiving prestigious business awards is more
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Table 2.14: Achieved status robustness tests: Alternative M&A data specifications
Panel A: 1% M&A frequency
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.124** -0.022 -0.102* -0.084
[-1, 0] (2.55) (0.59) (1.72) (1.42)
Event window 218 -0.110** 0.014 -0.124* -0.099
[-1, 1] (2.19) (0.28) (1.79) (1.44)
Event window 175 -0.131** 0.023 -0.154* -0.129
[-1, 2] (2.09) (0.43) (1.85) (1.54)
Event window 129 -0.140* 0.016 -0.155 -0.141
[-1, 3] (1.87) (0.23) (1.55) (1.43)
Panel B: 1% M&A investment
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.022** -0.014 -0.008 -0.004
[-1, 0] (2.58) (1.57) (0.70) (0.33)
Event window 218 -0.020** 0.004 -0.024** -0.020*
[-1, 1] (2.39) (0.49) (2.23) (1.86)
Event window 175 -0.031*** 0.017 -0.048*** -0.043***
[-1, 2] (3.03) (1.44) (3.04) (2.78)
Event window 129 -0.033** 0.031** -0.064*** -0.064***
[-1, 3] (2.44) (2.24) (3.21) (3.24)
Panel C: 5% M&A investment scaled by assets
Obs. Award Predicted Difference Bias-adjusted
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P) difference
Event window 274 -0.106* 0.264 -0.369* -0.354*
[-1, 0] (1.77) (1.40) (1.88) (1.81)
Event window 218 -0.039 -0.024 -0.015 0.005
[-1, 1] (1.23) (1.22) (0.45) (0.15)
Event window 175 -0.108*** 0.000 -0.108** -0.086**
[-1, 2] (3.17) (0.01) (2.57) (2.06)
Event window 129 -0.128*** 0.014 -0.141*** -0.122**
[-1, 3] (2.82) (0.52) (2.64) (2.32)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness award winners (high achieved status) and predicted
winners (lower achieved status). Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propen-
sity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity leverage,
Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before the award
month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects. Year prior
to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before the award month. Panel A shows the differences between
award winners and predicted winners in the frequency of M&A transactions worth more than 1% of ac-
quirer’s value completed during the event window. Panel B displays the differences between award winners
and predicted winners in the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 1% of acquirer’s value
during the event window, where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months
prior to the transaction. Panel C presents the differences between award winners and predicted winners in
the investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value, where each deal value is scaled
by company’s book assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. Absolute value of t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
likely to come primarily from social status concerns rather than an increased skill
level.
Another potential channel through which award winning can reduce acquisi-
tiveness is an increased participation in activities outside the firm. A study by
Malmendier and Tate (2009) finds that award-winning CEOs increasingly engage in
private activities, such as media interviews, writing books, sitting on outside corpo-
rate boards and playing golf. Such activities provide little firm value and distract
executives from their core corporate responsibilities. It is, therefore, possible that
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Table 2.15: CEO achieved status and acquisitiveness: Sub-period analysis
Panel A: M&A frequency
Before crisis start After crisis start
Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 176 -0.017 -0.010 106 -0.047 -0.023
[-1, 0] (0.36) (0.21) (0.80) (0.38)
Event window 146 -0.068 -0.062 79 -0.076 -0.057
[-1, 1] (1.45) (1.32) (0.95) (0.72)
Event window 121 -0.066 -0.061 58 -0.224** -0.202**
[-1, 2] (1.27) (1.19) (2.28) (2.07)
Event window 101 -0.198*** -0.195*** 33 -0.242* -0.237*
[-1, 3] (2.71) (2.71) (1.85) (1.84)
Panel B: M&A investment
Before crisis start After crisis start
Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted Obs. Difference Bias-adjusted
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 176 -0.011 -0.008 106 0.001 0.008
[-1, 0] (0.65) (0.51) (0.08) (0.64)
Event window 146 -0.030** -0.030** 79 -0.003 0.006
[-1, 1] (2.31) (2.25) (0.17) (0.37)
Event window 121 -0.049*** -0.048*** 58 -0.035 -0.027
[-1, 2] (2.75) (2.68) (1.23) (0.95)
Event window 101 -0.071*** -0.073*** 33 -0.038* -0.036*
[-1, 3] (2.87) (2.97) (1.84) (1.69)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and
predicted winners (lower achieved status). Columns on the left exclude awards conferred after 2003 (last
event window ends before 2007), and columns on the right exclude awards conferred before 2003 (last event
window starts after 2006). Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propensity
score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity leverage, To-
bin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before the award month,
CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects. Year prior to award
(year -1) ends exactly six months before the award month. Panel A shows the differences between award
winners and predicted winners in the frequency of M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s
value completed during the event window. Panel B displays the differences between award winners and
predicted winners in the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value
during the event window, where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months
prior to the transaction. Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
some of the decrease in M&A activities following a positive status shift is caused by
an increased amount of time that award-winning CEOs spend on outside activities
instead of assessing potential M&A targets. However, Malmendier and Tate (2009)
find that participation in private activities increases with the number of awards
while my results show that the impact of award winning on CEO status and ac-
quisitiveness is most pronounced following the first award. Therefore, the increased
level of distractions is unlikely to explain the significant reduction in acquisitiveness
following an award-based status shift.
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2.6 Dual status and CEO acquisitiveness
Since the model in Section 2.2 suggests that the marginal net utility from pursuing
an acquisition is lowest for CEOs with dual high status characteristics, Hypothesis
3 states that CEOs who possess high ascribed and high achieved social status si-
multaneously are less acquisitive compared to all other executives. Possessing both
status types is indicated by a dummy variable that equals to one if a CEO has high
ascribed and high achieved social status during the observation year24. Ascribed
status is indicated by CEO receiving a bachelor degree from one of Ivy League or
Russell Group universities. Based on the evidence from the event study (see Section
2.5), a CEO is considered to possess high achieved social status if he or she received
a prestigious business award during two years prior to observation year25.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 plot the average frequency and investment in M&A, respec-
tively, among CEOs with dual elevated social status, CEOs with only one high
status characteristic (either ascribed or achieved) and executives with lower status
in both dimensions in each sample year. Both acquisitiveness indicators show a
higher average among CEOs with lower ascribed and lower achieved social status in
most years. The only exceptions occur around the major merger waves before the
crash of 2000 and before the recent financial crisis. During these periods, high sta-
tus CEOs exhibit reverse M&A behavior and often exceed the average among lower
status executives. In fact, CEOs who possess both types of status only engaged
in acquisitions during 1998 - 1999 and 2003 - 2005, and completed no deals during
other years of the sample period.
I further investigate the link between possessing dual high status characteristics
and acquisitiveness using a multivariate regression analysis, in which the frequency
and investment in M&A is regressed on indicators of CEO ascribed and achieved so-
cial status as well as the interaction term. Table 2.16 presents the results, confirming
the presence of a negative relationship between high CEO social status characteris-
tics and acquisitiveness. While the negative coefficients on status indicators remain
24In the regression analysis, I examine the effect of holding both statuses simultaneously by including
the main effects and the interaction term between ascribed and achieved social status.
25While the main tests assume a two-year award impact on achieved status, the results remain quali-
tatively similar if a one, three, or a five year-impact is used instead. The two-year impact is chosen in
consistency with the event study findings.
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Figure 2.6: Average frequency of M&A (dual status)
The figure displays year-by-year average frequency of acquisitions for CEOs with high ascribed and high
achieved social status, CEOs with high ascribed or high achieved social status and CEOs with lower
ascribed and lower achieved social status. For each subgroup, the average number of acquisitions is
calculated as the number of acquisitions divided by the number of CEOs in that subgroup in a given
year. All M&A deals are required to be worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value and involve a purchase of
at least 51% of target’s shares.
Figure 2.7: Average value invested in M&A (dual status)
The figure displays year-by-year average investment in M&A for CEOs with high ascribed and high
achieved social status, CEOs with high ascribed or high achieved social status and CEOs with lower
ascribed and lower achieved social status. For each subgroup, the average investment in M&A is
calculated as the total value divided by the number of CEOs in that subgroup in a given year. All M&A
deal value is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. All M&A
deals are required to be worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value and involve a purchase of at least 51% of
target’s shares.
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insignificant at the 10% level in modelling M&A frequency (model 1), both ascribed
and achieved social status appear to have a significant independent impact on the
level of investment in acquisitions. This finding remains robust independently of the
scaling method used to assess acquisition value, suggesting that, consistent with Hy-
pothesis 3, CEOs who possess high status level within both social status dimensions
have the lowest level of acquisitiveness.
The coefficients on the interaction term between ascribed and achieved social
status remain insignificant at the 10% level in all models. This indicates that the
effect of possessing both higher ascribed as well as elevated achieved social status
simultaneously does not extend beyond the additive impact of the two individual
status types.
Models 4 - 6 in Table 2.16 replicate the main tests with firm rather than industry
fixed effects. Similar to the results related to testing the effect of ascribed social
status in isolation (presented in Section 2.4.2), these specifications show a lack of
significance of CEO social status characteristics in explaining within-firm differences
in M&A practices. As previously discussed in Section 2.4.1, while it is important
to account for potential endogeneity due to omitted variables, fixed effects models
might miss significant social status effects due to the slow-moving nature of status.
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Table 2.16: CEO dual status and acquisitiveness
Industry fixed effects Firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Achieved status -0.025 -0.011** -0.065* -0.016 -0.007 -0.088
(0.026) (0.006) (0.039) (0.028) (0.006) (0.055)
Ascribed status -0.016 -0.010** -0.026*** -0.015 0.001 -0.024
(0.017) (0.005) (0.009) (0.027) (0.006) (0.015)
Achieved x Ascribed -0.039 0.001 0.019 -0.063 -0.014 0.048
(0.036) (0.008) (0.038) (0.044) (0.010) (0.050)
Firm size -0.017*** -0.008*** -0.014** -0.010 -0.014** -0.016
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.024) (0.006) (0.030)
Past returns 0.024* 0.010** 0.055* -0.012 0.003 0.048
(0.012) (0.005) (0.029) (0.015) (0.005) (0.039)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 -0.001 0.056*** 0.001 0.000 0.055**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.018) (0.004) (0.001) (0.024)
ROA -0.005 0.024 -0.374** 0.352*** 0.146*** -0.065
(0.076) (0.034) (0.180) (0.121) (0.057) (0.213)
Cash holdings -0.026 -0.000 -0.085 0.466*** 0.101*** 0.126
(0.060) (0.020) (0.095) (0.111) (0.033) (0.276)
Book leverage -0.074 0.024 0.029 -0.201** -0.050* -0.009
(0.049) (0.018) (0.038) (0.081) (0.028) (0.061)
CEO age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO tenure 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.058** 0.035 0.032** 0.103** 0.031 0.031
(0.027) (0.026) (0.015) (0.041) (0.021) (0.031)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987
No. of firms 616 616 616 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.130 0.061 0.112 0.199 0.115 0.116
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of possessing dual (ascribed and achieved)
social status on CEO acquisitiveness. The dependent variable in model 1 is the number of deals worth
more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the total in-
vestment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each
deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. The dependent variable
in model 3 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a
given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are
required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a
CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals
to 0 otherwise. Achieved status indicator is equal to 1 if a CEO received a prestigious CEO award within
two years prior to observation year. Achieved x Ascribed is the interaction term. Firm size is the log form
of market capitalization, calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns
are the total compound returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets
(ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings rep-
resent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt
divided by book assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in
years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero other-
wise. All regressions include year fixed effect. Models 1 - 3 include industry fixed effect, defined based on
Fama-French 48 industries. Models 4 - 6 include firm fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The main results regarding the link between possessing dual high status charac-
teristics and acquisitiveness are robust to using alternative specifications for CEO
achieved social status and M&A data. In particular, the findings remain qualita-
85
tively similar if company awards are assumed to also influence CEO achieved social
status26. In addition, the relationship between high CEO status and acquisitiveness
is robust (p-value<0.01) to using M&A transactions worth over 1% of acquirer’s
value as well as scaling deal sizes using book value of assets rather than market
capitalization27. Including smaller acquisitions results in a stronger relationship be-
tween CEO social status and acquisitiveness, particularly within the achieved status
dimension, where higher status becomes significantly negatively related not only to
the level of investment in M&A but also to the frequency of acquisitions.
2.7 Discussion and conclusions
In this study, I develop a novel utility model to generate a number of testable
hypotheses on the relationship between CEO ascribed and achieved social status and
acquisitiveness. Ascribed social status is proxied through educational prestige and
achieved social status is measured using influential business awards. The empirical
evidence supports lower acquisitiveness among high status CEOs, irrespective of the
nature of status. However, the two types of social status influence CEO decision
making through different underlying processes and while the impact of ascribed
status is permanent, higher achieved status reduces CEO acquisitiveness following
status shifts and the effect is most pronounced after the first award. This exploration
of the dual paths of social status influence, and their differing influences, is the main
contribution of this study.
Ascribed social position remains constant throughout the life of an individual
and influences CEOs’ level of acquisitiveness through the difference in social costs
and benefits faced by high and lower status executives. CEOs with high inherited
status face greater marginal social cost of pursuing acquisitions due to their strong
identification with the corporate elite circle and reluctance to deviate from legiti-
mated behavior. In addition, executives with high ascribed social status are likely
to place less value on a potential achieved status increase since they already occupy
a high status position within the ascribed dimension. As a result, the marginal util-
26These results are reported in Table A.7 in the Appendix.
27Results using 1% M&A deals are reported in Table A.8 in the Appendix; results with scaling deals
using book assets are reported in Model 3 in Table 2.16.
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ity from pursuing acquisitions is higher for CEOs with lower ascribed social status.
Consistent with these predictions, I find that high ascribed status CEOs invest ap-
proximately 32% less in mergers and acquisitions, compared to executives without
prestigious backgrounds.
Within the achieved status dimension, I find a significantly lower frequency and
investment in M&A following a positive status shift. The reduction in acquisitiveness
becomes evident a year following the status increase and continues to drop for several
years that follow. Further tests show that the reduction in M&A activities is most
pronounced among first time winners, suggesting that the first award provides the
greatest shock to CEOs’ achieved social status. Since M&A is considered a risky
activity, the findings are consistent with recent evidence of a reduced CEO risk
taking following a positive status shift in areas such accounting practices and R&R
investments (see, for example, Koh, 2011; Shemesh, 2017).
Furthermore, dual status models show that both ascribed and achieved CEO
social status have a significant independent impact on firm’s M&A activities, result-
ing in the lowest level of acquisitiveness among executives who possess both higher
ascribed as well as elevated achieved social status simultaneously. This finding is
consistent with my utility model considering that the two types of status have dif-
ferent origins and influence CEO social utility from acquisitions through different
mechanisms.
The relationship between CEO social status and acquisitiveness does not appear
to be strongly distorted by the financial crisis and my achieved and ascribed status
results hold for two sub-periods that divide the overall sample based on the begin-
ning of the crisis. The findings within the achieved status dimension are slightly
stronger in the period before the crisis but the difference is mostly caused by re-
duced acquisitiveness among matched lower achieved status CEOs who probably
experienced stronger external pressures during this period. The findings within the
ascribed status dimension, on the other hand, appear slightly stronger in the second
sub-period. However, additional tests showed that the difference is likely to be un-
related to the occurrence of financial crisis and stronger results in recent years are
likely to be associated with the end of 2003 - 2007 merger wave during which elite
CEOs exhibited reverse M&A behaviour.
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The findings in this study contribute to our understanding of the influence of
CEO personal attributes on their risk preferences and corporate decision making.
Social status is a complex construct that can affect individuals’ behaviour through a
variety of channels, and this study shows the benefit of building detailed behavioural
hypotheses from the source literature in order to better understand the psychological
and sociological influences of personal CEO traits.
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CHAPTER 3
CEO social status and market response to
acquisitions
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3.1 Introduction
Existing research suggests that acquisitions usually do not provide significant firm
value, and can often reduce shareholder wealth over the short-term or long-term
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Consequently, researchers and corporate leaders
are interested in understanding the determinants of acquisition performance, mo-
tivating a continued investigation of the factors that can explain the variation in
announcement returns and the long term performance of mergers and acquisitions
(Harford, 1999; Harford et al., 2012; Lamont and Polk, 2002; Moeller et al., 2004,
2005; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).
A particular stream of this research examines the role of CEO personal charac-
teristics in explaining the differences in firm value generated through acquisitions.
Factors such as overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), power (Fracassi and
Tate, 2012), narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), age (Yim, 2013) and gen-
der (Levi et al., 2014) have been shown to be significantly related to the returns
from mergers and acquisitions. This study adds to this literature by examining
the implications of CEO social status characteristics for the value created through
acquisition announcements.
My findings reveal that, despite the existence of some positive influences of CEO
status and celebrity on firm value (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Pollock et al., 2009; Rindova
et al., 2006), deals announced by executives with recently elevated social status tend
to trigger a more negative market response, compared to acquisitions made by CEOs
with lower achieved status. The negative reaction is particularly severe for stock-
financed acquisitions which result in an average value destruction of approximately
4% within three days around the announcement. Considering prior evidence of
higher premiums paid by celebrity CEOs following award conferral (Cho et al., 2016)
and having examined the differences in acquisition attributes across CEOs with
varying levels of achieved social status, I find that my results are most consistent with
the idea that award-winning executives are incentivised to minimise the likelihood
of a failed deal in order to avoid media scrutiny and preserve their status position.
This is likely to result in recurrent overpayment for target firms (as documented
by Cho et al., 2016), triggering a more negative market response to acquisition
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announcements.
I find no evidence of a significant influence of ascribed status on announcement
returns, suggesting that status concerns are only a factor in the market reaction
to acquisition announcements within the achieved status dimension. These results
indicate that CEO ascribed status is unlikely to be associated with a reduced qual-
ity of acquisitions, and potential agency concerns present in firms with powerful
elite executives do not have a notable adverse effect on investor perception and
expectations from deals announced by such CEOs.
The findings in this study provide important contributions to the literature ex-
amining the determinants of acquisition performance (Chatterjee and Hambrick,
2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and research on firm value consequences of CEO
celebrity (Cho et al., 2016; Koh, 2011) by showing that high achieved CEO social
status has adverse implications for the M&A announcement returns. These results
pose important governance implications, indicating the need for more effective mon-
itoring mechanisms of CEO decisions in order to prevent investment distortions and
reduce the level of value-destroying acquisitions.
3.2 Theory and hypotheses
Existing research on award-winning and celebrity executives suggests that CEO
achieved social status can have implications for the value created through M&A
deal announcements. However, given the complexity of determinants of stock mar-
ket perception and reaction to corporate events, with the added conflicting theory
and evidence regarding the influence of CEO status on organisational strategy and
outcomes, the exact role of CEO achieved social status is not clear.
It is possible that, on average, executives experience a positive market response
to acquisition announcements following a status increase associated with presti-
gious award conferral. First, the evidence in Chapter 2 and several related studies
(Koh, 2011; Shemesh, 2017) suggests that CEOs with high achieved social status
value their elevated reputation and reduce risky activities to preserve their sta-
tus position. Building on this logic, it is likely that high status CEOs would be
more conservative in acquisition decisions, potentially paying lower premiums and
refraining from riskier projects, such as acquiring firms in unrelated industries or
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engaging in cross-border deals. The existing literature examining the determinants
of M&A announcement returns suggests that such strategies are less likely to result
in a negative market response (Lamont and Polk, 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann,
2005).
In addition, higher CEO reputational status is often perceived as a signal of
managerial quality, and award-winning executives are thought of as more capa-
ble strategic actors, generally providing positive capital markets outcomes (Pfarrer
et al., 2010; Pollock et al., 2009; Rindova et al., 2006). If investors recognise CEO
status as a signal of superior ability, they are more likely to react positively to
acquisition announcements by executives with high achieved social status.
Finally, the analysis of the data in my sample (as well as in related studies,
such as Koh, 2011; Malmendier and Tate, 2009) shows that companies with award-
winning CEOs are likely to have a strong recent stock performance. Psychological
research suggests that individuals’ expectations regarding the likelihood of future
success is influenced by experiences of recent success, with greater attention paid to
to most recent performance (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992; Steiner and Rain, 1989).
In line with this logic, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) document evidence of market
extrapolation of positive past returns among low book-to-market (“glamour”) firms,
resulting in higher M&A announcement returns. Thus, investor extrapolation of
strong recent performance among high achieved status CEOs could lead to a more
positive reaction to acquisition announcements.
There are also arguments that suggest that M&A announcements made by high
achieved status CEOs will result in a negative average market reaction. First, some
literature argues that superior CEO status might cultivate overconfidence and can be
associated with higher incidence of opportunistic activities (Kubick and Lockhart,
2017; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). While my findings do not show evidence of
this perspective with respect to CEO acquisitiveness, it is possible that investors
perceive award-winning executives as overconfident or opportunistic, resulting in a
more negative reaction to deals announced by such CEOs.
Second, there is evidence suggesting that, even if executives with recently ele-
vated status do not attempt a high number of acquisitions, they might overpay for
the deals they engage in. Prior research argues that increases in CEO reputation
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are likely to heighten shareholders’ expectations regarding future performance, cre-
ating a ’burden of celebrity’ among award-winning executives (Milbourn, 2003; Wade
et al., 2006). In addition, high social status associated with prestigious CEO awards
is likely to be accompanied by increased visibility and a substantial level of media
attention, further strengthening performance pressures on high status executives.
Major acquisition failures tend to be highly visible and can endanger CEO celebrity
status and their position within the organisation (Gong and Guo, 2014; Lehn and
Zhao, 2006). Faced with heightened performance expectations and increased media
scrutiny, high status executives might be willing to pay higher premiums to avoid
detrimental consequences of a failed deal. In line with this logic, Cho et al. (2016)
finds that award-winning CEOs do indeed pay higher premiums in times when their
performance is above or below the industry average, and this tendency is strongest in
acquisitions closest to the award conferral. Higher premiums, in turn, could trigger
a more negative market response to acquisition announcements if they are perceived
as overbidding (Liu and Taﬄer, 2008).
The existing theoretical and empirical evidence therefore suggests that M&A
deals announced by CEOs with elevated achieved social status have the potential to
result in a positive or a negative market reaction, and it remains unclear which effect
is more likely to be observed. Therefore, I investigate the role of CEO achieved social
status in determining the market response to M&A announcements empirically.
Hypothesis 1a: The average market response is higher for M&A deals an-
nounced by CEOs with high achieved social status compared to CEOs with lower
achieved social status.
Hypothesis 1b: The average market response is lower for M&A deals an-
nounced by CEOs with high achieved social status compared to CEOs with lower
achieved social status.
The market response to M&A announcements could also vary within the as-
cribed status dimension. Research suggests that decisions regarding corporate ac-
quisitions can be related to social rather than economic reasons (Haunschild, 1992,
1993; Palmer and Barber, 2001), and upper class executives with strong ties to the
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core corporate elite might have the power and the incentives to engage in M&A
deals that primarily suit the interest of their social networks.
Elite social background has been linked with greater ‘prestige’ power (see, for
example, Chikh and Filbien, 2011), which is one of the four broad types of power
identified by Finkelstein (1992)1. Managers with upper-class upbringing also tend
to be more sophisticated and, as a result, more successful in using ingratiatory
behavior for further increasing their corporate power (Stern and Westphal, 2010).
Powerful CEOs, in turn, have been shown to be more likely to appoint directors with
pre-existing network ties, reducing the effectiveness of corporate governance and
increasing the number of value-destroying acquisitions (Fracassi and Tate, 2012).
There is evidence that the market can recognise firms with agency problems and
lower expectations about the future value potential created through acquisitions
(Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog, 2017). It is therefore possible that investors would react
more negatively to acquisition announcements by high ascribed status executives if
such CEOs have less than optimal governance structure and incentives to engage in
M&A deals for social rather than economic motives.
Hypothesis 2: The average market response is lower for M&A deals announced
by CEOs with high ascribed social status compared to CEOs with lower ascribed social
status.
3.3 Data and methodology
In order to analyse the stock market response to acquisition announcements by
executives with varying status characteristics, I create a sample of M&A deals an-
nounced by S&P 500 CEOs between 1992 and 2012. I collect deal-specific data from
Thomson One Banker SDC database, including transaction size, financing type,
deal attitude, target industry and toehold. Similar to the requirements in Chapter
2, M&A deals are included if they take the form of a merger (SDC deal form M), an
acquisition of majority interest (AM), or an acquisition of assets (AA). In addition,
only transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value are included in the main
1For recent applications of Finkelstein (1992) power dimensions see, for example, Adams et al. (2005)
and Chikh and Filbien (2011).
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analysis, and the bidding company is required to acquire at least 51% of the target
company’s shares (Levi et al., 2014; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Morck et al., 1990).
The resulting sample consist of 1,612 M&A deals.
Daily stock prices are collected from CRSP, and the stock price reaction to each
of the M&A announcements in my sample is evaluated using acquirer cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) over a three-day event window [−1,+1]. This is the most
common approach adopted in related studies (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Harford et al.,
2012; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Moeller et al., 2004, 2005). CARs are calculated
as the arithmetic sum of acquirer abnormal returns from day -1 to day 1, where day
0 is the announcement day. Abnormal return for each company’s common stock on
each day is estimated using the market model:
ARjt = Rjt − (αˆj + βˆjRmt) (3.1)
Rjt is the rate of return on the common stock of jth firm on day t. Rmt is the rate
of return on the CRSP market equal-weighted index on day t. Following Edmans
(2011), the parameters αˆj and βˆj are estimated over a 255-day period ending 46
days prior to the announcement of the deal. In additional tests, I verify that my
results are robust to different event windows, using value-weighted CRSP market
index, and using a market-adjusted model of expected returns with alpha equal to
zero and beta equal to one.
I test the contribution of CEO ascribed and achieved social status to acquirer
announcement CARs using the following regression specification:
CARd = α + γ1Statusd + γ2Acquirerd + γ3Deald + εd (3.2)
CARd is the three-day cumulative abnormal return for deal d. Statusd is the in-
dicator of the level of social status of the acquiring firm’s CEO. The status indicator
is unique for ascribed social status but has five variations within the achieved status
dimension. Ascribed status measure equals to one if the acquiring firm’s CEO has
received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities,
and equals to zero otherwise. Achieved status indicator equals to one if the acquir-
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ing firm’s CEO has received an award within one year, two years, three years, five
years or any time before the deal announcement (the five alternative indicators are
modelled separately to better understand the longevity of achieved status influence).
Acquirerd and Deald represent a set of firm and deal-level control variables moti-
vated by the evidence from prior studies (Moeller et al., 2004, 2005; Mulherin and
Boone, 2000; Schoar, 2002). Specifically, I control for acquiring firm’s size (market
capitalization two months prior to the transaction), Tobin’s Q, book leverage and in-
dustry. In addition, I control for several deal-level characteristics, including relative
deal size, financing method indicators, relatedness indicator (within-industry deals),
deal attitude indicator, tender offer indicator and toehold (proportion of the target
firm’s shares owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement). Finally, I include
binary year indicators to control for time trends, and cluster robust standard errors
by the announcement date to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns.
3.4 Achieved status and market response to acquisitions
3.4.1 Empirical findings
Since existing theoretical and empirical evidence provides some support for both a
positive or a negative market response to M&A announcements by high achieved
status CEOs, I develop two contrasting hypotheses and investigate this issue em-
pirically. Hypothesis 1a posits that executives with elevated status will experience
a more positive market reaction to acquisition announcements compared to CEOs
with lower achieved social status, and Hypothesis 1b predicts lower announcement
returns among executives with superior achieved status.
I begin by examining average three-day cumulative abnormal announcement re-
turns across groups of CEOs with varying level of achieved social status. Figure
3.1 plots cumulative CARs for the full sample, non-winning executives, and award-
winning CEOs before and after they experience a positive shift in achieved social
status. Acquirers’ announcement returns for the full sample are negligible, averaging
approximately 4 basis points and highly insignificant (probability that the mean is
not different from zero is 0.81). Announcement returns among non-winners tend to
be slightly positive: average CAR for this group is approximately 30 basis points
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(p-value<0.10). Market reaction to deals announced by award winners before they
receive their first award is similar to that across the full sample of CEOs: average
CAR is approximately 7 basis points and insignificant at the 10% level (p-value>0.8).
In contrast, announcement returns become strikingly negative in the period after
executives experience an increase in achieved social status. The negative response
is most severe for deals completed within one year from winning an award (-450
basis points, p-value<0.01) and improves monotonically as the gap between award
date and the deal announcement increases. However, M&A deals announced by high
achieved status CEOs continue to be associated with significant value destruction
for all subgroups, as evidenced by the average announcement effect of -260 basis
points (p-value<0.01) for transactions completed any time after receiving an award.
This trend provides initial support to Hypothesis 1b, and suggests that the negative
market reaction to deals announced by high status executives might weaken when
the status increase is more distant relative to the time of the acquisition, perhaps
because public and media attention to award winners fades over time (Cho et al.,
2016; Wade et al., 2006).
Figure 3.1: Achieved status: Average CARs
The figure displays average acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to M&A deals announced by
CEOs with varying levels of achieved social status. CEOs are defined as having high achieved social
status in the period after they win an award. CARs are calculated over a three-day event window [-1,
+1] using a market model with the CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy for market returns.
I further examine whether the significant negative market response can be related
to the financing methods or the types of deals generally announced by high achieved
status executives. Table 3.1 displays average three-day announcement CARs for
CEOs with different status characteristics. Panel A splits acquisitions according to
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the financing method, considering the differences in the usage of cash and equity
offers2 between various groups of CEOs, and the market reaction to deals with dif-
ferent financing approaches. Consistent with other related studies (see, for example,
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Moeller et al., 2005), I find that in most cases the av-
erage market response is higher for the acquirers when cash is used to finance the
deal, and this effect is often attributed to equity offers emitting a negative market
signal about the bidder’s shares being overvalued (Moeller et al., 2004; Myers and
Majluf, 1984). While the average announcement return for all deals in my sample
is negligible, cash-financed acquisitions yield a significantly positive market return
of 80 basis points (p-value<0.01). Deals financed with a proportion of equity, on
the other hand, experience a significantly negative average stock price reaction of 50
basis points (p-value<0.10). Similarly, cash deals announced by non-winners gener-
ally yield a positive market response (110 basis points, p-value<0.01). Equity offers
show a negative coefficient with negative announcement returns, although this is
not significant.
Turning to award winners, I find no significant market reaction to either cash
or equity M&A announcements before executives win their first award. However,
following award conferral, executives with elevated achieved social status tend to
complete relatively more deals financed with some portion of equity, similar to the
acquisition behaviour of more powerful CEOs (Gong and Guo, 2014). Non-cash-
financed acquisitions tend to have more severe value-destroying consequences, with
the average announcement return ranging from -380 to -400 basis points across all
high achieved status subgroups (p-value<0.01 in most subgroups). Cash offers made
by award-winners are still associated with a negative market response, but the lower
significance of announcement returns for cash-financed deals could be related to a
relatively low number of such acquisitions in the examined sample (the number of
cash offers is between 5 and 32 across subgroups of high achieved status CEOs).
Next, I investigate whether the negative market response for deals announced
by high status CEOs could be related to the perceived deal quality. Considering
the evidence of value destruction associated with diversifying acquisitions (Lam-
2Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2008), I define cash deals as those financed with any combination of
cash and debt, and stock deals as those financed with any proportion of equity.
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ont and Polk, 2002; Schoar, 2002), I use diversification as a proxy for deal quality
(similar to Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Panel B in Table 3.1 splits M&A deal
announcements into diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions based on whether
the acquirer and the target firm are in the same macro industry. Across the full sam-
ple, announcement returns for same-industry and diversifying deals do not appear
to be significantly different, and do not yield individually significant average CARs.
Non-winners show some evidence of a positive market response to non-diversifying
acquisitions, although it appears relatively weak (40 basis points, p-value=0.08).
Award winners tend to complete a slightly higher proportion of diversifying ac-
quisitions before receiving their first award (36.1% of deals), compared to the ac-
quisition behaviour across the full sample (26.1% of deals) and non-winning CEOs
(25.0% of deals), but there is no significant market response to either same-industry
or diversifying deals in this subgroup. However, following award conferral, executives
with higher achieved social status appear to reduce the proportion of diversifying
deals to be more in line with the average across other S&P 500 firms. Specifically,
the proportion of diversifying deals falls to 26.1% in the first year following the
increase in status and remains below 29% for all high status subgroups, suggest-
ing that executives with high achieved social status might engage lower-risk M&A
projects following a positive status shift. The market response tends to be negative
and significant for both same-industry and diversifying deals, further indicating that
deal quality is unlikely to explain lower announcement returns among high achieved
status executives.
In order to further isolate achieved status influence from potential firm-level
effects, deal and industry characteristics and the impact of deals’ timing, I per-
form regression analysis controlling for a range of firm and deal attributes related
to announcement returns, and include year and industry fixed effects. Results of
these estimations are reported in Table 3.2, and the findings largely support the
evidence from the univariate analysis. All achieved status indicators have negative
coefficients, with four out of five models that indicate a more recent status increase
reporting statistically significant results at 10% or better (Models 1-4). This pat-
tern is consistent with the idea that high status executives are faced with increased
media scrutiny and heightened performance expectations following an award, incen-
99
Table 3.1: Achieved status and market response to acquisition announcements: Average
CARs
Panel A: Average CARs by financing method
Average CAR [-1, +1] Proportion of stock-
All deals Cash deals Stock deals financed deals
Full sample 0.000 0.008*** -0.005* 58.7%
(n=1612) (n=665) (n=947)
All non-winners 0.003* 0.011*** -0.003 58.4%
(n=1298) (n=540) (n=758)
Award winners:
- M&A deals before first award 0.000 -0.008 0.005 66.5%
(n=155) (n=52) (n=103)
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.045*** -0.065 -0.040** 78.3%
(n=23) (n=5) (n=18)
- M&A deals within 2 year after award -0.039*** -0.037* -0.039*** 69.0%
(n=42) (n=13) (n=29)
- M&A deals within 3 year after award -0.036*** -0.029* -0.039*** 64.4%
(n=45) (n=16) (n=29)
- M&A deals within 5 year after award -0.032*** -0.019 -0.038*** 68.9%
(n=61) (n=19) (n=42)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.026*** -0.008 -0.038*** 60.5%
(n=81) (n=32) (n=49)
Panel B: Average CARs by deal type
Average CAR [-1, +1] Proportion of
All deals Non-diversifying Diversifying diversifying deals
Full sample 0.000 0.001 -0.001 26.1%
(n=1612) (n=1191) (n=421)
All non-winners 0.003* 0.004* 0.001 25.0%
(n=1298) (n=973) (n=325)
Award winners:
- M&A deals before first award 0.000 -0.001 0.004 36.1%
(n=155) (n=99) (n=56)
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.045*** -0.040** -0.059 26.1%
(n=23) (n=17) (n=6)
- M&A deals within 2 year after award -0.039*** -0.034** -0.052*** 28.6%
(n=42) (n=30) (n=12)
- M&A deals within 3 year after award -0.036*** -0.031** -0.047** 28.9%
(n=45) (n=32) (n=13)
- M&A deals within 5 year after award -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.034** 27.9%
(n=61) (n=44) (n=17)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026 27.2%
(n=81) (n=59) (n=22)
The table presents average acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to M&A deals announced by
CEOs with varying levels of achieved social status. CEOs are defined as having high achieved social sta-
tus in the period after they win an award. CARs are calculated over a three-day event window [-1, +1]
using a market model with the CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. Panel A
shows average CARs by deal financing method. Cash deals are financed with any combination of cash
and debt. Stock deals are financed with any proportion of equity. Panel B shows average CARs by deal
type. Non-diversifying deals are those where the acquirer and target firms are in the same macro industry.
Diversifying deals are those where the acquirer and target firms are in different macro industries.
tivising them to potentially overpay for target firms in order to avoid detrimental
consequences of a failed deal. Model 5 in Table 3.2 tests the influence of award
winning on market response to acquisitions using M&A deals announced any time
after award conferral. Here, the coefficient on the achieved status indicator becomes
insignificant at the 10% level, suggesting that the effect of positive status shifts is
not permanent and might decrease or disappear over time.
The coefficient estimates of control variables are similar to those of prior studies,
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with some exceptions. Regression results confirm that cash-financed deals generally
receive better market response, while the coefficient on the equity financing indica-
tor is significantly negative (similar to the findings in Malmendier and Tate, 2008;
Moeller et al., 2005). Consistent with Moeller et al. (2004), firm size is found to be
significantly negatively related to the market reaction to deal announcements. In
addition, the results show that within-industry deals are more favourably received
by the market while large transactions reduce announcement returns.
Surprisingly, the indicator for hostile deals has a significantly positive coeffi-
cient, while the indicator for tender offers reports a significantly negative coefficient
(though both are generally significant only at the 10% level). However, hostile offers
account for only approximately 1.5% of deals in my sample and over half of these
transactions are financed entirely through cash, which is generally associated with
higher announcement returns (see, for example, Moeller et al., 2005). In addition,
there were no hostile deals in my sample during the recent crisis period (last occur-
rence in 2005). Excluding cash-financed hostile deals (14 deals in total) results in
an insignificant coefficient for hostile attitude, suggesting that this is the most likely
source of the overall effect. The negative coefficient for the tender offers appears to
be driven by a small number of outliers and becomes insignificant at the 10% level
if one deal with extremely negative return is excluded.
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Table 3.2: Achieved status and market response to acquisition announcements: Regressions
CAR [-1, +1]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.023*
(0.013)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.022**
(0.010)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.019*
(0.010)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.017**
(0.009)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.011
(0.008)
Firm size -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Relative deal size -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Book leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Cash financing 0.007* 0.006* 0.007* 0.006* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Equity financing -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Relatedness 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hostile 0.016* 0.016* 0.016* 0.017* 0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Tender offer -0.010** -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Toehold -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Adjusted R-squared 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.083
The table presents results from regression models testing the effect of CEO achieved social status on the
announcement returns to M&A deals. The dependent variable in all models is acquirer’s cumulative ab-
normal returns (CARs), calculated over a three-day event window [-1, +1] using a market model with the
CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. CEOs are defined as having high achieved
social status in the period after they win an award. Firm size is the log form of acquirer market capital-
ization two months prior to the transaction. Relative deal size is the transaction value scaled by acquirer’s
market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus
market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Book leverage is calculated as
total debt divided by book assets. Cash financing equals to 1 if only cash is used to pay for the acquisi-
tion, and 0 otherwise. Equity financing equals to 1 if only equity is used to pay for the acquisition, and 0
otherwise. Relatedness equals to 1 for deals in which the acquirer and target firms are in the same macro
industry, and 0 otherwise. Hostile equals to 1 if SDC regards the deal as hostile, and 0 otherwise. Tender
offer equals to 1 if SDC regards the deal as a tender offer, and 0 otherwise. Toehold is the proportion of
the target firm’s shares owned by the acquirer before the deal announcement. All regressions include year
and industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns, and are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.4.2 Robustness
I verify that my results are robust to alternative event windows and are not sensitive
to the choice of the model of expected returns. Table 3.3 provides the results of using
alternative specifications for calculating acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns. For
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tests reported in Panels A and B, CARs are accumulated over a 5-day and a 7-day
event window, respectively. For the estimations in Panel C, abnormal returns are
calculated using a market-adjusted returns model with alpha equal to zero and
beta equal to one: ARjt = Rjt − Rmt3. The results across all three alternative
CAR specifications remain virtually identical to the main tests, with slightly higher
coefficients on the achieved status indicators in tests with larger event windows.
In addition, I test whether my findings are sensitive to the chosen specification
for qualifying M&A deals. Table 3.4 presents the results of testing an expanded
sample of acquisition announcements that includes all deals worth more than 1%
of acquirer value, as opposed to restricting the dataset to deals with the value
greater than 5% of acquirer value. The findings remain qualitatively similar when
smaller acquisitions are included in the sample, and hold for both the market model
and the market-adjusted CARs (Panels A and B, respectively). While including a
larger number of deals somewhat reduces the magnitude of the adverse impact of
elevated achieved social status on announcement returns, the results remain highly
significant. Lower average negative market reaction is expected when including
additional smaller acquisitions as relative deal size has been shown to be negatively
related to announcement returns (see Table 3.2).
The overall results presented in this section show evidence of a significantly
negative market response to acquisition announcements made by executives with
high achieved social status, particularly for deals announced nearer to the status
increase. These findings are robust to a set of standard firm and deal-level controls,
alternative specifications for the measurement of abnormal returns and an expanded
sample of M&A deals, suggesting that the observed pattern is likely related to
consequences of CEO status increase. Therefore, these results provide considerable
support in favour of Hypothesis 1b.
3In Panel C of Table 3.3, market-adjusted returns are accumulated over a 3-day event window. In
additional tests I verify that the results are robust to using market-adjusted returns over a 5-day and a
7-day event windows. These results are reported in the Appendix in Table A.9.
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Table 3.3: Robustness tests: Alternative CAR specifications
Panel A: Market model 5-day CARs
Market model CAR [-2, +2]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.025*
(0.013)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.022*
(0.012)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.019*
(0.011)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.017*
(0.009)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.009
(0.009)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Adjusted R-squared 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066
Panel B: Market model 7-day CARs
Market model CAR [-3, +3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.031*
(0.016)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.026*
(0.013)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.023*
(0.012)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.023**
(0.010)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.008
(0.011)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Adjusted R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.057
Panel C: Market-adjusted 3-day CARs
Market-adjusted CAR [-1, +1]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.023*
(0.014)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.023**
(0.010)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.020**
(0.010)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.017**
(0.009)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.012
(0.008)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.072
The table presents results from regression models testing the effect of CEO achieved social status on the
announcement returns to M&A deals greater than 5% of acquirer’s value. CEOs are defined as having high
achieved social status in the period after they win an award. All models use CRSP equal-weighted index
as the proxy for market returns. Panels A and B utilise alternative event windows: CARs are calculated
over a 5-day event window in Panel A and over a 7-day event window in Panel B. In Panel C, CARs are
calculated over a 3-day event window using market-adjusted returns. Firm and deal controls are included
in all models and are not reported for brevity. Controls include firm size, relative deal size, Tobin’s Q, book
leverage, cash financing indicator, equity financing indicator, deal relatedness indicator, hostile deal indi-
cator and toehold. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama-French
48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation
of returns, and are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
104
Table 3.4: Robustness tests: Alternative M&A specification
Panel A: Market model 3-day CARs for M&A deals greater than 1% of acquirer value
Market model CAR [-1, +1]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.010
(0.007)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.014**
(0.006)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.011**
(0.005)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.008*
(0.004)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.006
(0.004)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3275 3275 3275 3275 3275
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044
Panel B: Market-adjusted 3-day CARs for M&A deals greater than 1% of acquirer value
Market-adjusted CAR [-1, +1]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.009
(0.007)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.014**
(0.006)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.011**
(0.005)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.009**
(0.004)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.007*
(0.004)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3275 3275 3275 3275 3275
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040
The table presents results from regression models testing the effect of CEO achieved social status on the
announcement returns to M&A deals greater than 1% of acquirer’s value. CEOs are defined as having high
achieved social status in the period after they win an award. All models use CRSP equal-weighted index
as the proxy for market returns. In Panel A, CARs are calculated over a 3-day event window using a mar-
ket model. In Panel B, CARs are calculated over a 3-day event window using market-adjusted returns.
Firm and deal controls are included in all models and are not reported for brevity. Controls include firm
size, relative deal size, Tobin’s Q, book leverage, cash financing indicator, equity financing indicator, deal
relatedness indicator, hostile deal indicator and toehold. All regressions include year and industry fixed
effects, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered by event date
to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns, and are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.5 Ascribed status and market response to acquisitions
3.5.1 Empirical findings
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative market response to acquisition announcements
by high ascribed status CEOs due to the likelihood of firms with such executives
having less than optimal governance structure and incentives to engage in M&A
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deals for social rather than economic motives. Due to the existing evidence of
the market adjusting expectations for firms with agency problems (Feito-Ruiz and
Renneboog, 2017), I expect investors to recognize the governance weaknesses in
firms with high ascribed status executives and therefore react more negatively to
acquisition announcements by such CEOs.
Figure 3.2 plots the average cumulative abnormal announcement returns for the
full sample, executives with lower ascribed social status and high status CEOs. Both
high and lower ascribed status CEOs appear to be associated with a slightly negative
market response to deal announcements, with the average CAR among lower status
executives of approximately -10 basis points, and the average CAR for acquisitions
by high ascribed status CEOs of approximately -30 basis points. However, the
difference between the two groups appears to be inconsiderable.
Figure 3.2: Ascribed status: Average CARs
The figure displays average acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to M&A deals announced by
CEOs with varying levels of ascribed social status. High ascribed status CEOs are those who received a
bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities. CARs are calculated over a
three-day event window [-1, +1] using a market model with the CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy
for market returns.
I summarise the average announcement returns for executives with high and
lower ascribed social status in Table 3.5. In contrast to expectations, announcement
returns to deals by high ascribed status CEOs do not show evidence of a negative
market response, regardless of the payment method (Panel A) or the type of acqui-
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sition (Panel B): across all specifications, the average CARs for deals announced by
high status executives remain insignificant at the 10% level.
Table 3.5: Ascribed status and market response to acquisition announcements: Average
CARs
Panel A: Average CARs by financing method
Average CAR [-1, +1] Proportion of stock-
All deals Cash deals Stock deals financed deals
Full sample 0.000 0.008*** -0.005* 58.7%
(n=1612) (n=665) (n=947)
Lower ascribed status CEOs -0.001 0.007*** -0.007 58.2%
(n=1162) (n=486) (n=676)
High ascribed status CEOs -0.003 -0.008 0.000 59.7%
(n=154) (n=62) (n=92)
Panel B: Average CARs by deal type
Average CAR [-1, +1] Proportion of
All deals Non-diversifying Diversifying diversifying deals
Full sample 0.000 0.001 -0.002 26.1%
(n=1612) (n=1191) (n=421)
Lower ascribed status CEOs -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 26.2%
(n=1162) (n=857) (n=305)
High ascribed status CEOs -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 23.4%
(n=154) (n=118) (n=36)
The table presents average acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to M&A deals announced by
CEOs with high and lower ascribed social status. High ascribed status CEOs are those who received a
bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities. CARs are calculated over a
three-day event window [-1, +1] using a market model with the CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy
for market returns. Panel A shows average CARs by deal financing method. Cash deals are financed with
any combination of cash and debt. Stock deals are financed with any proportion of equity. Panel B shows
average CARs by deal type. Non-diversifying deals are those where the acquirer and target firms are in
the same macro industry. Diversifying deals are those where the acquirer and target firms are in different
macro industries.
I further test the potential ascribed status effect on announcement returns using
regression models that control for a range of firm and deal attributes and include
year and industry fixed effects. Table 3.6 presents the results, showing that the
estimated coefficient on the ascribed status indicator is not significant at the 10%
level across all models. These results suggest that potential agency concerns present
in firms with powerful elite executives do not trigger a negative market response to
deals announced by such CEOs.
3.5.2 Robustness
Similar to the robustness tests within the achieved status dimension, I verify that the
results are similar for alternative event windows and when using a market-adjusted
returns model to calculate abnormal returns. Models 2 - 6 in Table 3.6 present the
results, confirming that ascribed status does not contribute to announcement returns
regardless of the specification for measuring acquirer abnormal returns. I also repeat
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Table 3.6: Ascribed status and market response to acquisition announcements: Regressions
CAR [-1, +1] CAR [-2, +2] CAR [-3, +3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MM MAR MM MAR MM MAR
Ascribed status -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm size -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Deal size -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Book leverage -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Cash financing 0.008* 0.009** 0.007 0.008* 0.006 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Equity financing -0.018** -0.015* -0.012 -0.011 -0.018* -0.017*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Relatedness 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Hostile 0.016 0.019* 0.016 0.020* 0.014 0.022
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Tender offer -0.012** -0.011** -0.009 -0.009 -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Toehold -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.010 -0.016
(0.029) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.067 0.057 0.055 0.058 0.052
The table presents the results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on announce-
ment returns to M&A deals greater than 5% of acquirer value. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if
a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and 0
otherwise. The dependent variable is acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) with varying speci-
fications. All models use CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. Models 1, 3 and 5
use the market model (MM) to calculate CARs. Models 2, 4 and 6 use market-adjusted returns (MAR)
to calculate CARs. Models 1 and 2 use CARs over a 3-day window; Models 3 and 4 use CARs over a 5-
day window; Models 5 and 6 use CARs over a 7-day window. Firm size is the log form of acquirer market
capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Relative deal size is the transaction value scaled by ac-
quirer’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets
plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Book leverage is calculated
as total debt divided by book assets. Cash financing equals to 1 if only cash is used to pay for the acquisi-
tion, and 0 otherwise. Equity financing equals to 1 if only equity is used to pay for the acquisition, and 0
otherwise. Relatedness equals to 1 for deals in which the acquirer and target firms are in the same macro
industry, and 0 otherwise. Hostile equals to 1 if SDC regards the deal as hostile, and 0 otherwise. Tender
offer equals to 1 if SDC regards the deal as a tender offer, and 0 otherwise. Toehold is the proportion of
the target firm’s shares owned by the acquirer before the deal announcement. All regressions include year
and industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns, and are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
the main tests using a larger sample of M&A deals that includes smaller acquisitions
worth more than 1% of acquirer value at the time of the transaction. The results of
these estimations are presented in Table 3.7, providing further evidence that CEO
ascribed status is unlikely to be related to M&A announcement returns.
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Table 3.7: Robustness tests: Alternative M&A specifications
CAR [-1, +1] CAR [-2, +2] CAR [-3, +3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MM MAR MM MAR MM MAR
Ascribed status 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm size -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Deal size -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Tobin’s Q 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Book leverage -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Cash financing 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Equity financing -0.008* -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Relatedness -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Hostile 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.007 0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Tender offer -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Toehold -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.026 0.004 -0.007
(0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730
Adjusted R-squared 0.046 0.045 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.032
The table presents the results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on announce-
ment returns to M&A deals greater than 1% of acquirer value. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if
a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and 0
otherwise. The dependent variable is acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) with varying speci-
fications. All models use CRSP equal-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. Models 1, 3 and 5
use the market model (MM) to calculate CARs. Models 2, 4 and 6 use market-adjusted returns (MAR)
to calculate CARs. Models 1 and 2 use CARs over a 3-day window; Models 3 and 4 use CARs over a 5-
day window; Models 5 and 6 use CARs over a 7-day window. Firm size is the log form of acquirer market
capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Relative deal size is the transaction value scaled by ac-
quirer’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets
plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Book leverage is calculated
as total debt divided by book assets. Cash financing equals to 1 if only cash is used to pay for the acquisi-
tion, and 0 otherwise. Equity financing equals to 1 if only equity is used to pay for the acquisition, and 0
otherwise. Relatedness equals to 1 for deals in which the acquirer and target firms are in the same macro
industry, and 0 otherwise. Hostile equals to 1 if SDC regards the deal as hostile, and 0 otherwise. Tender
offer equals to 1 if SDC regards the deal as a tender offer, and 0 otherwise. Toehold is the proportion of
the target firm’s shares owned by the acquirer before the deal announcement. All regressions include year
and industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns, and are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.6 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter I investigate the role of CEO social status in determining the value
created through M&A announcements. I develop hypotheses by considering the
complex implications of CEO social status characteristics for investor perception and
expectations regarding acquisition announcements made by executives with varying
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level of ascribed and achieved social status.
My findings reveal that possessing high achieved social status tends to trigger
a negative market response. This results in an average value destruction of 4.5%
within three days around deal announcements by executives with recently elevated
status. The magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to all deals announced by
high achieved status CEOs improves monotonically as the gap between status eleva-
tion and the deal announcement increases, but stock-financed acquisitions continue
to trigger an average announcement return of -3.8% to -4% across all high achieved
status groups. These findings are consistent with the idea that award-winning ex-
ecutives are faced with heightened performance expectations and increased media
attention following a positive status shift, incentivising them to avoid scrutiny and
preserve their status position by minimising the likelihood of a failed deal and likely
overpaying for target firms. Indeed, there is evidence of higher premiums paid by
celebrity CEOs following award conferral (Cho et al., 2016), and overbidding has
been shown to trigger a more negative market response to acquisition announce-
ments (Liu and Taﬄer, 2008).
In contrast to the strong market reaction to M&A announcements made by
CEOs with elevated achieved social status, I find no evidence of a significant im-
pact of ascribed status on announcement returns. My results suggest that possible
social considerations of high ascribed status executives with regards to acquisition
decisions, as well as potential agency concerns present in firms with powerful elite
CEOs do not have a notable adverse effect on investor perception and expectations
from deals announced by such CEOs.
My findings contribute to the research on firm value consequences of CEO per-
sonal attributes (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2008). The evidence in this chapter is in line with the documented
occurrence of higher premiums paid by executives with elevated social status (Cho
et al., 2016), suggesting that social status concerns can distort CEO behaviour with
regards to their acquisition decisions, resulting in adverse effects on shareholder
value. These results pose important governance implications and confirm the need
for a more advanced corporate governance structure that could offer a more effective
supervision of CEO investment decisions in order to prevent investment distortions
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and reduce the level of value-destroying acquisitions.
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CHAPTER 4
CEO social status and corporate social
responsibility
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4.1 Introduction
The research on the relation between CSR and firms’ financial outcomes remains
inconclusive (Beurden and Gössling, 2008; Brammer and Millington, 2008; Seifert
et al., 2004a), motivating a continuing investigation of factors that influence com-
panies’ decision to engage in responsible behaviours. The majority of this litera-
ture concentrates on external factors and firm-level justifications, such as building
a competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 2006), enhancing reputation (Lin-Hi
and Blumberg, 2016; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016), and responding to institutional
and competitive pressures (Attig et al., 2016; Bertels and Peloza, 2008; Dupire and
M’Zali, 2016).
Another stream of literature considers CSR an agency problem and identifies
personal benefits it can provide to the firms’ executives, incentivising higher social
expenditures. Existing findings suggest that CEOs can use CSR investments strate-
gically to further their political connections (Borghesi et al., 2014), support affiliated
charities (Masulis and Reza, 2015) and build beneficial ties with firm stakeholders
(Cespa and Cestone, 2007). In addition, engaging in socially responsible behaviours
can provide executives with private reputational benefits (Barnea and Rubin, 2010).
Consistent with the agency view, there is evidence of lower CSR investments among
firms with stronger governance and monitoring mechanisms (Adhikari, 2016; Cheng
et al., 2013; Masulis and Reza, 2015).
Similar to the agency perspective, upper echelons literature searches for CSR
determinants by considering the influence of firms’ executives and the top man-
agement team. However, rather than concentrating on incentives, this stream of
research investigates how managers’ characteristics, values and perceptions shape
CSR-related decisions of their firms. Recent evidence shows that factors such as
age (Oh et al., 2016), gender (Manner, 2010), political ideology (Chin et al., 2013),
hubris (Tang et al., 2015) and narcissism (Petrenko et al., 2016) can, in fact, affect
firms’ propensity to engage in socially responsible behaviours.
Building on insights from both agency and upper echelons perspectives, I in-
vestigate how CEO social status can affect CSR practices. The research on social
constructs such as executive prestige, social status and standing within the elite
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remains scarce and the majority of the studies concentrate on the performance im-
plications of these factors. This literature tends to view CEO status as a resource
that can provide companies with signalling benefits, easier access to new resources
and information as well as increased organisational legitimacy, resulting in superior
performance (Chen et al., 2008; D’Aveni, 1990; Hitt et al., 2001; Jian and Lee, 2011;
Pollock et al., 2009).
There is less research on the strategic implications of CEO social characteristics
but they are becoming increasingly recognised as important determinants of CEO
risk-taking attitudes and drivers of corporate decisions. For example, Kish-Gephart
and Campbell (2015) consider the lasting effects of CEO social class origins and show
how these can shape individuals’ risk preferences, resulting in executives from upper
class exhibiting higher levels of strategic risk taking compared to their middle-class
counterparts. Palmer and Barber (2001), on the other hand, argue the importance
of normative expectations associated with different social class backgrounds and
show how these considerations affected the likelihood of completing diversifying
acquisitions in the 1960s.
I extend this literature by considering the influence of CEO social status on
decisions related to socially responsible behaviours. Similar to the examination of
status impact on CEO acquisitiveness, I distinguish between ascribed (inherited)
and achieved (earned) social status in this analysis. These two status origins are
commonly differentiated in sociological and management research due to their differ-
ent underlying characteristics that likely result in varying influences on individuals’
decision making (Lin, 1999; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). Consistent with my previ-
ous methodological approach, I use the level of educational prestige to indicate high
ascribed social status and employ a range prestigious business awards to indicate
positive shifts in achieved social status.
Drawing on existing literature, I hypothesise that high ascribed social status
can provide executives with both the motivation and the power to increase CSR
to their advantage. Upper class background combined with a position of the most
senior company’s officer provides high ascribed status CEOs with membership within
the "inner circle" of corporate elite (Domhoff, 2002; Useem, 1984). Prior research
suggests that companies with strong links to the inner circle collectively share social
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and reputational capital of their network, and members are likely to be encouraged to
sustain a certain level of legitimacy and prestige (Kang, 2008; Sauerwald et al., 2016).
The personal and professional benefits associated with being a part of this prestigious
network (see, for example, D’Aveni, 1990; Flickinger et al., 2016; McDonald and
Westphal, 2011) are likely to motivate high ascribed status executives to conform
to the practices of this social group and preserve their standing. Since high social
performance has been shown to be a powerful way to enhance companies’ reputation
(Creyer, 1997; Du et al., 2007), it provides an attractive way of sustaining a positive
corporate image, motivating higher CSR investments among high ascribed status
executives. In addition, charitable giving is often seen as a norm among the more
prominent members of the elite (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Useem, 1984), and such
donations can be a significant part of companies’ CSR strategy. Finally, since higher
status within the corporate elite can be a valuable organisational resource, such
social standing can provide executives with a superior power position (Daily and
Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992), making it easier for them to shape firms’ CSR
strategy to their advantage (Muttakin et al., 2016).
Turning to the achieved status dimension, I hypothesise that there will also
be a positive relationship between this type of CEO status and corporate social
performance, although there is a more diverse range of mechanisms that can link an
increase in achieved social status to CSR-related decisions. On the one hand, higher
pay-for-performance sensitivity among CEOs with recent status increase (Milbourn,
2003; Wade et al., 2006) might motivate them to preserve short-term profits and
not invest in CSR due to its relatively long-term pay-off nature (Mahapatra, 1984;
Oh et al., 2016). On the other hand, a positive shift in CEO status associated with
winning an award increases media visibility and is likely to result in higher scrutiny
and more diverse social demands from company stakeholders, creating pressures for
CEOs to increase investment in socially responsible behaviours (Borghesi et al., 2014;
Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). In addition, engagement in social
activities can assist high achieved status executives in preserving and promoting
their own private reputation (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). On balance, the financial
risks associated with investment in CSR activities appear less substantial compared
to the reputational risks that high achieved status executives might face if they
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decided to disengage from social activities following a positive status shift.
I test these hypotheses using a sample of CEOs from the S&P 500 companies
between 1992 and 2012. Consistent with expectations, I find that both high ascribed
and high achieved CEO social status are associated with superior overall social
performance, and the effect of both status types on CSR remains significant after
accounting for firm and CEO characteristics, as well as yearly trends. In particular,
having an executive with high ascribed status results in an approximately 45%
higher social performance compared to the average level of CSR among companies
with lower ascribed status CEOs. Within the achieved status dimension, I find that
the overall social performance increases by approximately 57% between one year
before and one year after the positive status shift. I verify that the results are
robust to two alternative measures of CSR, and use several approaches to ensure
that the findings are not driven by endogenous firm-level characteristics.
In order to gain more insight into the ways through which high status execu-
tives adopt their CSR strategy, I further disaggregate the overall measure of CSR
into its components across two dimensions. First, I examine whether the apparent
increase in social performance is driven by superior social strengths or a reduction
in social weaknesses. Firms are likely to have a more diverse choice of actions in
increasing their positive social activities (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012), and investment
in CSR strengths has also been shown to have a more pronounced positive impact
on firm performance compared to reducing social concerns (Servaes and Tamayo,
2013). However, focusing on improvement of social strengths can create a ’liabil-
ity of good reputation’ and might be perceived as a benefit-seeking activity rather
than a genuine attempt to increase the social good (Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2016;
Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). As a result, concentrating on prevention of irresponsible
behaviour might be a more beneficial long-term strategy, and it can provide firms
with a moral capital to withstand the consequences of future irresponsible behaviour
(Bermiss et al., 2013; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2016).
Second, I analyse two separate categories of CSR based on the type of stake-
holders that they target. Firms can choose to engage in social actions that directly
address the needs of their primary stakeholders, such as employees and customers,
or focus on social activities that are aimed at the society at large. Similar to the
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varying effect from improving social strengths and reducing social concerns, the out-
comes of corporate social actions can differ depending on the type of stakeholders
they are aimed at. Social activities related to companies’ primary stakeholders have
more potential in strengthening firms’ competitive advantage (Attig et al., 2016;
Dupire and M’Zali, 2016), and have been shown to improve shareholder value (Hill-
man and Keim, 2001). On the other hand, CSR activities directed at the community
and society at large appear to have substantially more value in growing firm’s moral
capital, which can provide insurance-like benefits in times of crisis (Godfrey et al.,
2009).
I find that high achieved status executives improve their social performance pri-
marily through a reduction in CSR concerns related to firms’ primary stakeholders,
and achieved status has no significant relationship with CSR strengths or social
actions targeting society at large. High ascribed status CEOs, on the other hand,
display a different approach for CSR activities related to the two broad types of
stakeholders. These executive tend to improve social strengths associated with the
primary company stakeholders, while reducing social concerns related to society at
large. While the effect of ascribed and achieved CEO status on the focus of CSR
strategy is different, both paths have potential to provide a balance between in-
creasing firm financial value and strengthening the company’s moral capital and
responsible image.
This study makes an important contribution to several streams of literature.
First, it provides theoretical and empirical contributions to the upper echelons lit-
erature by building and testing hypotheses regarding the influence of a personal
CEO characteristic on corporate decision-making (see, for example, Benmelech and
Frydman, 2015; Graham et al., 2013). Second, this study adds to the research on
determinants and effects of CSR by providing evidence of a positive relationship be-
tween CEO social status and engagement in corporate social responsibility (see, for
example, Attig et al., 2016; Moussu and Ohana, 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016). Finally,
this study provides a conceptual contribution to the research on organisational impli-
cations of managerial status by bringing a sociological distinction between ascribed
and achieved social status to the financial literature1 (see, for example, McDonald
1To my knowledge, the only similar examination of ascribed and achieved status in finance was published
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and Westphal, 2010; Palmer and Barber, 2001).
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
4.2.1 Ascribed status and CSR
There exists an "inner circle" among senior managers of large organisations which
differs from the rest of the corporate elite with respect to social and educational
characteristics of its members, and the existence of this social stratification is gen-
erally recognised by corporate managers themselves (Domhoff, 2002; Useem, 1984;
Useem and Karabel, 1986). CEOs with high ascribed social status are individuals
who are born into elite families, and their high social class together with the achieve-
ment of the most senior managerial role provides membership within the inner circle
(Domhoff, 2002; Useem, 1984).
Being part of this core elite group can provide multiple advantages, in both pro-
fessional and personal domains. Members of the inner circle can get access to scarce
resources, information and strategic help through valuable social ties (Galaskiewicz,
1985; McDonald and Westphal, 2010). Moreover, embeddedness within the core
elite is associated with elevated social status and prestige, resulting in additional
signalling benefits, because high managerial prestige tends to convey competence,
credibility, trustworthiness and valuable networks (D’Aveni, 1990; Pollock et al.,
2009). Finally, executives who strongly identify with the corporate elite are more
likely to receive social support with regards to their personal problems (McDonald
and Westphal, 2011).
Embeddedness within the inner circle can also provide its members with a su-
perior power position within their organisation. Strong ties with the elite can be
linked with higher "prestige" power (Finkelstein, 1992) which can be attributed to
managers based on the value that their networks and status bring to their firms.
Sources of such value can include managers’ ability to acquire new resources at a
lower cost (Chen et al., 2008), the signalling power of prestige (Pollock et al., 2009)
in Lucey et al. (2013) out of my initial research in this topic. As discussed in the introduction chapter, the
analysis in this thesis is a significant advance on that initial research as it incorporates a broader review
of the ways in which social status can affect CEO behaviour, and addresses the unique methodological
concerns related to the measurement of status influence (discussed in Malmendier and Tate (2009) and
Ammann et al. (2016), among others).
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as well as easier access to new information (D’Aveni, 1990). Moreover, prestigious
CEOs are less likely to be penalised for deviant behaviour (D’Aveni, 1990) and their
social ties can protect them from being dismissed in times of underperformance
(Flickinger et al., 2016), contributing to their superior power position.
The multitude of benefits of being part of the elite network, however, comes at a
price. As any social group, the corporate elite is governed by a set of norms and can
exercise social pressures for members to conform (Kang and Kroll, 2014; Sauerwald
et al., 2016). Members who violate normative expectations or deviate from priorities
of the corporate elite can experience social sanctioning and risk losing their standing
within the inner circle (Westphal and Khanna, 2003).
Members of a network are expected to share a sense of social solidarity and follow
the norms of reciprocity (Sandefur and Laumann, 1998) as well as refrain from elite-
threatening actions (Westphal and Khanna, 2003). As a result, directors and senior
managers belonging to the core elite might be constrained with respect to their
corporate practices and strategies, including board structure decisions (Westphal
and Khanna, 2003) as well as acquisition behaviour (Palmer and Barber, 2001).
Normative expectations of belonging to the core elite can also influence exec-
utives’ decisions regarding their firms’ CSR investments. Companies with strong
links to the inner circle are likely to be interlocked (Useem, 1984), with embedded
directors and CEOs collectively owning the social and reputational capital of this
elite network (Kang, 2008; Sauerwald et al., 2016). This can introduce reputational
concerns as reputation of individual members of the network can have spillover ef-
fect on the associated firms, in positive and negative directions (Kang, 2008; Pollock
et al., 2009). As a result, high ascribed status CEOs with membership within the
inner circle are likely to be encouraged to sustain a certain level of legitimacy and
prestige.
Engaging in CSR can be used as a means to enhance firms’ image as it has been
shown to be a powerful way of improving relationships with stakeholders (Du et al.,
2007) as well as serve as advertisement and goodwill (Knauer, 1994). Moreover,
reputational benefits from socially responsible activities have been shown to be par-
ticularly valuable during periods of crisis as firms that have accumulated positive
moral capital tend to face lower stakeholder sanctions during times of reputational
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threats (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005).
The broad reputational benefits of CSR practices can provide high ascribed status
CEOs with a robust way of sustaining an acceptable level of positive corporate image,
motivating higher socially responsible spending. In addition, multiple studies show
that companies with senior managers with strong ties to the elite circles tend to make
more charitable contributions. These include firms with more inner-circle directors
(Useem, 1984), companies in cities with more gifting or tithing clubs (Navarro, 1988)
as well as firms with CEOs who have ties to local philanthropic leaders (Galaskiewicz,
1985, 1997). The empirical evidence supports the argument of the institutional
theory that posits that charitable giving can be considerably influenced by normative
processes and social networks (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997). Since such contributions
are among the most prominent components of CSR, this can have a significant
impact in shaping companies’ CSR strategy.
The combined effect of the benefits from the membership within the inner circle
and the intrinsic value of the status it provides (Huberman et al., 2004) is likely to
motivate CEOs that belong to the core elite to conform to the practices of this social
group and preserve their standing, creating an incentive for higher CSR performance.
Moreover, the superior power position associated with membership within the inner
circle can help in facilitating higher CSR expenditures even if it does not benefit
the company shareholders. Since high ascribed status is likely to provide executives
with membership within the core elite (Domhoff, 2002; Useem, 1984), I hypothesise
that high ascribed status will be associated with higher CSR.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CEO ascribed status and
corporate social responsibility.
Despite the lack of a universal definition of CSR in academic literature, it is
generally accepted that to engage in socially responsible behaviour, a firm must
"further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required
by law" (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p.117). Drawing on this definition, companies
can approach their CSR strategy in a variety of ways, and recently, there has been an
increased interest in examining different dimensions of CSR in greater detail, both
conceptually and empirically (see, for example, Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Lin-Hi and
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Blumberg, 2016; Wang and Berens, 2015; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).
One of the distinctions in CSR engagement comes from the idea that a firm
can contribute to society either by increasing its positive effects (also referred to as
"doing good" or CSR strengths) or by decreasing the negative ones (also referred
to as "avoiding bad" or CSR concerns) (Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2016; Lin-Hi and
Müller, 2013). "Doing good" can be accomplished through activities such as char-
itable giving, volunteering programs and promotion of environmentally sustainable
policies. "Avoiding bad" involves preventing harmful behaviours such as human
rights violations, fraud and pollution.
Historically, the discussion of CSR has predominantly emphasised its positive
effects (Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013), and companies have been generally showing pref-
erence for increasing their CSR through "doing good" rather than "avoiding bad",
despite the fact that the former can be more costly to implement (Attig et al.,
2016). This tendency is not surprising considering that increasing CSR strengths
can be more beneficial to firms through its impact on firm performance (Servaes and
Tamayo, 2013) and its ability to satisfy more diverse stakeholder demands (Zygli-
dopoulos et al., 2012). Moreover, concentrating on increasing firms’ positive effects
on society is likely to have a more prominent impact on strengthening a responsible
image as it involves proactive decisions to contribute to the well-being of society,
while decreasing the negative effects can often be viewed as actions that "any good
citizen would do" (Davis, 1973, p. 313). Finally, increasing CSR strengths can be
easier to implement as firms have a diverse choice of ways to further social goods
while the paths to decreasing CSR concerns can be limited to the firms’ particular
environmental or ethical issues (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).
I hypothesise that the motivation behind superior CSR among executives with
high ascribed status stems from the need to maintain a positive corporate image, sug-
gesting that these CEOs will probably concentrate their CSR strategy on improving
strengths rather than diminishing concerns. The additional normative expectation
of higher donations among the members of the core elite is also likely to contribute
to the increase in CSR strengths, leading to my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Higher corporate social performance among CEOs with high
ascribed status is driven by higher CSR strengths rather than lower CSR concerns.
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Another dichotomy in the CSR construct is related to the relevance of its compo-
nent dimensions. Firms can choose to engage in social actions that directly address
the needs of their primary stakeholders, such as employees and customers, or un-
dertake activities that are directed at contributing to the society at large. Building
on the recent work by Dupire and M’Zali (2016) and Flammer (2015), I refer to the
former group of stakeholders as "core" and the latter group as "peripheral".
In his influential work on the organisation of the corporate elite in the United
States, Useem (1984) describes corporate giving as a type of "social currency" used
to promote class-wide interests of the inner circle. The author argues that corpo-
rations integrated into the core elite display greater commitment to culture and
charitable donations, thereby promoting the common interests of the business and
cultural elite. Useem (1984) also reports that corporate managers belonging to the
inner circle are unlikely to reject appeals for charitable giving from other members
of the network, regardless of the relevance of such contributions to the company’s
primary operations. Indeed, later studies provide additional empirical support for
Useem’s (1984) assertions, showing that firms with executives deeply embedded in
elite circles make more charitable contributions (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997).
Useem’s (1984) theory of charitable giving as a "social currency" suggests that
high ascribed status executives deeply embedded in elite circles are likely to focus
their social actions on issues related to the greater community rather than compa-
nies’ primary stakeholders, thereby concentrating their CSR strategy on peripheral
stakeholders. Therefore, my third hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: CEO ascribed status is associated with higher corporate social
performance targeting peripheral stakeholders compared to corporate social perfor-
mance targeting core stakeholders.
4.2.2 Achieved status and CSR
Ascribed status and the implications of being a part of the inner circle of corpo-
rate elite provide a clear channel that links this aspect of CEO status to social
performance. Considering the potential impact of an increase in achieved status on
corporate social responsibility, on the other hand, unveils a more diverse range of
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mechanisms that can theoretically point to both an increase or a decrease in CSR
following a positive status shift.
An increase in CEO achieved social status following a prestigious business award
is likely associated with greater reputation as it signals superior ability. Despite some
evidence of negative consequences of CEO reputation on organisational outcomes
(see, for example, Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Wade et al., 2006), it is generally
viewed as a valuable resource due to the benefits it provides to the firm. In particular,
D’Aveni (1990) argues that managerial prestige improves organisational legitimacy
and is associated with easier access to new information. Wade et al. (2006) also
note that CEO reputation increases firm’s credibility with their stakeholders, in-
cluding investors, employees, customers and suppliers. In addition, Pollock et al.
(2009) provide evidence of a positive signalling influence of prestigious executives
during IPOs, while Agarwal et al. (2011) assesses the financial value of managerial
reputation and finds that firms with more reputed management are associated with
lower cost of equity, higher market value, and a more persistent positive operating
performance.
Regardless of the specific topic, the literature on the value of managerial repu-
tation seems to agree that one of the most apparent and valuable effects of CEO
prestige is that it generates an ’illusion of competence’ (D’Aveni, 1990), whereby
managerial reputation is taken as an indication of professional quality. Moreover,
Hayward et al. (2004) posit that organizational achievements, and particularly finan-
cial performance, are likely to be attributed to individual leaders. These patterns
of associating CEO reputation with firm performance can be particularly problem-
atic to CEOs with greater reputation as it may not be sufficient for them to simply
maintain a certain level of performance in order to preserve their status.
Indeed, several studies find evidence of higher pay-performance sensitivities
among highly reputed (or celebrity) CEOs. Wade et al. (2006) use a sample of award-
winning executives to examine the impact of CEO celebrity status on their pay, and
find that, compared to non-winners, award-winning executives receive higher remu-
neration when performance is high following the award, but lower compensation
when performance is low subsequent to the award. Milbourn (2003) proxies CEO
reputation based on the number of press citations and finds a similar pattern of
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greater pay-for-performance sensitivity among more reputed executives.
The findings provided by Milbourn (2003) and Wade et al. (2006) suggest that
increases in CEO reputation are likely to heighten shareholders’ expectations re-
garding the future performance. This results in higher standards that need to be
met by celebrity CEOs in order to preserve their status, and can shift their attention
from long-term goals to concentrating on short-term performance.
In their analysis of CEO career horizon problems in the context of corporate
social responsibility, Oh et al. (2016) argue that executives that are more focused
on short-term corporate outcomes are likely to exhibit disengagement from CSR
activities. This is primarily due to the fact that social actions tend to be long-term
investments that do not show immediate financial returns but can incur significant
costs (Mahapatra, 1984; Orlitzky et al., 2003). While Oh et al. (2016) concentrate
on how the timing of returns from CSR activities relates to CEO age, the long-term
nature of social investments can also contradict the interests of highly reputed CEOs,
particularly following a positive status shift. Specifically, if executives focus on the
short-term performance in order to maintain their reputation, they are unlikely
to engage in activities, such as CSR, that require substantial current investment
without providing notable short-term value.
In addition, while the balance of literature suggests that there is a positive re-
lationship between social and financial performance, there is still some credible ev-
idence of a negative or a neutral link between CSR and firm performance, as well
as research indicating that this relationship varies with certain firm characteristics,
such as firm dynamism (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000;
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wang et al., 2008). These diverse and inconsistent
results indicate that engagement in CSR is associated with high level of outcome
uncertainty, making it a risky strategy. In turn, superior CEO status and reputa-
tion have been shown to be associated with lower risk taking, which is evident from
the findings by Koh (2011) who shows that celebrity CEOs engage in more conser-
vative accounting practices and are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings
management, and is also in line with the results of my first study that shows that
award-winners decrease their M&A activities following a positive status shift.
Although, on the surface, the long term nature and uncertainty associated with
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CSR engagement does not appear to be in the best interest of highly reputed CEOs,
recent research indicates that highly visible award-winning CEOs might face more
pressures to engage in social activities, and also outlines a range of advantages that
CSR actions can provide to high status executives, including private reputational
benefits as well as added value to their organisation.
First, winning an award is likely to increase media coverage for the company,
resulting in higher media visibility. Fiss and Zajac (2006) investigate the role of
media coverage in the adoption of strategic change and posit that more visible firms
are exposed to more diverse stakeholder demands. Consistent with this argument,
the authors find that firms with greater media visibility are more likely to adopt
a balancing framing approach, seeking to "accommodate the diverging interests of
different constituents" (Fiss and Zajac, 2006, p.1176).
Building on this line of argument, Zyglidopoulos et al. (2012) propose that me-
dia attention will be positively related to corporate social responsibility as greater
visibility will induce companies to use social actions in order to meet the diverse
stakeholder demands. The authors test this hypothesis using S&P500 firms between
2000 and 2004, and find that increases in media coverage are related to increases in
CSR, noting that the influence appears to stem from superior CSR strengths rather
than lower CSR weaknesses (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). A more recent study by
Borghesi et al. (2014) expands the sample to include non S&P 500 firms between
1992 and 2006, and provide additional evidence of a positive relationship between
media attention and CSR. These results indicate that a positive shift in CEO status
and the subsequent increase in media visibility is likely to put more pressure on
executives to engage in social actions.
In addition, there is research that suggests that investing in corporate social
responsibility can provide insurance-like protection to firms, particularly in times of
crisis. In his theoretical work on the relationship between corporate philanthropy
and shareholders wealth, Godfrey (2005) argues that social actions can generate
a positive ’moral capital’ among stakeholders which can contribute to shareholder
value by providing a buffer in times of crisis. In a subsequent emprical investigation,
Godfrey et al. (2009) consider a sample of 178 negative regulatory and legal actions
against firms between 1993 and 2003, and find that participation in CSR activities,
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indeed, protected shareholder value during these negative events. Interestingly, the
authors find that only social actions targeting peripheral stakeholders (or society
at large) provided these ’insurance-like’ benefits, suggesting that the value of the
reputational capital from CSR activities can depend on the focus of social actions.
Since more visible firms are generally more vulnerable to crises (Zyglidopoulos
et al., 2012), the insurance-like reputational benefits associated with social actions
can provide substantial incentives to high status executives to engage in CSR. More-
over, if the higher pay-performance sensitivity among high status CEOs inclines
them to engage in earnings management (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate,
2009), engagement in social actions can also be strategically used to attenuate the
adverse perception from this practice (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016).
Finally, high status CEOs might be inclined to engage in CSR due to the private
benefits associated with it. In particular, investment in social actions can improve
executives’ reputation as good citizens, and create a "warm-glow" effect since in-
dividuals contributing to public good have been shown to report higher levels of
happiness and life satisfaction (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Videras and Owen, 2006).
The private reputational benefits from CSR can be particularly pronounced among
high status CEOs due to the greater media coverage associated with their prestigious
achievements (Borghesi et al., 2014).
Overall, the literature suggests that winning an award could potentially lead to
both a decrease or an increase in CSR investments. An award-winning CEO might
be motivated to decrease social activities in order to preserve short-term profits
and reduce risk. On the other hand, winning an award increases media visibility,
creating more pressures for CEOs to meet diverse stakeholder demands and generate
a positive reputational capital for times of stress. In addition, an award-winning
CEO might increase CSR activities in order to promote his own private reputation.
On balance, it appears, that the financial risks associated with higher CSR en-
gagement are less substantial compared to the reputational risks that high status
executives would face if they decided to disengage from social activities following a
positive status shift. Combined with the variety of personal and professional bene-
fits from CSR investments, it is more likely that an increase in achieved status will
lead to higher rather than lower social performance.
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Hypothesis 4: A positive shift in CEO achieved social status results in higher
corporate social performance.
Next, I investigate the channels through which high achieved status CEOs might
increase their social activities, and the first dichotomy in the CSR construct is related
to the fact that overall social performance can be achieved through an increase in
positive social actions or a decrease in negative social activities. In addition, research
suggests that, while CSR strengths and concerns might be positively correlated as
companies try to offset their negative impacts with positive proactive actions, "doing
good" and "avoiding bad" should be viewed as independent constricts and modelled
separately (Mattingly and Berman, 2006).
Zyglidopoulos et al. (2012) argue that firms have more freedom in increasing
their social strengths since there is a diverse choice of actions that can further social
goods, such as charitable giving, volunteer programs and improvements in employee
benefits. On the other hand, paths to decreasing companies’ negative impacts will
usually be limited to the specific issues they face. Therefore, Zyglidopoulos et al.
(2012) posit that investment in CSR strengths allows firms to better address the
diverse stakeholder demands, making this side of social activity more attractive to
firms. Indeed, the authors find that higher media scrutiny associated with greater
coverage of a firm in one of the major US newspapers results in a significant increase
in CSR strengths but has a neutral impact on CSR concerns.
In addition to the ability to satisfy more diverse stakeholder demands, Servaes
and Tamayo (2013) find that investment in CSR strengths also has a more pro-
nounced positive impact on firm performance compared to reducing CSR concerns.
The authors argue that the reason CSR concerns are not as strongly related to firm
performance is that a reduction in negative social actions is less likely to be a result
of specific social efforts but rather an outcome of other organisational decisions.
The higher apparent pay-off from increases in CSR strengths will likely motivate
high status CEOs to focus on this side of social actions since they are faced with
high performance expectations and greater pay-performance sensitivities (Milbourn,
2003; Wade et al., 2006).
Finally, investment in CSR strengths is likely to have a more prominent reputa-
tional impact and strengthen company’s responsible image because positive social
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actions usually involve proactive decisions to contribute to the well-being of society,
while decreasing firm’s negative social impacts can often be viewed as actions that
"any good citizen would do" (Davis, 1973, p. 313). Following a positive shift in
achieved status, CEOs who achieved recognition are incentivised to preserve their
reputation and, since companies’ actions are often attributed to their leaders (Hay-
ward et al., 2004), high status executives are likely to make decisions that strengthen
the image of their organisation.
Overall, investment in social strengths appears to be a more intuitive channel for
high achieved status CEOs to increase their overall social performance. This side
of CSR provides a more diverse choice of potential actions, has a more prominent
impact on firm performance and can assist executives in building a reputation of
a responsible leader. Therefore, I hypothesise that the increase in overall social
performance among high achieved status CEOs will be driven through higher CSR
strengths.
Hypothesis 5: Higher corporate social performance among CEOs with high
achieved status is driven by higher CSR strengths rather than lower CSR concerns.
Another distinguishing factor in various CSR activities is the relevance of its
component dimensions, as firms can choose to undertake activities that directly
address the needs of their primary, or core, stakeholders, or engage in social actions
that contribute to the society at large (Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Flammer, 2015).
Social actions targeting different groups of stakeholders can have a varying impact
on the company’s competitive advantage and pose distinct benefits to organisations
and their leaders.
From a strategic perspective, it appears that focusing on primary stakeholders,
such as employees, customers and suppliers, can have a more positive impact on the
firm’s overall competitive advantage. Hillman and Keim (2001) argue that invest-
ment in social actions targeting company’s core stakeholders contributes to creating
a better relationship with these essential stakeholder groups, and helps companies
develop valuable intangible assets that can result in competitive advantage. In their
empirical investigation, Hillman and Keim (2001) find support for their propositions
and document that social activities related to companies’ primary stakeholders lead
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to improved shareholder value while social actions targeting society at large is neg-
atively associated with shareholder wealth. Consistent with the theoretical and
empirical foundations in Hillman and Keim (2001), Dupire and M’Zali (2016) find
that competitive pressures tend to mainly improve social performance related to
core stakeholders, while Attig et al. (2016) document that social actions targeting
primary stakeholders are also more important to multinational corporations.
While, in general, the shareholder value appears to be positively related to CSR
activities directed at core company stakeholders, Godfrey et al. (2009) shows how
social actions aimed at the community and the society at large can provide insurance-
like benefits to companies in times of crisis. In an event study of negative legal and
regulatory actions against firms, the authors find that CSR investments targeting
peripheral stakeholders protected shareholder value during the negative events, while
activities related to firms’ trading partners created no such protection. In their
discussion on the mechanisms behind this pattern, Godfrey et al. (2009) argue that
social performance towards firms’ primary stakeholders is less likely to contribute
to the company’s "moral capital" as such actions create clear advantages for the
firm and are viewed as less self-serving compared to activities that contribute to the
greater society.
Therefore, social performance towards different groups of stakeholders appears
to provide distinct advantages to companies, with core CSR activities having a gen-
erally positive impact on shareholder value and firms’ competitive advantage, while
peripheral CSR performance seems more valuable in times crisis. High performance
expectations facing CEOs with greater achieved status are likely to concentrate their
attention on the more immediate firm profitability, creating greater incentives to fo-
cus their CSR strategy on improving social performance related to the company’s
core stakeholders.
Hypothesis 6: CEO achieved status is associated with higher corporate social
performance targeting core stakeholders compared to corporate social performance
targeting peripheral stakeholders.
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4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Sample and data collection
The starting sample consists of yearly-rebalanced S&P 500 constituents between
January 1992 and December 2012. Following prior research, I exclude utilities and
financial firms2 as the differences in regulatory environments in such companies
are likely to limit CEOs’ influence over strategic decisions such as CSR investment
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Petrenko et al., 2016). The usable dataset is comprised of
5,080 firm-year observations from 470 companies and includes all observations for
which financial and CSR information is available3.
Similar to the analysis of social status and CEO acquisitiveness, data on CEO
personal characteristics, including age, tenure and gender is extracted from Com-
pustat ExecuComp database. Educational background information used to indicate
CEO ascribed status is collected from Marquis Who’s Who, Thomson One Banker,
EDGAR listings, Notable Names Database, and annual reports, where available.
Award data used to indicate positive achieved status shifts is hand-collected from
publications that conferred prestigious CEO awards during the sample period, in-
cluding Business Week, Financial World, Forbes, Industry Week, Chief Executive,
Electronic Business Magazine, Time, Time & CNN, Harvard Business Review, and
Morningstar.com.
Financial variables and firm-specific characteristics are obtained from Compustat.
These include firm size, return on assets (ROA), book leverage, R&D expenditures,
advertising expenditures, capital expenditures and industry codes for all sample
companies. Finally, data used to construct the measures of CSR performance is
obtained from MSCI ESG Stats (formerly known as Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini,
and Company or KLD). CSR variables used in this study are described in detail in
the following section, and the description of all firm, CEO and CSR measures is also
summarised in Tables A.10 and A.11 in the Appendix.
2Utilities: SIC codes 4900 - 4999; financial firms: SIC codes 6000 - 6999.
3I expand the dataset to include observations between 1991 and 2015 within the achieved status tests
in order to include data for the pre/post three year period for awards conferred at the beginning and at
the end of the sample period. I am not able to expand the dataset as far as 1989 (which is three years
before the first award in 1992) because KLD data coverage begins in 1991.
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4.3.2 CSR measurement
I use data from KLD to measure corporate social responsibility performance. KLD
uses a combination of government reports, financial statements, surveys and articles
to provide an independent annual evaluation of firms’ social performance. KLD
dataset has been widely used in recent scholarly research (see, for example, Adhikari,
2016; Cahan et al., 2017; Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Harjoto and Laksmana, 2016;
Petrenko et al., 2016) and has become accepted as the standard for measurement
of corporate social actions (see, for example, Chatterji et al., 2009; Mattingly and
Berman, 2006).
KLD’s assessment of corporate social performance is performed within seven
major dimensions: community, diversity, employee relations, natural environment,
human rights, product and corporate governance. Each of these dimensions includes
several strength and concern subcategories that can be rated either 0 (neutral) or 1
(strength/concern present). The number of strengths and concerns varies between
different dimensions and can be different from one year to another. For example,
community dimension includes strength items such as support for housing, support
for education and charitable giving. Community concerns include items such as
investment controversies, community impact and tax disputes. The total number
of annually evaluated community strengths is between two and seven throughout
the sample period and the total number of community concerns is between one and
four4.
Issues related to corporate governance are perceived to be separate from other
CSR dimensions (Adhikari, 2016; Jian and Lee, 2015) and corporate governance has
been shown to affect companies’ CSR engagement (Jo and Harjoto, 2012). Therefore,
I construct the measures of CSR performance based on the first six categories and
use the net corporate governance rating (total corporate governance strengths minus
total corporate governance concerns) as a control variable (similar to Cahan et al.,
2017; Kim et al., 2012)5.
Specifically, for each firm-year observation, I first aggregate all strength and
4Table A.13 in the Appendix presents the list of all strength and concern items for each of the seven
KLD dimensions.
5While the main tests are performed with the corporate governance control, I verify that the results
remain qualitatively similar if corporate governance is excluded from the model.
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concern ratings across the six dimensions to arrive at annual measures of total CSR
strengths and total CSR concerns. I then construct a net CSR performance variable
by subtracting firm’s total CSR concerns from its total CSR strengths6. I use the
net CSR measure to test hypotheses related to the firms’ overall social performance
(Hypothesis 1 for ascribed status and Hypothesis 4 for achieved status), and employ
the total CSR strengths and total CSR concerns measures in tests associated with
hypotheses that distinguish between the impact of CEO status on the positive and
negative dimensions of CSR (Hypothesis 2 for ascribed status and Hypothesis 5 for
achieved status).
For tests associated with Hypotheses 3 and 6, I disaggregate the social perfor-
mance measures described above based on the type of stakeholders that they target.
Similar to Dupire and M’Zali (2016) and Flammer (2015), I consider CSR actions
within the product, diversity and employee relations dimensions to affect primarily
core company stakeholders, whereas CSR activities within the community, environ-
ment and human rights dimensions focus on the peripheral stakeholders. Therefore,
core strengths and core concerns measures are defined as total strengths and total
concerns within product, diversity and employee relations categories. Peripheral
strengths and peripheral concerns variables are defined as total strengths and to-
tal concerns within community, environment and human rights categories. The net
measures for core and peripheral CSR performance are calculated as total strengths
minus total concerns within the respective type of CSR.
Aggregating strengths and concerns across multiple dimension of social perfor-
mance might confound the potential effects of elite CEOs on the individual areas
of CSR (Bouslah et al., 2013). Therefore, I perform several additional tests using
separate measures of CSR strengths, CSR concerns and net CSR within each of the
six individual dimensions of social performance in order to trace the specific areas
of CEO status influence on firm’s CSR practices.
Finally, I verify my results using two alternative measures of CSR that address
the methodological limitations of the KLD dataset. In particular, since the number
of evaluated strengths and concerns can differ over time, the aggregate CSR scores
6This is a common approach to measuring CSR performance in recent studies. See, for example,
Adhikari (2016) and Petrenko et al. (2016).
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are not directly comparable over time. Therefore, I follow Servaes and Tamayo
(2013) and supplement my analysis with additional tests using scaled proxies for
CSR variables, which are calculated as aggregate strengths (concerns) within the
relevant dimensions divided by the maximum possible number of strengths (con-
cerns) within those dimensions in the given year. In addition, similar to Attig et al.
(2016), I also employ industry-adjusted measures for CSR which are calculated as
aggregate strengths (concerns) within the relevant dimensions minus the average
CSR strengths (concerns) within the firm’s industry. Table A.11 in the Appendix
provides a description of all the variables used to proxy corporate social performance
in this study.
4.3.3 Status measurement
To measure CEO social status, I follow the same approach as in the analysis of CEO
acquisitiveness7. I use the level of educational prestige to indicate CEO ascribed
status because elite educational background is viewed as a primary criteria for social
categorisation and is likely to be indicative of upper-class upbringing (Domhoff, 1970;
Karabel and Astin, 1975; McDonald and Westphal, 2010; Westphal and Khanna,
2003). Specifically, a CEO is defined as having high ascribed status if he or she
received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League universities8, since the vast
majority of CEOs in my sample received their education in the United States, and
attendance at Ivy League schools has been historically associated with social elitism
and selectivity9 (Mullen, 2009).
I use prestigious business awards to indicate exogenous shocks to CEO achieved
social status. Similar to Koh (2011) and Malmendier and Tate (2009), I only include
national awards that are not subject to any constraints such as CEO age, gender or
industry, assuring that they are prominent enough to affect CEO status, and any
US executive has a possibility to win. The final list of publications selected based on
7Please refer to Section 2.3 for details.
8The Ivy League includes eight members: Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University,
Darmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania and Yale Univer-
sity.
9The United Kingdom is the second most popular source of bachelor degrees in my sample and the
Russell Group is considered to encompass the most elite institutions within the country. Therefore, I
verify that my findings are robust to considering attendance at one of the Russell Group universities as
also being indicative of high ascribed status.
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these criteria includes ten sources: Business Week, Financial World, Forbes, Industry
Week, Chief Executive, Electronic Business Magazine, Time, Time & CNN, Harvard
Business Review, and Morningstar.com10.
4.4 Ascribed status and CSR
4.4.1 Empirical specification
I analyse the relationship between ascribed status and CSR performance using linear
regression models with the following specification:
CSRft = α+β1Statusft+β2Firmft−1+β3CEOft+FixedEffectsft+εft (4.1)
CSRft is the level of CSR performance in firm f at time t, which is measured
using a range of variables described in Table A.11 in the Appendix. Statusft is the
indicator of ascribed status which equals to one if a CEO received a bachelor degree
from one of the Ivy League universities, and equals to zero otherwise.
Firmft−1 represents a set of firm control variables. Since larger and more prof-
itable firms are more visible and have been shown to have a higher likelihood of
engaging in CSR (see, for example, Kubik et al., 2012), I control for return on
assets (ROA) and firm size, which is measured as the natural logarithm of total
assets11. I also control for book leverage because constraints on available cash flows
associated with higher debt might reduce firm’s social spending (Adhikari, 2016),
and CEOs’ risk tolerance can influence their attitude toward social actions (Wad-
dock and Graves, 1997). In addition, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) argue that there
is a positive relationship between firms’ social investment and their R&D and adver-
tising expenditures. Therefore, I control for R&D intensity, measured as the ratio
of R&D expenditures to total sales; and advertising intensity, measured as the ra-
tio of advertising expenditures to total sales. Since reporting R&D and advertising
10Please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for more details on each of the awards.
11In recent CSR studies (see, for example, Adhikari, 2016; Attig et al., 2016; Petrenko et al., 2016), firm
size is typically measured as either a natural logarithm of total assets or a natural logarithm of total sales.
I use the logarithm of total assets as the main measure of firm size but verify that the results are robust
to using a logarithm of total sales as a proxy for firm size.
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expenditures is not mandatory, there are many observations with missing values.
Following recent literature (see, for example, Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Hirshleifer
et al., 2012), I assign such observations a value of zero and keep them in the sample.
Finally, corporate governance has been shown to affect engagement in social issues
(Jo and Harjoto, 2012), so I include a corporate governance control measured based
on firms’ net CSR rating within the corporate governance dimension (total corpo-
rate governance strengths minus total corporate governance concerns) (similar to
Cahan et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2012). The above firm control variables are similar to
those used in recent studies that examine the likelihood of firms’ CSR involvement
(see, for example, Attig et al., 2016; Cahan et al., 2017; Dupire and M’Zali, 2016;
Petrenko et al., 2016).
CEOft represents a set of CEO-related control variables. Because recent research
suggests that CEO career horizon problems can influence their attitude toward social
activities (see, for example, Borghesi et al., 2014; Oh et al., 2016), I control for CEO
age and CEO tenure, both of which are measured in years. In addition, many studies
report gender differences in predicting CSR involvement (see, for example, Borghesi
et al., 2014; Manner, 2010), so I control for CEO gender, using a binary indicator
that equals to one if a CEO is female and equals to zero otherwise.
Finally, FixedEffectsft account for time trends by including year fixed effects
in all models. In addition, CSR practices could vary across industries due to dif-
ferences in industry standards and competitive pressures (see, for example, Dupire
and M’Zali, 2016). To account for potential inter-industry variations in social per-
formance, I include either industry or firm fixed effects in all estimations.
I performed Cook-Weisberg tests to diagnose whether heteroskedasticity could be
an issue in my estimations, and the results revealed the presence of heteroskedasticity
(p < 0.001) in my regression models. Therefore, I use robust standard errors that are
corrected for heteroskedasticity, and also cluster standard errors at the individual
firm level in order to account for the lack of independence among observations within
a given firm throughout the sample period.
To assess the degree of potential multicollinearity in my statistical analysis, I first
examined the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the regression models
(see Table 4.5). The correlations appear to be generally low among the control
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variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a particular concern. In addition,
I calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all of the predictor variables and
found that all VIFs are below 1.5. This is outside the conventional threshold of
10 (Neter et al., 1985), providing further evidence that my analysis does not have
multicollinearity issues.
Endogeneity is also a potential issue in my analysis, particularly because the
estimations might suffer from omitted variables. It is possible that there are unob-
servable firm characteristics that affect both the likelihood of having a high ascribed
status CEO and the firm’s social performance. In order to account for this pos-
sibility, I include a model with a fixed effects estimator in all hypotheses testing,
thus verifying that a certain trend is present within individual firms. In addition,
following Attig et al. (2016), I also employ a propensity score matching procedure
(using several matching methods) where firms with high ascribed status CEOs are
matched with similar firms that have lower status CEOs, and the estimation is
repeated within this restricted sample.
Another potential source of endogeneity is reverse causality. While the level of
firm’s CSR cannot directly affect the indicator of CEO’s ascribed status (since it is
based on past education), it is possible that elite CEOs are drawn to companies with
certain social characteristics. In order to attenuate this concern and also address a
potential simultaneous relationship between other independent variables and CSR,
I lag all the financial variables by one period and only include observations where
the CEO remains in office for the whole year. Therefore, all independent variables
pre-date the dependent measures of social performance. This approach is a common
response to threats of potential reverse causality in recent literature on predicting
social outcomes (Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Oh et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo,
2013)12.
12Another common approach to address endogeneity concerns is through the instrumental variable (IV)
estimation procedure. This two-stage approach requires an exogenous variable that is correlated with the
endogenous regressor (the elite indicator in my analysis) while remaining uncorrelated with the error term
in the equation of interest. While it would be beneficial to include this procedure as an additional robustness
check, the potential instrumental variables that could satisfy these conditions require information regarding
CEO family and I could not obtain such data.
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4.4.2 Univariate analysis
Figure 4.1 plots the average net CSR among firms with high and lower ascribed
status CEOs in each year of the sample period. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the
overall social performance is higher among firms with high status CEOs in 19 out
of 21 years. The two exceptional years are 1999 where firms with elite executives
have a slightly inferior social rating, and 2012 where both subgroups are almost
even in their net CSR, with a difference of 0.01. Considering the strong overall
trend, these two years appear to be exceptions rather than part of a pattern. In
addition, net CSR remains consistently positive among high ascribed status CEOs
while companies with lower status executives exhibit negative average net CSR
in years prior to 1995, suggesting that the level of their negative social impact
outweighed their positive actions13. A notable spike in net CSR in both subgroups
occurs between 2010 and 2012, which corresponds to the years when KLD changed
a significant number of evaluated strength and concern items, suggesting that this
pattern is likely to be related to the methodological changes in the KLD dataset
rather than firms’ social practices14. Since a similar threshold increase is apparent
in both subgroups, it does not appear that the methodological changes happen to
suit a particular type of firms more than the other.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 plot the average CSR strengths and CSR concerns, respec-
tively, among firms with high and lower ascribed status CEOs in each year of the
sample period. The average CSR strengths are higher in companies with high status
executives in 19 out of 21 years (same pattern as with the overall net CSR), and the
average CSR concerns are generally lower among the elite, except for three years
between 1994 and 1996. Hypothesis 2 posits that higher CSR performance among
CEOs with high ascribed status will be driven by higher social strengths rather
than lower concerns. The initial visual examination of the data shows that both
higher strengths and lower concerns contribute to the superior overall social perfor-
mance in firms with elite CEOs. The average difference in net CSR between the two
subgroups is 0.8 across all sample years, with the positive difference in strengths
13It is possible that this is not the case if companies with lower status CEOs engaged in positive social
actions that were not evaluated by KLD at the time.
14For the full list of KLD strength and concern items evaluated within each year, please see Table A.13
in the Appendix.
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contributing 0.6 and the negative difference in concerns contributing a further 0.2.
Thus, it appears that, while high status CEOs generally exhibit higher positive so-
cial performance as well as engage in less negative social actions, the former might
have more weight in the overall CSR, providing some initial support to Hypothesis
2.
Figure 4.1: Net CSR by year
The figure displays year-by-year average net CSR for high and lower ascribed status CEOs where net
CSR is calculated as the difference between CSR strengths and CSR concerns.
Figure 4.2: CSR strengths by year
The figure displays year-by-year average CSR strengths for high and lower ascribed status CEOs where
the CSR strengths measure is calculated as aggregate strengths within all CSR dimensions.
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Figure 4.3: CSR concerns by year
The figure displays year-by-year average CSR concerns for high and lower ascribed status CEOs where
the CSR concerns measure is calculated as aggregate concerns within all CSR dimensions.
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the main variables used in this study.
The fraction of high ascribed status CEOs remains between 10% and 19% throughout
the sample period, with an average of 12%. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, all
three overall CSR measures indicate a significantly higher average CSR performance
among firms with high status CEOs (p-value<0.01), which is evident through both
more positive social actions as well as less negative social impact. However, the
medians for CSR concerns and the net measure are identical between the two groups
of CEOs, while the median for CSR strengths is higher among executives with high
ascribed status, suggesting that the difference in CSR strengths is less likely to be
driven by outliers and indicating potential support for Hypothesis 2.
Summary statistics for the core and peripheral CSR measures show how firms
with high and lower ascribed status CEOs differ in their average social performance
towards different types of stakeholders. The general trend of superior social ratings
among the elite remains consistent for all core and peripheral CSR variables, with
the measures of strengths and net social performance being higher and the measures
of social concerns being lower in firms with high ascribed status executives. However,
it appears that within the core areas of CSR (those that target product, diversity
and employee related issues), firms with elite CEOs are particularly strong in terms
of positive social actions (p-value<0.01) while the difference in social concerns is
insignificant at the 10% level. This pattern is reversed within the peripheral dimen-
sion of CSR (which includes issues related to community, environment and human
rights), where high status executives seem to have superior efforts in reducing their
negative social impact (p-value<0.01) while not showing a significant difference in
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terms of positive social actions. Overall, the contribution from the core social ac-
tions to the aggregate measures of CSR appear to be more than double compared to
the contribution from the peripheral dimensions (for example, the average core and
peripheral CSR strengths, are 2.6 and 1.2, respectively). These initial insights sug-
gest that, contrary to Hypothesis 3, high ascribed status executives might engage in
more social actions targeting core stakeholders compared to peripheral stakeholders.
There is some variability between companies with high ascribed status executives
and other firms in terms of firm characteristics. In particular, companies with elite
CEOs appear to have slightly lower leverage (p-value<0.1) while maintaining higher
R&D and advertising intensity (p-value<0.5 and p-value<0.01, respectively). On
the other hand, there are no significant differences in firm size, return on assets or
corporate governance between companies with elite and non-elite CEOs.
There are also significant differences in CEO personal characteristics. High as-
cribed status executives tend to be younger (p-value<0.01), have a significantly
longer tenure (p-value<0.5) and are more likely to be female (p-value<0.01). Higher
average tenure among the more prominent members of the corporate elite is expected
as such CEOs are likely to possess higher prestige power, which can protect them
against dismissal, even in times of underperformance (Flickinger et al., 2016; Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2009). Higher proportion of female executives among the elite is
also not surprising as women are more likely to need a distinguished social status
position and prestigious network connections in order to achieve a CEO position
(Doldor et al., 2012). However, overall fraction of females is very low in both sub-
groups, ranging between 0.018 and 0.034.
The apparent differences in average firm and CEO characteristics between the
two groups of companies suggest that there might be underlying unobservable differ-
ences between firms with high and lower ascribed status executives. It is therefore
important to verify the evidence of the unconditional relationship between ascribed
status and CSR using multivariate analysis with controls for unobservable firm char-
acteristics (such as fixed effects estimator or propensity score matching).
Table 4.2 provides more detailed summary statistics for the aggregate CSR vari-
ables as well as individual CSR dimensions. A notable feature that emerges from
the descriptive statistics is the relatively low magnitude of the means and the me-
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for high and lower ascribed status CEOs
High ascribed Lower ascribed Difference
status CEOs status CEOs in means
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. p(high - low)
CSR variables
CSR net 623 1.642 1.000 3.285 4457 0.941 1.000 3.469 0.000***
CSR strengths 623 3.767 3.000 3.226 4457 3.403 2.000 3.302 0.009***
CSR concerns 623 2.125 2.000 2.001 4457 2.462 2.000 2.437 0.001***
Core CSR net 623 1.146 1.000 2.397 4457 0.747 0.000 2.331 0.000***
Core CSR strengths 623 2.559 2.000 2.224 4457 2.261 2.000 2.199 0.002***
Core CSR concerns 623 1.413 1.000 1.317 4457 1.514 1.000 1.464 0.102
Peripheral CSR net 623 0.496 0.000 1.605 4457 0.194 0.000 1.907 0.000***
Peripheral CSR strengths 623 1.209 1.000 1.475 4457 1.142 1.000 1.559 0.318
Peripheral CSR concerns 623 0.713 0.000 1.184 4457 0.949 0.000 1.517 0.000***
Firm controls
Firm size 623 8.860 8.740 1.276 4457 8.877 8.800 1.151 0.732
ROA 623 0.170 0.162 0.092 4457 0.166 0.161 0.085 0.262
Leverage 623 0.218 0.207 0.144 4457 0.230 0.224 0.148 0.055*
R&D intensity 623 0.053 0.016 0.142 4457 0.044 0.011 0.080 0.016**
Advertising intensity 623 0.024 0.000 0.047 4457 0.014 0.000 0.028 0.000***
Corporate governance 623 -0.485 -1.000 0.804 4457 -0.527 -1.000 0.769 0.206
CEO controls
CEO tenure 623 8.894 7.000 7.295 4457 6.645 5.000 6.155 0.029**
CEO age 623 55.811 56.000 7.356 4457 56.421 57.000 6.423 0.000***
CEO gender 623 0.034 0.000 0.181 4457 0.018 0.000 0.133 0.008***
The table provides summary statistics for the main regression variables used in this study. Sample of
CEOs consists of chief executive officers from S&P 500 constituents between 1992 and 2012. Financial
firms and utility companies are excluded from this study. The sample includes all firm-year observation
for which a CEO was in office for the entire fiscal year. High ascribed status CEOs are those who received
a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League Universities. Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for
the description of CSR variables. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calculated
as total debt divided by total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated as as operating income before
depreciation divided by book assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total
sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales. Corporate gov-
ernance is measured as the difference between strengths and concerns within KLD’s corporate governance
dimension. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1
if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. The column p(high - low) shows the p-values of t-tests
that the differences in means between high and lower ascribed status CEOs are zero. Superscripts *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
dians across all the CSR variables and among both firms with high ascribed status
CEOs and other sample companies. To put these values in perspective, Table 4.3
reports the annual number of strength and concern items evaluated by KLD within
each dimension, as well the total number of strengths and concerns within a given
year. Throughout the sample period, the overall number of strengths across all six
dimensions varies between 29 and 43, with an average of 38. The specific annual
values suggest that an aggregate CSR strengths score of 30 or more is potentially
achievable in all years except 2012. Similarly, the overall number of concerns across
all six dimensions ranges between 27 and 37, with an average of 34.
In reality, the average total CSR strengths are only 3.8 and 3.4 for firms with
high and lower status CEOs, respectively, and the average total CSR concerns are
2.1 and 2.5 among high and lower status executives, respectively. The median values
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are even lower, with the median for CSR concerns of 2 for both subgroups, and the
median for CSR strengths of 3 and 2 for firms with high and lower status CEOs,
respectively. These average figures are around ten times lower than the maximum
scores that could have been achieved, suggesting that companies might not spread
their social activities across many different dimensions at any given time. The
pattern of relatively small average social performance is evident in other recent
studies on CSR, and the mean values are even lower when firms outside of the
S&P500 are included in the sample (see, for example, Adhikari, 2016; Attig et al.,
2016; Borghesi et al., 2014), lending some support to the argument that smaller and
less-visible firms might have lower general CSR engagement.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for CSR variables
High ascribed status CEOs Lower ascribed status CEOs
Obs. Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max St. Dev. Obs. Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max St. Dev.
CSR net 623 1.64 -7 -1 1 3 16 3.28 4457 0.94 -9 -1 1 3 18 3.47
CSR strengths 623 3.77 0 1 3 6 17 3.23 4457 3.40 0 1 2 5 21 3.30
CSR concerns 623 2.13 0 1 2 3 12 2.00 4457 2.46 0 1 2 3 15 2.44
CSR core strengths 623 1.17 0 0 1 2 7 1.31 4457 0.98 0 0 1 1 8 1.24
CSR core concerns 623 1.15 0 0 1 2 5 1.17 4457 1.21 0 0 1 2 9 1.31
CSR peripheral strengths 623 1.19 0 0 1 2 7 1.44 4457 1.10 0 0 1 2 8 1.50
CSR peripheral concerns 623 0.56 0 0 0 1 5 1.01 4457 0.78 0 0 0 1 8 1.32
CSR community strengths 623 0.58 0 0 0 1 4 0.87 4457 0.47 0 0 0 1 4 0.77
CSR diversity strengths 623 1.38 0 0 1 2 6 1.45 4457 1.28 0 0 1 2 7 1.48
CSR employee relations strengths 623 0.88 0 0 1 2 6 1.11 4457 0.77 0 0 0 1 7 1.05
CSR environment strengths 623 0.60 0 0 0 1 5 0.94 4457 0.64 0 0 0 1 5 1.05
CSR human rights strengths 623 0.02 0 0 0 0 1 0.15 4457 0.04 0 0 0 0 2 0.21
CSR product strengths 623 0.29 0 0 0 1 2 0.48 4457 0.21 0 0 0 0 3 0.45
CSR community concerns 623 0.12 0 0 0 0 2 0.33 4457 0.16 0 0 0 0 3 0.41
CSR diversity concerns 623 0.27 0 0 0 1 2 0.46 4457 0.30 0 0 0 1 2 0.51
CSR employee relations concerns 623 0.88 0 0 1 2 6 1.11 4457 0.77 0 0 0 1 7 1.05
CSR environment concerns 623 0.43 0 0 0 1 4 0.87 4457 0.61 0 0 0 1 6 1.09
CSR human rights concerns 623 0.16 0 0 0 0 2 0.41 4457 0.17 0 0 0 0 3 0.44
CSR product concerns 623 0.51 0 0 0 1 4 0.76 4457 0.54 0 0 0 1 4 0.85
The table provides summary statistics for the CSR variables used in this study, splitting the sample based on whether a firm had a CEO with high ascribed
status in a given year. A CEO is identified as having high ascribed status if he or she received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League Universities.
Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the description of CSR variables.
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Table 4.3: Annual distribution of evaluated CSR strength and concern items across dimensions
Community Community Diversity Diversity Employee rel. Employee rel. Envir. Envir. Human r. Human r. Product Product Total Total
strengths concerns strengths concerns strengths concerns strengths concerns strengths concerns strengths concerns strengths concerns
1992 4 4 7 4 10 6 9 8 0 4 5 5 35 31
1993 4 4 7 5 10 6 9 8 0 4 5 5 35 32
1994 6 4 7 5 9 6 9 8 2 7 5 5 38 35
1995 6 4 8 5 9 6 9 8 2 5 5 5 39 33
1996 6 4 8 5 9 6 8 8 1 5 5 5 37 33
1997 6 4 8 5 9 6 8 8 1 5 5 5 37 33
1998 6 4 8 5 9 7 8 8 1 6 5 5 37 35
1999 6 4 8 5 9 7 8 9 1 6 5 5 37 36
2000 6 4 8 5 9 7 8 9 2 7 5 5 38 37
2001 6 4 8 5 9 7 8 9 2 7 5 5 38 37
2002 6 4 8 5 10 7 8 9 3 6 5 5 40 36
2003 6 4 8 5 11 7 8 9 3 6 5 5 41 36
2004 6 4 8 5 11 7 8 9 3 6 5 5 41 36
2005 7 4 8 5 11 7 8 9 3 6 5 5 42 36
2006 7 4 8 5 11 7 9 9 3 6 5 5 43 36
2007 7 4 8 5 11 7 9 9 3 6 5 5 43 36
2008 7 4 8 5 11 7 9 9 3 6 5 5 43 36
2009 7 4 8 5 11 7 9 9 3 6 5 5 43 36
2010 4 1 7 4 10 5 9 9 2 5 3 5 35 29
2011 4 1 7 4 10 5 9 9 2 5 3 5 35 29
2012 2 1 4 3 9 5 9 9 2 4 3 5 29 27
The table presents annual distribution of the total number of CSR strength and concern items evaluated within each CSR dimension by KLD in a given year. Please refer to
Table A.11 in the Appendix for the full list of strength and concern items evaluated by KLD.
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To further investigate CSR practices of the sample companies, Table 4.4 describes
engagement in different CSR dimensions by high and lower status CEOs, concen-
trating on positive social actions (i.e. CSR strengths). Panel A divides firm-year
observations based on the number of different CSR dimensions that they engage in
within a given year. Overall, 16% of firm-years are associated with no engagement in
positive social activities and approximately half of the sample show CSR strengths
in only one or two distinct dimensions within a particular year. This confirms that
most companies do not tend to spread their social efforts across many different ar-
eas. The pattern is similar for firms with and without high ascribed status CEOs,
although elite executives, on average, exhibit a slightly more diverse spread of CSR
investments.
Panel B of Table 4.4 shows the proportion of firm-year observations with engage-
ment in each CSR dimension. Approximately two thirds of the sample show some
engagement in one of the core dimensions of CSR which include product, diversity
and employee relations, and only one third exhibit CSR strengths within the periph-
eral dimensions, suggesting that most firms prioritise social actions targeting their
primary stakeholders. The overall distribution of social strengths across different
CSR dimensions appears to be very similar across all firms.
A quarter of observations are associated with engagement in only one CSR di-
mension (see Panel A), and to better understand firms’ priorities regarding the
direction of their social actions, I investigate the distribution of CSR engagement
across different dimensions within years when firms only engage in one. Panel C
presents the results, showing that the overall pattern of higher engagement in social
areas targeting core stakeholders still holds. However, in this case, firms with high
ascribed status CEOs show a relatively lower commitment to primary stakeholders
compared to firms with non-elite CEOs. In addition, when companies concentrate
on only one CSR dimension, high status executives appear to choose to invest in
community strengths almost twice as much as other CEOs (15% and 8% of the
time, respectively), suggesting that social actions such as charitable giving might be
relatively more important to elite executives.
Table 4.5 presents a correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression
analysis. Of particular interest is the significant correlation (at 1% level) between
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Table 4.4: Engagement in different CSR dimensions
Panel A: Number of distinct CSR strength dimensions firms engage in within a given year
No engagement Engag. Engag. Engag. Engag. Engag. Engag.
in CSR in 1 dimen. in 2 dimen. in 3 dimen. in 4 dimen. in 5 dimen. in 6 dimen.
High ascribed status CEOs 16% 17% 26% 18% 14% 8% 0%
Lower ascribed status CEOs 16% 26% 25% 17% 11% 5% 1%
Total 16% 25% 25% 17% 11% 5% 1%
Panel B: Proportion of firm-year observations with engagement in each CSR dimension
Community Diversity Employee Environment Human Product
relations rights
High ascribed status CEOs 17% 29% 23% 17% 1% 13%
Lower ascribed status CEOs 16% 30% 24% 18% 2% 10%
Total 17% 29% 24% 18% 2% 10%
Panel C: Proportion of firm-year observations with engagement in each CSR dimension when they only engage in one
Community Diversity Employee Environment Human Product
relations rights
High ascribed status CEOs 15% 42% 22% 13% 0% 7%
Lower ascribed status CEOs 8% 44% 26% 16% 0% 7%
Total 8% 43% 26% 16% 0% 7%
The table describes the engagement in different CSR dimensions (strengths only) by elite and non-elite
CEOs. Panel A shows the proportion of firm-year observations where firms with high and lower ascribed
status CEOs engage in zero, one, two, three, four, five or all six CSR dimensions. Panel B shows the pro-
portion of firm-year observations with engagement in each CSR dimension. Panel C shows the proportion
of firm-year observations with engagement in each CSR dimension when they only engage in one dimension
within a given year.
the indicator of ascribed status and most CSR measures. Specifically, there is a
positive and significant correlation between having a high status CEO and all three
net measures of CSR: the overall net CSR, the core net CSR and the peripheral
net CSR. There is also positive and significant correlation for two out of three CSR
strengths measures: the overall CSR strengths and the core CSR strengths. Finally,
there is a negative and significant correlation for two out of three CSR concerns
measure: the overall CSR concerns and the peripheral CSR concerns. These patterns
are consistent with the analysis of the summary statistics.
Overall, the univariate analysis provides some interesting initial insights into
the social practices of firms with high ascribed status executives, compared to other
companies. In particular, there is some support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 as high status
CEOs show superior average CSR performance with a relatively higher contribution
from superior positive actions compared to reduced negative actions. There is also
evidence that can contradict Hypothesis 3 as firms with high status CEOs appear to
exhibit relatively higher social performance targeting core stakeholders. However,
a more detailed examination of the distribution of social activities across different
dimensions shows that community-related issues might be relatively more important
to the elite.
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Table 4.5: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Ascribed status 1.00
2 CSR net 0.07 1.00
3 CSR strengths 0.04 0.75 1.00
4 CSR concerns -0.05 -0.41 0.29 1.00
5 Core CSR net 0.06 0.86 0.70 -0.28 1.00
6 Core CSR strengths 0.04 0.71 0.92 0.24 0.80 1.00
7 Core CSR concerns -0.02 -0.31 0.26 0.81 -0.40 0.23 1.00
8 Peripheral CSR net 0.05 0.77 0.51 -0.41 0.33 0.31 -0.07 1.00
9 Peripheral CSR strengths 0.01 0.58 0.82 0.29 0.35 0.53 0.24 0.64 1.00
10 Peripheral CSR concerns -0.05 -0.36 0.22 0.82 -0.06 0.16 0.33 -0.60 0.24 1.00
11 Firm size -0.00 0.10 0.52 0.57 0.16 0.47 0.45 -0.01 0.44 0.47 1.00
12 ROA 0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.13 0.15 0.07 -0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.16 1.00
13 Leverage -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.17 -0.14 1.00
14 R&D intensity 0.03 0.18 0.10 -0.12 0.17 0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 -0.24 1.00
15 Advertising intensity 0.11 0.19 0.15 -0.05 0.14 0.14 -0.00 0.17 0.13 -0.08 0.00 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
16 Corporate governance 0.02 0.15 0.06 -0.12 0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.15 0.14 -0.04 -0.13 0.07 0.02 -0.11 0.03 1.00
17 CEO tenure 0.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
18 CEO age -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.13 -0.08 0.04 0.40 1.00
19 CEO gender 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 1.00
The table presents a correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression models. Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the description of the variables. Correlation
coefficients that are significant at the 1% level are reported in boldface.
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4.4.3 Multivariate analysis
I formalise the evidence of the unconditional relationship between ascribed status
and social performance using a range of multiple regression models with different
specifications. To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, Table 4.6 presents the main
results regarding the influence of elite CEOs on the overall CSR variables that are
based on all six dimensions of corporate social responsibility.
First, I test the relationship between ascribed social status and CSR using Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models that include year and industry fixed
effects, and the results of these estimations are reported in Models 1 - 3 of Table 4.6.
Model 1 employs net CSR as the dependent variable and shows a positive and signif-
icant coefficient (p-value<0.05) on the ascribed status indicator. Model 2 estimates
the influence of elite CEOs on the aggregate CSR strengths, and the coefficient on
the ascribed status indicator is also positive and significant (p-value<0.10). Finally,
Model 3 uses total CSR concerns as the dependent variable and reports no signifi-
cant contribution (p-value>0.10) from CEO ascribed status in explaining this side
of corporate social responsibility. Taken together, these results suggest that there is
a positive link between CEO ascribed status and corporate social responsibility, and
this relationship is driven by higher CSR strengths rather than lower CSR concerns.
The coefficients on the control variables are in line with findings in similar recent
studies (see, for example, Attig et al., 2016; Borghesi et al., 2014; Petrenko et al.,
2016) and are generally consistent with expectations. In terms of firm characteristics,
I find that size, profitability, R&D and advertising intensity, and corporate gover-
nance are all positively related to CSR strengths as well as net CSR (p-value<0.05).
In contrast, only firm size and corporate governance show a significant relationship
with CSR concerns (p-value<0.05), and the coefficients suggest that companies’
negative social actions increase with firm size and decrease with better corporate
governance. The findings related to firm size are similar to those in other research
that considers CSR concerns separately (Manner, 2010; Petrenko et al., 2016), and
this pattern is interesting as it suggests that, perhaps, large organisations involve
greater complexity or broader reach, potentially leading to higher propensity for
social concerns to emerge.
There are also some significant influences from the CEO-related characteristics.
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CEO gender appears to have a significant relationship with all CSR variables (p-
value<0.05), with a particularly strong impact on CSR strengths and net CSR
(p-value<0.01), suggesting that female executives are more likely to make socially
responsible investments. The coefficient on CEO age is positive and significant in
models with CSR strengths and CSR concerns (p-value<0.10 and p-value<0.05, re-
spectively) but is insignificant within the net CSR model (p-value>0.10). The coef-
ficient on CEO tenure is only significant in relation to CSR concerns (p-value<0.01)
and suggests that higher tenure is related to lower negative social actions.
The majority of research on predicting firms’ involvement in CSR still concen-
trates on firm characteristics and there aren’t many studies that include CEO con-
trols in their models. Among the ones that do, the effect of gender on CSR is
generally similar to that observed in my results (see, for example, Borghesi et al.,
2014; Manner, 2010). Regarding the influence of CEO age and tenure, the major-
ity of research reports either no significant relationship or a negative link between
CEO age or tenure and socially responsible investments (see, for example, Borghesi
et al., 2014; Manos and Drori, 2016; Oh et al., 2016). However, these studies tend
to consider only the net effect of CSR or focus on the positive side of social actions
(CSR strengths), making it hard to compare the findings. One exception is a study
by Petrenko et al. (2016) that looks at the influence of CEO narcissism on both
CSR strengths and CSR concerns, as well as the net corporate social responsibility.
While the models in this study do not control for CEO tenure, they take account of
CEO age and report a similar pattern of a positive relationship between CEO age
and CSR concerns and no significant relationship between CEO age and the overall
net CSR.
In models 4 - 6 of Table 4.6, I reestimate the specifications in models 1 - 3
with firm fixed effects. The results of these estimations look considerably different
from those reported in models with industry rather than firm fixed effects. Here,
the coefficient on the ascribed status indicator is positive for CSR strengths and
net CSR but remains insignificant at the 10% level for both dependent variables
(the coefficient in the net CSR model is approaching significance at the 10% level
with p-value=0.12). In contrast, the results suggest that CEO ascribed status has
a significant negative relationship with CSR concerns (p-value<0.10). The striking
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difference in findings in models with firm fixed effects indicates that omitted firm
variables are likely to be an important source of endogeneity in my analysis, and firms
with elite CEOs might be fundamentally different compared to other companies.
This suggests that the true effect of ascribed status on social performance is driven by
lower CSR concerns among firms with elite CEOs rather than higher social strengths.
Taken together, the findings in Table 4.6 provide limited support for Hypoth-
esis 1 which posits that CEO ascribed status is associated with superior overall
engagement in CSR. Both net CSR models (with and without fixed firm effects)
indicate an economically significant positive link between CEO ascribed status and
corporate social responsibility: having an executive with elite background results
in an approximate increase of 45% in net CSR compared to the base level among
companies with non-elite CEOs15. However, while the coefficient on the ascribed
status indicator is significant in the estimation with industry fixed effects (Model 1,
p-value<0.10), it is only approaching significance at the 10% level when firm fixed
effects are included in the model (Model 4, p-value=0.12).
On the other hand, testing whether higher social performance among the elite
is driven by superior social strengths or reduced social concerns provides contrast-
ing results depending on the approach. I find evidence of significantly higher CSR
strengths among CEOs with elite background in models without firm effects and ev-
idence of significantly lower CSR concerns in models that include fixed firm effects.
These results suggest that CEOs with higher ascribed social status might be drawn
to firms with higher CSR strengths but, once there, their influence affects social per-
formance primarily through reducing CSR concerns. This pattern is not consistent
with Hypothesis 2 which predicted the opposite effect and, overall, it appears that
firms that attract high ascribed status CEOs are associated with superior social
strengths, but the influence of elite CEOs is related to social concerns.
To take account of the apparent unobservable firm-level characteristics that affect
both the likelihood of having an ascribed status CEO as well as social engagement
practices, all further analyses are conducted utilising models with fixed firm effects.
This approach helps to isolate the effect of possible omitted firm variables, and is
more likely to capture the true effects of ascribed social status on CSR strategies.
15Following Hirshleifer et al. (2012), I calculate the economic impact of status variables on CSR measures
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Table 4.6: Ascribed status and CSR
Industry fixed effects Firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR
Net Str. Con. Net Str. Con.
Ascribed status 0.540** 0.400* -0.140 0.457 0.154 -0.302*
(0.245) (0.220) (0.131) (0.291) (0.221) (0.179)
Firm size 0.559*** 1.603*** 1.044*** -0.378* 0.189 0.568***
(0.126) (0.106) (0.082) (0.213) (0.142) (0.125)
ROA 5.395*** 4.899*** -0.496 0.422 -0.181 -0.603
(1.061) (0.821) (0.678) (0.931) (0.726) (0.600)
Leverage -0.347 -0.772 -0.425 1.018 0.626 -0.392
(0.726) (0.603) (0.427) (0.622) (0.469) (0.404)
R&D intensity 5.308*** 4.404*** -0.904 0.909 1.001** 0.092
(1.804) (1.367) (0.753) (0.773) (0.492) (0.472)
Advertising intensity 8.803** 7.927** -0.876 0.466 -1.176 -1.642
(3.659) (3.154) (1.716) (4.201) (3.458) (2.478)
Corporate governance 0.768*** 0.607*** -0.161** 0.403*** 0.317*** -0.086
(0.116) (0.094) (0.069) (0.075) (0.064) (0.056)
CEO tenure 0.013 -0.019 -0.032*** 0.005 -0.002 -0.008
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009)
CEO age 0.001 0.021* 0.021** 0.003 0.011 0.007
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009)
CEO gender 2.339*** 2.906*** 0.567** 0.213 0.581 0.368
(0.729) (0.682) (0.243) (0.408) (0.497) (0.296)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.351 0.493 0.517 0.282 0.477 0.298
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on CSR ratings.
Models 1 - 3 are estimated using OLS regressions with industry and year fixed effects. Models 4 - 6 are esti-
mated using fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is net CSR. The dependent
variable in models 2 and 5 is total CSR strengths. The dependent variable in models 3 and 6 is total CSR
concerns. Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the description of CSR variables. Ascribed status
indicator equals to one if a CEO received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League universities, and
equals to zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA (return on assets) is cal-
culated as as operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Leverage is calculated as total
debt divided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Ad-
vertising intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales. Corporate governance is
measured as the difference between strengths and concerns within KLD’s corporate governance dimension.
CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a
female, and equals to zero otherwise. All models include year fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are defined
based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported
in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
My third hypothesis posits that social actions among CEOs with high ascribed
status will be focused on peripheral stakeholders (society at large) to a greater ex-
tent than the core stakeholders (such as employees and customers). To test whether
this is the case, I disaggregate the overall CSR ratings based on the type of stake-
holders that they target. Similar to Dupire and M’Zali (2016) and Flammer (2015),
social actions within the product, diversity and employee relations dimensions are
considered to belong to the core CSR, and social activities within the community,
environment and human rights dimensions are included in the peripheral CSR mea-
sure.
Table 4.7 shows the results of testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on core
as the regression coefficient on the status indicator divided by the mean in the relevant CSR measure across
firms with executives that do not possess the high status characteristic.
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and peripheral CSR. The coefficient on the ascribed status indicator is positive and
significant in models that employ core net CSR (p-value<0.05) as well as core CSR
strengths (p-value<0.10) but is insignificance at the 10% level with regards to core
CSR concerns. This suggests that high ascribed status CEOs are associated with
superior social performance targeting primary company stakeholders compared to
executives without elite background, and this is driven primarily through greater
positive social actions.
Tests in relation to the peripheral CSR, on the other hand, show that ascribed
status has no significant relationship with either peripheral CSR strengths or the
net peripheral CSR. In models that employ peripheral CSR concerns, the coeffi-
cient on ascribed status is negative but only approaches significance at the 10%
level (p-value=0.16). These findings suggest that, to a large extent, ascribed status
does not have a significant relationship with social actions targeting the society at
large. However, there is limited support that CEOs with elite background might
invest in reducing peripheral CSR concerns relatively more compared to lower status
executives.
To gain further insight into the distribution of social initiatives across different
types of stakeholders, I created several variables that measure the relative investment
in core and peripheral CSR. The intuitive measure to use in this analysis is the ratio
of core to peripheral CSR. However, 58% of firm-year observations in my sample
have a zero value in either peripheral CSR strengths or peripheral CSR concerns.
These observations would have to be dropped from the analysis, leaving a sample
that might result in misrepresentation of the real pattern as it would exclude firms
that do not have any investment in peripheral CSR16. Therefore, I calculate the
main measure of the relative investment in core CSR as core CSR minus peripheral
CSR, and this approach is applied to CSR strengths and concerns as well as the net
CSR. In additional models, I still check whether the same behaviour holds when the
ratio of core to peripheral CSR is used instead of the difference.
Table 4.8 shows that results of testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on the
relative investment in core CSR. Models 1 - 3 use the difference between core and
16While there are less observations with zero value for core CSR strengths and concerns, using core
variables as the denominator would still eliminate approximately 30% of observations, and the resulting
sample would suffer from similar misrepresentation issue.
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Table 4.7: Ascribed status and core and peripheral CSR
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Core Core Core Peripheral Peripheral Peripheral
Net Strengths Concerns Net Strengths Concerns
Ascribed status 0.454** 0.283* -0.171 0.002 -0.129 -0.131
(0.191) (0.150) (0.123) (0.152) (0.119) (0.093)
Firm size -0.101 0.102 0.203** -0.278*** 0.087 0.365***
(0.144) (0.093) (0.088) (0.102) (0.078) (0.068)
ROA 1.585** 0.323 -1.262*** -1.163** -0.504 0.659**
(0.671) (0.524) (0.479) (0.494) (0.398) (0.277)
Leverage 0.578 0.496 -0.082 0.440 0.130 -0.310
(0.498) (0.351) (0.355) (0.284) (0.254) (0.196)
R&D intensity 0.605 0.536 -0.069 0.304 0.465* 0.161
(0.543) (0.358) (0.379) (0.335) (0.268) (0.202)
Advertising intensity 0.750 -0.639 -1.389 -0.284 -0.537 -0.253
(2.797) (2.050) (1.987) (2.177) (1.849) (1.072)
Corporate governance 0.139*** 0.099** -0.039 0.264*** 0.217*** -0.047
(0.053) (0.043) (0.039) (0.042) (0.035) (0.029)
CEO tenure 0.008 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004)
CEO age -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.001
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004)
CEO gender 0.144 0.348 0.205 0.070 0.233 0.163
(0.292) (0.271) (0.202) (0.316) (0.316) (0.187)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.100 0.299 0.255 0.389 0.492 0.142
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on core and pe-
ripheral CSR ratings. The dependent variable in model 1 is core net CSR. The dependent variable in model
2 is core CSR strengths. The dependent variable in model 3 is core CSR concerns. The dependent variable
in model 4 is peripheral net CSR. The dependent variable in model 5 is peripheral CSR strengths. The de-
pendent variable in model 6 is peripheral CSR concerns. Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the
description of CSR variables. Ascribed status indicator equals to one if a CEO received a bachelor degree
from one of the Ivy League universities, and equals to zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm
of total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated as as operating income before depreciation divided
by book assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated
as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure
divided by total sales. Corporate governance is measured as the difference between strengths and concerns
within KLD’s corporate governance dimension. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All models in-
clude year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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peripheral CSR as dependent variables, while Models 4 - 6 use the ratio of core to
peripheral CSR (with a reduced sample described above). The coefficient on the
ascribed status indicator in Model 2 indicates a strong (p-value<0.01) positive rela-
tionship between ascribed status and the relative investment in core CSR strengths.
In addition, Model 1 shows that having high ascribed status CEOs increases the
overall (net) core CSR relative to the peripheral CSR (p-value<0.05). In contrast,
there does not appear to be a significant difference in relative core and peripheral
CSR concerns depending on the presence of an elite CEO (p-value>0.10).
Table 4.8: Ascribed status and core and peripheral CSR: Relative investment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Core-per. Core-per. Core-per. Core/per. Core/per. Core/per.
net CSR CSR strengths CSR concerns net CSR CSR strengths CSR concerns
Ascribed status 0.452** 0.413*** -0.039 -0.028 0.241* -0.174
(0.187) (0.156) (0.124) (0.213) (0.143) (0.172)
Firm size 0.177 0.015 -0.162* -0.151 0.011 0.005
(0.130) (0.097) (0.094) (0.108) (0.132) (0.098)
ROA 2.749*** 0.827 -1.921*** -0.865 0.386 -1.816***
(0.723) (0.581) (0.503) (0.832) (0.723) (0.584)
Leverage 0.138 0.367 0.229 1.080** 0.367 0.666
(0.520) (0.394) (0.407) (0.504) (0.580) (0.473)
R&D intensity 0.301 0.071 -0.230 -0.283 -0.275 -1.327*
(0.465) (0.398) (0.383) (0.766) (0.793) (0.769)
Advertising intensity 1.034 -0.102 -1.136 -4.383 4.108 -0.300
(2.735) (1.813) (2.014) (4.468) (3.055) (3.623)
Corporate governance -0.126** -0.118*** 0.008 -0.064 -0.100* -0.007
(0.059) (0.045) (0.040) (0.053) (0.051) (0.038)
CEO tenure 0.010 0.004 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.008
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
CEO age -0.005 0.001 0.006 0.016 -0.000 0.017
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
CEO gender 0.074 0.116 0.042 0.269 -0.074 -0.195
(0.452) (0.315) (0.253) (0.497) (0.404) (0.322)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080 3014 2682 2173
No. of firms 470 470 470 404 368 285
Adjusted R-squared 0.148 0.163 0.102 0.050 0.143 0.145
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on the difference
between core and peripheral CSR ratings. The dependent variable in model 1 is the difference between
core and peripheral net CSR. The dependent variable in model 2 is the difference between core and pe-
ripheral CSR strengths. The dependent variable in model 3 is the difference between core and peripheral
CSR concerns. The dependent variable in model 4 is the ratio of core net CSR to peripheral net CSR.
The dependent variable in model 5 is is the ratio of core CSR strengths to peripheral CSR strengths. The
dependent variable in model 6 is is the ratio of core CSR concerns to peripheral CSR concerns. Please re-
fer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the description of CSR variables. Ascribed status indicator equals
to one if a CEO received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League universities, and equals to zero
otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated as as
operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided
by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Advertising in-
tensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales. Corporate governance is measured
as the difference between strengths and concerns within KLD’s corporate governance dimension. CEO age
and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female,
and equals to zero otherwise. All models include year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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The pattern remains similar when the ratio of core to peripheral CSR is used as
dependent variable instead of the difference. However, when testing the latter, the
influence of ascribed status appears to be somewhat reduced, and the coefficient on
the ascribed status indicator is only significant in relation to the relative investment
in core CSR strengths (p-value<0.10). This suggests that prioritising core social
investments relative to the peripheral CSR is less pronounced among CEOs with
elite background across firms that exhibit some (non-zero) peripheral CSR strengths,
compared to the full sample.
Overall, the findings in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide strong evidence to reject
Hypothesis 3 which predicted a higher overall emphasis on peripheral CSR among
executives with elite background. However, the results also suggest that the impact
of ascribed status on firms’ CSR activities is more nuanced than it might initially
appear. While looking at the aggregate CSR variables across all dimensions (Table
4.6) suggests that ascribed status influences CSR through reducing negative social
actions, disaggregating overall CSR measures into core and peripheral social activi-
ties (Table 4.7) shows that CEOs with elite background actually exhibit significantly
higher social strengths across core CSR dimensions but might be associated with
somewhat lower social concerns across peripheral CSR dimensions. In addition,
considering the relative investment in core and peripheral CSR (Table 4.8) indicates
that increasing positive core social actions compared to peripheral ones is relatively
more pronounced among the elite, but the relative importance of peripheral concerns
compared to those within core CSR dimensions is not significantly related to status.
These findings lend support to the argument that considering only the aggregate
measure of CSR might confound potential influences that exist in different direc-
tions and areas of social performance (see, for example, Dupire and M’Zali, 2016;
Harjoto and Laksmana, 2016; Manos and Drori, 2016).
As a final step in investigating the influence of ascribed status on the focus of
social investments, I examine status effects on individual CSR dimensions. Table
4.9 reports the results, showing that ascribed status loads significantly negatively on
CSR concerns within community and product dimensions (p-value<0.10) and also
loads significantly positively on the net CSR measure within diversity and product
components (p-value<0.10). A significantly higher overall performance in the prod-
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uct dimension and significantly lower community concerns among CEOs with high
ascribed status appear to be the most consistent patterns across different models,
reaffirming that, overall, social actions targeting primary company stakeholders are
a priority among executives with elite background, but they also invest their efforts
into reducing negative impacts towards the society at large.
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Table 4.9: Ascribed status and individual CSR dimensions
Panel A: Net CSR within individual dimensions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Community Diversity Environment Employee rel. Human rights Product
net net net net net net
Ascribed status 0.024 0.195* -0.027 0.115 0.005 0.143*
(0.092) (0.115) (0.094) (0.118) (0.057) (0.084)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.238 0.420 0.176 0.068 0.100
Panel B: CSR strengths within individual dimensions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Community Diversity Environment Employee rel. Human rights Product
strengths strengths strengths strengths strengths strengths
Ascribed status -0.049 0.135 -0.058 0.127 -0.022 0.021
(0.078) (0.096) (0.076) (0.105) (0.016) (0.045)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.085 0.330 0.556 0.182 0.083 0.039
Panel C: CSR concerns within individual dimensions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Community Diversity Environment Employee rel. Human rights Product
concerns concerns concerns concerns concerns concerns
Ascribed status -0.073* -0.060 -0.031 0.011 -0.027 -0.122*
(0.039) (0.043) (0.059) (0.071) (0.056) (0.073)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.077 0.084 0.094 0.231 0.056 0.127
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on social performance within
individual CSR dimensions. Panel A reports results for net CSR within each of the six CSR dimensions. Panel B
reports results for CSR strengths within each of the six CSR dimensions. Panel C reports results for CSR concerns
within each of the six CSR dimensions. Ascribed status indicator equals to one if a CEO received a bachelor degree
from one of the Ivy League universities, and equals to zero otherwise. All models include a set of firm and CEO con-
trols that are not reported for brevity. Firm controls include firm size, ROA, leverage, R&D intensity, advertising
intensity and corporate governance. CEO controls include CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO gender. Please refer to
Table A.11 in the Appendix for the description of firm and CEO-related variables. All models include year and firm
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.4.4 Robustness
I perform several additional robustness tests to verify that the findings remain con-
sistent after controlling for methodological limitations of the KLD dataset. In par-
ticular, since KLD evaluate a varying number of strength and concern items within
each dimension over time, I replicate the analysis with two alternative proxies of
CSR that are robust to these changes in methodology: a scaled CSR measure that
is adjusted by the maximum CSR score within each year and an industry-adjusted
CSR measure that is adjusted for the average within each firm’s industry. Panels A
and B in Table 4.10 provide the results. The coefficient on ascribed status remains
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negative and significant (p-value<0.10) in all models that use CSR concerns as the
dependent variable, and is positive and significant in one out of two models that
employ net CSR as the dependent variable (p-value<0.10). The exception within
net CSR tests in Model 1 of Panel B which tests the relationship between industry-
adjusted net CSR and ascribed status including fixed firm effects and the coefficient
on ascribed status in this specification has the p-value of 0.12.
Panel C in Table 4.10 replicates the main tests within a restricted sample that
includes observations before 2010. This cut-off point was motivated by the fact that
2010 represents the year with the greatest change in the total number of evaluated
strength and concerns items across all CSR dimensions. In particular, Table 4.3
shows that the total number of strength items covered by KLD was reduced from
43 to 35, while the total number of evaluated concerns went down from 36 to 29,
representing a decrease in both of approximately 19% in one year. The results in
Panel C of Table 4.10 confirm that the influence of ascribed status on CSR concerns
remains consistently negative and significant before 2010 (p-value<0.10). However,
the relationship between status and the net measure of CSR does not hold at the
10% level of significance.
Overall, the results in Table 4.10 confirm that the negative link between CEO
ascribed status and social concerns is robust to using alternative proxies of CSR
as well as restricting the sample to a more stable period in the number of social
strengths and concerns evaluated by KLD.
Next, I follow the approach in Attig et al. (2016) and perform a propensity
score matching procedure as a further robustness check that accounts for potential
endogeneity in my estimations. This approach involves three main steps. First, I
estimate a logit model in which I regress the ascribed status indicator on all the
firm and CEO controls used in the main analysis. The results of the logit regression
are reported in Panel A of Table 4.11 and, interestingly, there is a positive and
significant coefficient on R&D intensity and advertising intensity, suggesting that
there might be a link between ascribed status and corporate policies other than
CSR and M&A.
In the second step, I use the coefficients obtained from the logit model to create
propensity scores for all observations in the sample, and use these scores to match
158
Table 4.10: Robustness tests: KLD Methodology
Panel A: Scaled CSR measures
Fixed effects models
[1] [2] [3]
Scaled Scaled Scaled
CSR net CSR strengths CSR concerns
Ascribed status 0.091* 0.024 -0.067*
(0.049) (0.033) (0.038)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.257 0.509 0.288
Panel B: Industry-adjusted CSR measures
Fixed effects models
[1] [2] [3]
Ind-adj. Ind-adj. Ind-adj.
CSR net CSR strengths CSR concerns
Ascribed status 0.457 0.154 -0.302*
(0.291) (0.221) (0.179)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.282 0.477 0.298
Panel C: Ascribed status and CSR before 2010
Fixed effects models
[1] [2] [3]
CSR CSR CSR
net strengths concerns
Ascribed status 0.439 0.101 -0.338*
(0.334) (0.251) (0.199)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3770 3770 3770
No. of firms 415 415 415
Adjusted R-squared 0.039 0.335 0.292
The table presents results of robustness tests related to measuring the effect of CEO ascribed status on
CSR. Panel A reports results of regression models using scaled CSR measures as dependent variables.
Panel B provides results of regression models using industry-adjusted CSR measures as dependent vari-
ables. Panel C reports results of regression models using only observations before 2010. Please refer to
Table A.11 in the Appendix for the definition of CSR variables. Ascribed status indicator equals to one if a
CEO received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League universities, and equals to zero otherwise. All
models include a set of firm and CEO controls that are not reported for brevity. Firm controls include firm
size, ROA, leverage, R&D intensity, advertising intensity and corporate governance. CEO controls include
CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO gender. Please refer to Table A.10 in the Appendix for the description
of firm and CEO-related variables. All models include year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
each observation that is associated with a high ascribed status CEO (ascribed status
indicator = 1) to an observation that is not (ascribed status indicator = 0). I use
three different matching methods (one-to-one, k-nearest neighbours and kernel) with
two specifications in each, and restrict the maximum propensity score difference to
be within 0.5 (capiper = 0.5).
The final step is replicating the main analysis within the resulting restricted
propensity score matched samples. Panel B in Table 4.11 reports the results, showing
that ascribed status loads significantly negatively on the measure of CSR concerns
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independently of the matching method (p<0.05 in three models and p<0.10 in the
other three models). However, similar to findings in other robustness tests, the
link between ascribed status and net CSR does not appear as consistent, with only
one out of six models reporting a significant coefficient on the indicator of ascribed
status.
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Table 4.11: Robustness tests: Propensity score matching
Panel A: Logit regression
Ascribed status
Firm size 0.164
(0.129)
ROA 0.485
(1.411)
Leverage -0.574
(0.809)
R&D intensity 2.732***
(0.981)
Advertising intensityy 10.293***
(3.665)
Corporate governance 0.061
(0.119)
CEO tenure 0.079***
(0.020)
CEO age -0.051**
(0.024)
CEO gender 0.597
(0.908)
Industry fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
No. of observations 4685
No. of firms 429
Pseudo R-squared 4685
Panel B: Propensity-score matching
Matching method Outcome = CSR net Outcome = CSR strengths Outcome = CSR concerns
One-to-one
Without replacement 0.754 0.190 -0.563*
(0.474) (0.335) (0.335)
With replacement 0.677 -0.020 -0.698*
(0.530) (0.365) (0.400)
k-nearest neighbours
Nearest neighbours (n=5) 0.514 0.049 -0.465**
(0.339) (0.258) (0.230)
Nearest neighbours (n=10) 0.519 0.077 -0.442**
(0.333) (0.244) (0.206)
Kernel
Gaussian kernel 0.546* 0.224 -0.323*
(0.295) (0.219) (0.187)
Epanechnikov kernel 0.614 0.212 -0.402**
(0.318) (0.240) (0.188)
The table presents results of the propensity score matching procedure. Panel A reports results of a logit
model in which an indicator of ascribed status is regressed on firm and CEO controls, and includes year
and industry fixed effects. Firm controls include firm size, ROA, leverage, R&D intensity, advertising in-
tensity and corporate governance. CEO controls include CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO gender. Please
refer to Table A.10 in the Appendix for the description of firm and CEO-related variables. Panel B shows
the results of regression models testing the effect of ascribed status on CSR measures in propensity score
matched samples obtained based on different matching methods. All models include a set of firm and
CEO controls as well as year and industry fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are defined based on Fama-
French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Finally, a potential concern of using attendance at one of the Ivy League uni-
versities as an indicator of CEO ascribed status is that the observed relationship
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could be a result of receiving a better education rather than possessing superior so-
cial standing. Ivy League schools are considered to be among the best educational
institutions in the world17, and higher quality education could potentially influence
executives’ decisions regarding socially responsible investments.
To test whether education quality might be driving the results, I repeat the
main tests from Table 4.6 with an additional variable that indicates firms with
well-educated CEOs who attended one the world’s top 100 universities (excluding
Ivy League schools). Table 4.12 provides the results and shows that attendance
at prestigious Ivy League and other world’s top 100 universities exhibit a similar
pattern in relation to various measures of CSR. However, the coefficient on a degree
from a top 100 world university remains insignificant at the 10% level across all
models. The coefficient on a degree from one of the Ivy League schools, on the
other hand, is significantly related to CSR concerns (p-value<0.05), confirming that
the relationship between elite background and social concerns found in this paper
is more likely to be driven by the status aspects associated with attending an Ivy
League school rather than education quality.
17According to the Times Higher Education World University Ranking, available at
http://www.timeshigher education.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking.
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Table 4.12: Robustness tests: Ascribed status vs. education quality
Fixed effects models
[1] [2] [3]
CSR Net CSR Strengths CSR Concerns
Ascribed status 0.552* 0.197 -0.355*
(0.283) (0.217) (0.187)
Degree from top 100 world univ. 0.286 0.127 -0.159
(0.201) (0.165) (0.136)
Firm size -0.365* 0.195 0.560***
(0.212) (0.141) (0.125)
ROA 0.432 -0.176 -0.609
(0.933) (0.727) (0.600)
Leverage 1.029* 0.631 -0.398
(0.620) (0.468) (0.403)
R&D intensity 0.915 1.004** 0.088
(0.775) (0.491) (0.473)
Advertising intensity 0.623 -1.106 -1.729
(4.143) (3.436) (2.467)
Corporate governance 0.401*** 0.316*** -0.085
(0.075) (0.064) (0.056)
CEO tenure 0.005 -0.002 -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.009)
CEO age 0.005 0.011 0.007
(0.015) (0.013) (0.009)
CEO gender 0.189 0.571 0.381
(0.426) (0.503) (0.298)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5080 5080 5080
No. of firms 470 470 470
Adjusted R-squared 0.283 0.477 0.299
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of CEO ascribed status on CSR ratings,
including a control for education quality. Ascribed status indicator equals to one if a CEO received a bach-
elor degree from one of the Ivy League universities, and equals to zero otherwise. Degree from a top 100
world university is a dummy variable that equals to one if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one
of the world’s top 100 universities excluding Ivy League schools, and equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is
the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated as as operating income before
depreciation divided by book assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. R&D
intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as ad-
vertising expenditure divided by total sales. Corporate governance is measured as the difference between
strengths and concerns within KLD’s corporate governance dimension. CEO age and tenure are measured
in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero oth-
erwise. All models include year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
4.5 Achieved status and CSR
4.5.1 Empirical specification
I analyse the relationship between achieved status and CSR performance by compar-
ing within-firm changes in various measures of CSR before and after CEOs win their
first high-profile award. To estimate within-firm variation in social performance, I
use linear regression models with the following specification:
CSRft = α+β1PostAwardft+β2Firmft−1+β3CEOft+FixedEffectsft+εft (4.2)
CSRft is the level of CSR performance in firm f at time t, which is measured
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using a range of variables described in Table A.11 in the Appendix. PostAwardft
is a binary variable set to one in the period after a CEO wins an award, indicating
high achieved social status.
Firmft represents a set of firm control variables, similar to those used to test
the influence of ascribed status on CSR, and similar to the controls employed in
recent studies that investigate the likelihood of firms’ CSR involvement (see, for
example, Attig et al., 2016; Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Petrenko et al., 2016). Based
on the evidence in prior research, I control for firm size18 and profitability (Kubik
et al., 2012), book leverage (Adhikari, 2016; Waddock and Graves, 1997), as well as
R&D and advertising expenditures (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Unlike the tests
within the ascribed status dimension, I do not include the corporate governance
control in the main models that test the influence of achieved social status, as this
variable is based on KLD data and including it results in loss of observations. The
sample of award winners is not as substantial as the sample of high ascribed status
CEOs, and in order to preserve observations, I estimate the main results without
the corporate governance control but verify that my findings are robust to including
it in the model.
CEOft represents controls for CEO age and tenure, measured in years, in order
to account for the influence of CEO career horizon problems on social engagement
(see, for example, Borghesi et al., 2014; Oh et al., 2016). I do not include a control
for CEO gender in testing the influence of achieved status because I measure the
within-firm variation in CSR among award winners and each firm is only associated
with one CEO throughout the sample period. Since CEO gender is a time-invariant
characteristic, it is accounted for by including firm fixed effects.
Finally, FixedEffectsft variable represents fixed effects included in my estima-
tions. I account for time trends by including year fixed effects in all models. To
account for potential inter-industry variation in CSR, as well as unobserved firm
drivers of social performance, I also include firm fixed effects19.
Since heteroskedasticity is a concern in my estimations, I use robust standard
18Similar to the tests within the ascribed status dimension, I verify that the findings are robust to using
the logarithm of total sales instead of total assets as a proxy for firm size.
19Comparisons for two and three years include both firm and year fixed effects. For the one year
comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insufficient observations required to estimate
fixed effects (similar to Koh, 2011).
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errors and cluster them at the individual firm level, thus accounting for the lack of
independence among observations within a given firm throughout time. The analysis
of VIF scores suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis as VIFs
for all of the predictor variables remain below 2 across models, which is outside the
conventional threshold of 10 (Neter et al., 1985).
To establish causality and account for unobserved differences between companies
with and without award-winning CEOs (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), I construct a
sample of predicted winners - companies with similar characteristics to those with
award-winning CEOs but whose executives did not win an award. I then repeat the
within-firm variation analysis among firms with predicted winners to verify that the
same trend is not present in these companies. In additional robustness tests, I also
employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) technique to further confirm that observed
patterns in CSR behaviour of award winners are not driven by an overall trend
in social practices or by potential systematic differences between firms with and
without award-winning executives. The use of a sample of predicted winners is a
common approach to verify the robustness of findings related to the behaviour of
award winners (Koh, 2011; Malmendier and Tate, 2009, see, for example).
4.5.2 Univariate analysis
Table 4.13 summarises the dataset of CEO awards. Panel A reports the number of
awards by publication source, indicating that over a third of awards were conferred
by Business Week’s, followed by Financial World and Forbes. Panel B divides CEOs
by the total number of awards they received during the sample period, showing that
66 out of 138 executives received multiple high-profile awards. To avoid duplicating
firm observations in my estimations, only first award is considered for each CEO,
resulting in a starting sample of 138 CEOs. Finally, Panel C describes the number
of executives that were in office in each period of interest (pre/post 1, pre/post 2
and pre/post 3 years around the award) and whose firm has sufficient CSR data
coverage within those periods. A total of 88 CEOs were in office for the pre/post 1
year period, with the number decreasing to 65 in the pre/post 2 year period and 43
in the pre/post 3 year period. I estimate the main models including all observations
for which the CEO was in office in the corresponding period, and also verify that
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the findings are robust to constricting the sample to the 43 executives that were in
office in all periods.
Table 4.13: Summary statistics for awards and award-winning CEOs
Panel A: Number of awards by publication source
Source Title of award Number of awards
Business Week Top Managers of the Year 115
Financial World CEOs of the Year 61
Forbes Best Performing CEOs 53
Forbes World’s Most Powerful People 18
Chief Executive Magazine CEO of the Year 18
Industry Week CEO of the Year 12
Harvard Business Review Best-Performing CEOs in the World 10
Electronic Business Magazine CEO of the Year 6
Time & CNN 25 Most Influential Global Executives 4
Morningstar.com CEO of the Year 2
Time Person of the Year 1
Total 300
Panel B: Number of awards by each CEO
Number of awards Number of CEOs Total number of awards
10 awards 3 30
7 awards 4 28
6 awards 2 12
5 awards 2 10
4 awards 11 44
3 awards 16 48
2 awards 28 56
1 award 72 72
Total 138 300
Panel C: Number of award-winning CEOs with sufficient CSR data coverage that remained in office for each period
Total number of award-winning CEOs 138
Number of CEOs still in office for the pre/post 1 period 88
Number of CEOs still in office for the pre/post 2 period 65
Number of CEOs still in office for the pre/post 3 period 43
The table provides a breakdown of the number of awards conferred by selected publications between Jan-
uary 1992 and December 2012. Panel A shows the total number of awards received by CEOs within the
data sample. Panel B describes the number of awards won by each CEO. Panel C summarises the number
of award-winning CEOs that remained in office for each evaluation period and have sufficient CSR data
coverage. The subsequent analysis utilises only the first award won by each CEO in order to prevent using
the same observations for both the pre- and post- award period.
Table 4.14 provides summary statistics for companies with award-winning CEOs
around the time they win their first award. The pattern in within-firm changes in
the net CSR measure suggests that award-winners generally increase their overall
social performance over time. In addition, the annual rise in net CSR is notably
stronger in the years following the award: average social performance increased by
approximately 44% in the first year following the award, and the overall rise in the
average net CSR is over 80% in the three years after the award conferral (compared
to approximately 26% in the three years preceding the award). The magnitude
of these increases appears considerable since, similar to Attig et al. (2016), I do
not find an overall trend of an increase in the net CSR over time when examining
the full sample that includes non-winning firms. The observed pattern of higher
166
net CSR following awards, thus, provides potential support for Hypothesis 4 which
states that there is a positive relationship between achieved status and overall social
performance.
Considering the trends in average CSR strengths and concerns separately shows
that award winners tend to increase both positive and negative social actions over
time. However, while CSR strengths are gradually rising throughout the evaluation
period, CSR concerns increase up to the award year and then drop for two years
following the award, suggesting that award-winners might focus on reducing their
negative actions after a positive shift in achieved status. This is a notable pattern
since, generally, CSR concerns tend to increase over time (Attig et al., 2016), and
it provides initial evidence that contradicts Hypothesis 5 which posits that superior
social performance among CEOs with high achieved status is driven by higher CSR
strengths rather than lower CSR concerns.
The within-firm variation in social actions targeting different types of stakehold-
ers also exhibits some notable patterns. Following an award, executives display a
considerably stronger rise in investment in social actions targeting core stakeholders
compared to activities related to peripheral stakeholders. In particular, the net core
CSR performance almost doubles in the three years after the award conferral while
peripheral net CSR performance only increases by approximately 30% during the
same period. In addition, the net social performance towards primary stakeholders
shows a continuous increase following an award, while investment in social actions
towards the society at large goes up and down in years after the award. It appears
that both higher core CSR strengths and lower core CSR concerns, contribute to
the overall increase in the core social performance. These trends lend initial support
to Hypothesis 6 which posits that CEO achieved status has a stronger association
with social actions targeting primary company stakeholders compared to activities
aimed at the peripheral stakeholders.
The review of the variation in firm characteristics around the year of award
conferral shows that there is a steady increase in firm size. Award-winning firms are
also associated with a rise in profitability (proxied by ROA) in the years before the
award, but exhibit a decline in the return on assets in the year following the award,
lending some support to the evidence of underperformance of award-winning CEOs
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following the increase in their status (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate, 2009;
Wade et al., 2006). Another notable trend is the gradual decrease in leverage in
the years prior to the award, followed by an annual increase in every year after the
award conferral, suggesting that executives might be taking on additional risk after
a positive status shift.
Table 4.14: Summary statistics for the sample of award-winning CEOs
3 years 2 years 1 year Award 1 year 2 years 3 years
before award before award before award year after award after award after award
CSR variables
CSR net 1.047 1.138 1.114 1.322 1.898 2.015 2.419
CSR strengths 2.535 2.662 2.943 3.218 3.727 3.754 4.349
CSR concerns 1.488 1.523 1.830 1.897 1.830 1.738 1.930
Core CSR net 1.047 1.123 0.966 1.057 1.466 1.692 2.070
Core CSR strengths 1.884 1.954 2.102 2.230 2.568 2.708 3.233
Core CSR concerns 0.837 0.831 1.136 1.172 1.102 1.015 1.163
Peripheral CSR net 0.000 0.015 0.148 0.264 0.432 0.323 0.349
Peripheral CSR strengths 0.651 0.708 0.841 0.989 1.159 1.046 1.116
Peripheral CSR concerns 0.651 0.692 0.693 0.724 0.727 0.723 0.767
Firm controls
Firm size 8.374 8.513 8.666 8.853 9.051 9.152 9.347
Leverage 0.248 0.235 0.211 0.188 0.197 0.212 0.233
ROA 0.066 0.080 0.073 0.094 0.078 0.087 0.076
R&D intensity 0.060 0.049 0.054 0.047 0.050 0.062 0.053
Advertising intensity 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.015
CEO controls
CEO age 54.140 54.846 56.239 57.170 57.852 57.938 57.279
CEO tenure 8.186 8.277 9.227 10.170 11.045 11.908 11.558
The table provides mean values for the variables used in this analysis. The sample consists of firms from
S&P 500 constituents with CEOs that received an award between January 1992 and December 2012. Fi-
nancial firms and utility companies are excluded from this study. CSR Strengths (Concerns) variable is
the sum of firm’s CSR strengths (concerns) across six CSR dimensions. CSR net variable is the difference
between CSR strengths and CSR concerns for any observation year. Firm size is the natural logarithm of
total assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. ROA (return on assets) is cal-
culated as net income divided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided
by total sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales. CEO
age and tenure are measured in years. CEO personal data is extracted from Compustat Execucomp and
financial data is obtained from Compustat.
To put the within-firm variation in CSR among award winners in perspective,
Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 plot the average net CSR, CSR strengths and CSR concerns,
respectively, among firms with award-winning CEOs, firms with predicted winners
and all non-winning companies. The sample of predicted winners is constructed
using a nearest-neighbour propensity score match controlling for social and firm
characteristics in the year before the award (similar to Koh, 2011; Malmendier and
Tate, 2009), thus allowing a comparison of the patterns in social performance of
high achieved status CEOs with executives of similar firms that did not experience
a shift in status.
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Both award winners and predicted winners, have a higher average level of net
CSR and CSR strengths compared to all other companies, suggesting that firm
characteristics associated with award-winning do play a role in determining social
performance. The trend in CSR strengths is similar between CEOs who won an
award and predicted winners (Figure 4.5), with both groups generally showing a
gradual improvement in positive social activities. However, in the years following
the award, winning CEOs appear to increase their social strengths at a greater pace
compared to predicted winners, resulting in a widening gap between the two groups.
In addition, having received an award, winning executives exhibit a notable decrease
in CSR concerns over the following two years (Figure 4.6), while predicted winners
display the opposite behaviour. These two trends result in a substantial divergence
in the net social performance between winners and predicted winners after the award
year (Figure 4.4), and indicate that the observed CSR tendencies among firms with
winning executives are unlikely to be fully explained by firm characteristics alone.
Figure 4.4: Within-firm variation in net CSR
The figure displays the differences in net CSR between award winners, predicted winners and all
non-winning companies. Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propensity
score match controlling for firm size, leverage, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, CEO age and CEO
tenure, as well as year and industry fixed effects.
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Figure 4.5: Within-firm variation in CSR strengths
The figure displays the differences in CSR strengths between award winners, predicted winners and all
non-winning companies. Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propensity
score match controlling for firm size, leverage, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, CEO age and CEO
tenure, as well as year and industry fixed effects.
Figure 4.6: Within-firm variation in CSR concerns
The figure displays the differences in CSR concerns between award winners, predicted winners and all
non-winning companies. Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propensity
score match controlling for firm size, leverage, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, CEO age and CEO
tenure, as well as year and industry fixed effects.
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4.5.3 Multivariate analysis
To formalise the initial insights from the univariate analysis, I compare the within-
firm changes before and after CEOs win an award using multiple regression models
that control for related firm and CEO characteristics. Table 4.15 presents the main
results regarding the influence of an achieved status shift on the overall social per-
formance (net CSR) as well as CSR strengths and CSR concerns, where all measures
of CSR are based on all six dimensions of corporate social responsibility, and the
Post award variable indicates the period after CEOs win their awards and achieve
a positive status shift.
Models 1 - 3 in Table 4.15 estimate the impact of winning an award on the
net CSR and, consistent with Hypothesis 4, the coefficient for the Post award vari-
able is positive, indicating an increase in the overall social performance following a
positive status shift. The influence of achieved status remains positive in all three
evaluation periods but is statistically significant only in the pre/post 1 year period
(p-value<0.05), suggesting that the impact of winning an award on CSR decisions
is rapid but might be relatively short-lived. The magnitude of the Post award co-
efficient in the pre/post 1 year period (0.637) indicates that status influence is also
economically significant: the average net CSR in the year before the award is 1.114
and winning an award, on average, increases the overall social performance by 57%
after accounting for firm and CEO characteristics as well as yearly trends20.
The subsequent models in Table 4.15 estimate the influence of the positive
achieved status shift associated with winning an award on CSR strengths and CSR
concerns separately. Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the results indicate that higher so-
cial performance following an award is driven by reduced negative social impacts
rather than a significant increase in positive social activities. When modelling CSR
strengths, the coefficient on the Post award variable is insignificant at the 10%
level in all evaluation periods, while in models with CSR concerns as the dependent
variable, the coefficient on the indicator of the post-award period is negative and
significant in the pre/post 1 (p-value<0.05) and pre/post 2 (p-value<0.10) year pe-
20I follow the approach in Hirshleifer et al. (2012) to estimate the economic significance of explanatory
variables. In the analysis of achieved social status shifts, I calculate the economic significance as the ratio
of the regression coefficient on the achieved status indicator (Post award) to the mean CSR during the
evaluated period before the award.
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riods. The magnitude of the coefficient in the pre/post 2 year period indicates that
winning an award results in an average decrease in CSR concerns of approximately
32% over two years after the award.
Since the focus of this analysis is to examine the within-firm variation in CSR
among award-winners, the results on the control variables might be specific to the
dataset and should not be generalised. Overall, the significance of the control vari-
ables is quite low and is not always consistent across different test periods. The
lower general significance of controls is similar to that observed in other studies that
include firm fixed effects in examining the likelihood of engaging in CSR (see, for
example, Attig et al., 2016; Koh, 2011).
Table 4.15: Achieved status and CSR
CSR net CSR strengths CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.637** 0.629 0.426 0.253 0.089 0.079 -0.399** -0.541* -0.347
(0.302) (0.452) (0.489) (0.220) (0.369) (0.328) (0.200) (0.294) (0.313)
Firm size 0.125 -0.0869 -0.372 0.932*** 0.162 0.073 0.835*** 0.249 0.445*
(0.311) (0.527) (0.385) (0.217) (0.373) (0.269) (0.212) (0.251) (0.228)
ROA 0.523 1.603 0.611 -0.207 1.571 0.075 -0.907 -0.032 -0.537
(1.839) (1.913) (1.687) (1.504) (1.270) (1.157) (0.768) (0.985) (0.946)
Leverage 1.762 -0.719 1.441 0.00264 1.158 1.409 -1.995* 1.877** -0.032
(1.805) (1.371) (1.094) (1.489) (1.264) (0.945) (1.153) (0.811) (0.858)
R&D intensity 5.662* 1.042 1.596 3.877* 0.597 0.719 -1.826 -0.445 -0.877
(3.051) (0.946) (1.303) (2.260) (0.842) (0.825) (1.210) (0.582) (0.651)
Advertising intensity 9.789 -17.60** -14.72* 11.74 -4.528 -4.381 1.172 13.07*** 10.34**
(11.487) (7.654) (7.972) (8.601) (5.465) (5.345) (6.385) (3.958) (4.170)
CEO age -0.071 -0.220*** -0.021 -0.010 -0.148** 0.015 0.060** 0.072* 0.036*
(0.053) (0.073) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.036) (0.025) (0.042) (0.018)
CEO tenure 0.007 0.459*** -0.068 -0.0357 0.348*** -0.054* -0.042* -0.111 0.013
(0.052) (0.127) (0.042) (0.044) (0.093) (0.031) (0.022) (0.071) (0.019)
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.321 0.188 0.213 0.360 0.323 0.422 0.281 0.112 0.163
The table reports the within-firm change in firm’s CSR ratings before and after a CEO wins an award.
The dependent variable in models 1 - 3 is net CSR. The dependent variable in models 4 - 6 is total CSR
strengths. The dependent variable in models 7 - 9 is total CSR concerns. CSR strengths (concerns) vari-
able is the sum of firm’s CSR strengths (concerns) across six CSR dimensions. CSR net variable is the
difference between CSR strengths and CSR concerns for any observation year. Post award is a dummy
variable set to 1 in the period after a CEO wins an award. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total
assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated
as net income divided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total
sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales. CEO age and
tenure are measured in years. Comparisons for 2 and 3 years include both firm and year fixed effects. For
the 1 year comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insufficient observations required to
estimate fixed effects. All financial controls are lagged by one period. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Next, I examine how an increase in CEO achieved social status might influence
the direction of social investments based on the type of stakeholders they affect.
Hypothesis 6 posits that executives that experienced a positive status shift will fo-
cus their CSR strategy on improving social performance related to the company’s
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primary (or core) stakeholders rather than greater community (peripheral stakehold-
ers). Similar to the analysis of ascribed status as well as recent studies (Dupire and
M’Zali, 2016; Flammer, 2015), I consider social actions within the product, diversity
and employee relations dimensions to be primarily related to core stakeholders, and
activities within the community, environment and human rights dimensions to be
primarily relevant to peripheral stakeholders.
Panel A in Table 4.16 reports the results of testing the influence of achieved
status on core CSR measures, and Models 1 - 3 show that award-winning CEOs in-
crease their overall social investment towards core stakeholders following an award.
The coefficient on the Post award variable is positive and significant in all three
test periods, with p-value<0.05 in pre/post 1 year period and p-value<0.10 in the
other two periods. The results indicate an average increase in the net core CSR of
approximately 55% in the first year following an award, and an overall increase of
approximately 66% over three years after an award, suggesting a notable economic
significance. The examination of core CSR strengths and core CSR concerns suggest
that the primary contribution to the higher overall social performance towards core
stakeholders stems from reducing negative social outcomes rather than increasing
positive ones. In contrast, Panel B in Table 4.16 documents the effect of achieved
status shifts on peripheral CSR measures, showing no statistically significant rela-
tionship (at the 10% level) between winning an award and social actions towards
society at large. These results suggest that achieved status is primarily related to
core CSR performance, providing some initial support to Hypothesis 6.
In order to better estimate the relative importance of investments in core versus
peripheral CSR activities following a positive status shift, I measure the effect of
winning an award on the difference between core and peripheral CSR21. Panel C in
Table 4.16 reports the results, confirming that high CEO status leads to prioritising
social performance towards primary company stakeholders, lending further support
to Hypothesis 6. In particular, Models 1 - 3 show a positive and significant coefficient
on the Post award variable (p-value<0.10) for all three test periods. Considering
relative investment in core and peripheral CSR strengths (Models 4 - 6) and concerns
21Similar to the tests within the ascribed status dimension, the issue with using a ratio of core to
peripheral CSR is that this approach result in significant loss of observations due to multiple firms reporting
a zero value for either core or peripheral CSR.
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(Models 7 - 9) suggests that the difference is likely driven by a higher focus on
lowering core concerns rather than increasing core strengths, consistent with the
trend observed in Panel A.
Table 4.16: Achieved status and core and peripheral CSR
Panel A: Achieved status and core CSR
Core CSR net Core CSR strengths Core CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.534** 0.687* 0.692* 0.236 0.287 0.284 -0.314** -0.399 -0.408*
(0.215) (0.367) (0.409) (0.174) (0.304) (0.270) (0.141) (0.241) (0.237)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.210 0.150 0.199 0.206 0.235 0.368 0.158 0.116 0.106
Panel B: Achieved status and peripheral CSR
Peripheral CSR net Peripheral CSR strengths Peripheral CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.076 -0.057 -0.266 -0.030 -0.199 -0.205 -0.107 -0.141 0.061
(0.181) (0.243) (0.257) (0.117) (0.155) (0.173) (0.143) (0.145) (0.145)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.467 0.233 0.164 0.515 0.258 0.280 0.214 0.098 0.188
Panel C: Achieved status and the relative investment in core versus peripheral CSR
Core-peripheral CSR net Core-peripheral CSR strengths Core-peripheral CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.482* 0.744* 0.958* 0.283 0.486 0.489 -0.202 -0.258 -0.468*
(0.258) (0.429) (0.477) (0.204) (0.311) (0.313) (0.197) (0.268) (0.238)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 0.169 0.160 0.263 0.147 0.258 0.097 0.105 0.103
The table reports the within-firm change in firm’s core and peripheral CSR ratings before and after a CEO wins an
award. Panel A shows changes in the net core CSR, core CSR strengths and core CSR concerns. Core CSR strengths
(concerns) variable is the sum of firm’s diversity, employee relations and product quality strengths (concerns). Core
CSR net variable is the difference between core CSR strengths and core CSR concerns for any observation year. Panel
B shows changes in the net peripheral CSR, peripheral CSR strengths and peripheral CSR concerns. Peripheral CSR
strengths (concerns) variable is the sum of firm’s community, environment and human rights strengths (concerns).
Peripheral CSR net variable is the difference between peripheral CSR strengths and peripheral CSR concerns for any
observation year. Panel C shows changes in the difference between core and peripheral CSR ratings. Post award is a
dummy variable set to 1 in the period after a CEO wins an award. Firm and CEO controls are included in all mod-
els and are not reported for brevity. Firm controls include firm size, ROA, leverage, R&D intensity and advertising
intensity. CEO controls include CEO age and tenure, measured in years. Comparisons for 2 and 3 years include both
firm and year fixed effects. For the 1 year comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insufficient ob-
servations required to estimate fixed effects. All financial controls are lagged by one period. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
I also explore the influence of a status increase on each of the six individual CSR
dimensions used to construct the aggregate measures, since prior research suggests
that considering only the overall constructs might confound the effect on the distinct
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areas of social responsibility (Bouslah et al., 2013). Table 4.17 reports the result.
The most consistent status effect is observed within the human rights (Panel E)
and the product quality (Panel F) CSR dimensions. Within the human rights CSR
measures, the indicator of the post-award period loads significantly positively on the
net CSR and significantly negatively on CSR concerns in all three test periods (all
coefficients are significant at least at the 10% level). The pattern is similar within
the product quality dimension, although the coefficients on the Post award variable
are notably stronger here compared to the effect associated with the human rights
CSR, and the influence of achieved status remains significant (at least at the 10%
level) only for the first two evaluation periods.
While social strengths and concerns within most KLD dimensions are generally
applicable to all companies, many of the items within the human rights category
appear to be specific to firms’ operations. These include strengths such as "positive
record in South Africa" and concerns such as "operations in Sudan" and "operations
in Northern Ireland between 1991 - 1994". Since this analysis focuses on comparing
the within-firm changes in CSR rather than considering a potential cross-sectional
effect, the observed pattern of lowering human rights concerns is not necessarily
related to the specific firm characteristics. However, I believe that the findings
related to the human rights CSR dimension should be taken with caution due to the
specificity of evaluated social activities.
175
Table 4.17: Achieved status and individual CSR dimensions
Panel A: Community CSR rating
Community CSR net Community CSR strengths Community CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award -0.046 -0.100 -0.246 -0.114 -0.150 -0.234** -0.070 -0.050 0.012
(0.113) (0.148) (0.148) (0.103) (0.127) (0.114) (0.046) (0.063) (0.057)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.269 0.065 0.069 0.302 0.062 0.106 0.217 0.061 0.108
Panel B: Diversity CSR rating
Diversity CSR net Diversity CSR strengths Diversity CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.169 0.119 0.280 0.138 0.076 0.204 -0.049 -0.043 -0.077
(0.142) (0.186) (0.221) (0.126) (0.178) (0.179) (0.075) (0.108) (0.110)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.249 0.295 0.183 0.266 0.287 0.192 0.175 0.145
Panel C: Employee relations CSR rating
Employee relations CSR net Employee relations CSR strengths Employee relations CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.144 0.135 0.304 0.013 0.081 0.141 -0.136 -0.053 -0.162
(0.120) (0.200) (0.243) (0.083) (0.153) (0.156) (0.096) (0.149) (0.140)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.255 0.025 0.034 0.256 0.074 0.221 0.22 0.037 0.073
Panel D: Environment CSR rating
Environment CSR net Environment CSR strengths Environment CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.000 -0.201 -0.235* 0.022 -0.127 -0.004 0.056 0.074 0.231***
(0.109) (0.127) (0.128) (0.065) (0.088) (0.104) (0.101) (0.091) (0.081)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.365 0.233 0.19 0.327 0.293 0.384 0.162 0.038 0.214
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Panel E: Human rights CSR rating
Human rights CSR net Human rights CSR strengths Human rights CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.131** 0.243** 0.215* 0.023 0.097* 0.037 -0.102* -0.165** -0.182*
(0.063) (0.106) (0.123) (0.024) (0.054) (0.060) (0.053) (0.080) (0.096)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.269 0.177 0.207 0.204 0.083 0.127 0.279 0.2 0.236
Panel F: Product CSR rating
Product CSR net Product CSR strengths Product CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.218*** 0.432** 0.108 0.091 0.130 -0.061 -0.133** -0.303* -0.169
(0.081) (0.176) (0.156) (0.056) (0.092) (0.114) (0.068) (0.161) (0.123)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.286 0.106 0.029 0.144 0.111 0.129 0.249 0.087 0.081
The table reports the within-firm change in firm’s CSR ratings for each individual CSR dimension before and after
a CEO wins an award. Panel A presents the within-firm change in firm’s community CSR rating. Panel B presents
the within-firm change in firm’s diversity CSR rating. Panel C presents the within-firm change in firm’s employee
relations CSR rating. Panel D presents the within-firm change in firm’s environment CSR rating. Panel E presents
the within-firm change in firm’s human rights CSR rating. Panel F presents the within-firm change in firm’s product
CSR rating. The dependent variable in models 1 - 3 is net CSR within the corresponding dimension. The dependent
variable in models 4 - 6 is total CSR strengths within the corresponding dimension. The dependent variable in models
7 - 9 is total CSR concerns within the corresponding dimension. CSR strengths (concerns) variable is the sum of all
strengths (concerns) within the corresponding dimension. CSR net variable is the difference between CSR strengths
and CSR concerns within the corresponding dimension. Post award is a dummy variable set to 1 in the period after
a CEO wins an award. Firm and CEO controls are included in all models and are not reported for brevity. Firm
controls include firm size, ROA, leverage, R&D intensity and advertising intensity. CEO controls include CEO age
and tenure, measured in years. Comparisons for 2 and 3 years include both firm and year fixed effects. For the 1 year
comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insufficient observations required to estimate fixed effects.
All financial controls are lagged by one period. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported
in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.5.4 Robustness
To control for the limitations in KLD methodology related to covering different sets
of strength and concern items over time, I replicate the main analysis using two
alternative approaches to measuring CSR. First, I create scaled measures of CSR
by dividing the aggregate CSR scores by the maximum potential score within a
given year. Second, I use industry-adjusted CSR measures that are adjusted for
the average social performance within each firm’s industry. Panels A and B in
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Table 4.18 report the results, confirming that the relationship between the Post
award variable and measures of social performance remains consistent for different
approaches to estimating social performance. In particular, award winners exhibit a
stronger overall social performance in the year following the award (p-value<0.05),
and show evidence of lowering negative social impacts in the two years following
the award (p-value<0.05 for the pre/post 1 year periods and p-value<0.10 for the
pre/post 2 year period).
In the main tests, I use all observations where a CEO remained in office for a given
evaluation period, resulting in a coverage of a different number of firms across the
three periods: 88 firms in the pre/post 1 year period, 65 firms in the pre/post 2 year
period and 43 in the pre/post 3 year period. As a robustness check, I replicate the
main results within a restricted sample that only includes firms in which executives
were in office for the full range of test periods, resulting in a consistent coverage
of 43 firms. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 4.18 and confirm that
the same pattern holds for a more conservative sample. In addition, comparing the
magnitude of the coefficients on the Post award variable in Panel C of Table 4.18 to
that reported in the main results (Table 4.15) indicates that the effect of achieved
status on the net CSR and CSR concerns is even stronger within the restricted
sample.
To address the possibility that award-winning firms are systematically different
from other companies, and endogenous firm characteristics may be driving the re-
sults, I construct a sample of predicted winners and compare the within-firm changes
in CSR among award winners to the variation in CSR practices among executives
of similar firms. To identify a control sample of predicted winners, I estimate a logit
model and identify determinants of CEO awards based on a range of observable firm
and CEO characteristics. This approach is similar to that used in other studies ex-
amining the influence of prestigious CEO awards (Koh, 2011; Malmendier and Tate,
2009), with an added advantage of including CEO-related variables in addition to
firm-level characteristics.
Panel A in Table 4.19 reports the results of the logit regression, showing that
receiving an award is positively related to firm size, profitability and advertising in-
tensity, while higher leverage lowers the likelihood of winning an award. The strong
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Table 4.18: Robustness tests: KLD methodology and sample restriction
Panel A: Scaled CSR ratings
Scaled CSR net Scaled CSR strengths Scaled CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.102** 0.142 0.095 0.021 0.042 0.013 -0.075** -0.132* -0.099
(0.048) (0.112) (0.092) (0.033) (0.074) (0.059) (0.033) (0.079) (0.069)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.294 0.116 0.168 0.398 0.243 0.28 0.312 0.177 0.246
Panel B: Industry-adjusted CSR ratings
Industry-adjusted CSR net Industry-adjusted CSR strengths Industry-adjusted CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.616** 0.629 0.426 0.260 0.089 0.079 -0.371** -0.541* -0.347
(0.264) (0.452) (0.489) (0.200) (0.369) (0.328) (0.157) (0.294) (0.313)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.188 0.213 0.377 0.323 0.422 0.306 0.112 0.163
Panel C: Same number of firms for all periods
CSR net CSR strengths CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.905** 0.435 0.426 0.414 -0.185 0.079 -0.579** -0.621* -0.347
(0.428) (0.562) (0.489) (0.366) (0.401) (0.328) (0.238) (0.310) (0.313)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 86 172 258 86 172 258 86 172 258
No. of firms 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.378 0.175 0.213 0.513 0.393 0.422 0.324 0.151 0.163
The table reports the within-firm change in firm’s CSR ratings before and after a CEO wins an award. Panel A re-
ports the results using scaled CSR measures. Panel B reports the results using the industry-adjusted CSR measures.
Panel C reports the results when restricting the sample to the same firms within all three periods. The dependent
variable in models 1 - 3 is net CSR (scaled and industry-adjusted in Panels A and B, respectively). The dependent
variable in models 4 - 6 is total CSR strengths (scaled and industry-adjusted in Panels A and B, respectively). The
dependent variable in models 7 - 9 is total CSR concerns (scaled and industry-adjusted in Panels A and B, respec-
tively). Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the definition of different CSR measures. Post award is a
dummy variable set to 1 in the period after a CEO wins an award. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total as-
sets. Firm and CEO controls are included in all models and are not reported for brevity. Leverage is calculated as
total debt divided by total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. R&D
intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as advertising
expenditure divided by total sales. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. Comparisons for 2 and 3 years include
both firm and year fixed effects. For the 1 year comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insuffi-
cient observations required to estimate fixed effects. All financial controls are lagged by one period. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
links between higher profitability and lower leverage with winning an award are con-
sistent with expectations as such characteristics are associated with financial health,
and firm performance is considered in the selection process by several publications.
In addition, award winners tend to be younger CEOs with more experience, and this
pattern is at least partially driven by several repeat winners who founded their com-
panies at a relatively young age and remained in office for a period far beyond the
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average CEO tenure (such as Jeffrey Bezos, Michael Dell, Steven Jobs and William
Gates).
Next, I use the coefficients from the logit model to calculate a propensity score for
every company, and match each award winner to a non-winning CEO with the closest
firm and CEO-related characteristics within a given year. Panel B in Table 4.19
compares the summary statistics between winners and predicted winners, reporting
the significance of the difference in means between the two samples. The last column
shows the t-statistic associated with the difference in means, confirming that there is
no significant variation between winners and predicted winners in any firm or CEO
characteristics, or in their CSR performance in the year before the award.
I then use the control sample of predicted winners and test for within-firm
changes in CSR before and after CEOs are predicted to win awards. Table 4.20
summarises the impact of predicted winners on the overall measures of CSR (Panel
A), as well as core and peripheral CSR individually (Panels B and C, respectively).
Post award variable indicates the period after CEOs are predicted to win awards,
and its coefficient is insignificant at the 10% level in 26 out of 27 models. The only
exception occurs in Model 5 of Panel B which uses core CSR strengths as the de-
pendent variable and evaluates the impact of predicted winners within the pre/post
2 year period. This does not pose concerns in relation to my main findings as award
winning was not significantly related to CSR strengths. The general insignificance
(at the 10% level) of predicted winners with regards to the measures of net CSR
and CSR concerns indicates that the results in the previous section are not driven
by endogenous firm-level characteristics associated with winning awards.
To further assure causality, I also employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) tech-
nique to compare changes in social performance among award winners to the vari-
ation in CSR among predicted winners. I verify the results using three different
matching methods (one-to-one matching, k-nearest neighbours and kernel) using al-
ternative specifications in each approach. Table 4.21 summarises the results for the
overall measures of CSR as well as core and peripheral social performance.
Panel A reports the findings related to the overall measures of CSR across all six
dimensions. The DiDs in the net CSR between winners and predicted winners are
positive but remains insignificant at the 10% level in all three test periods. In con-
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Table 4.19: Robustness tests: Sample of predicted winners
Panel A: Determinants of award-winning
Variable Coefficient
Firm size 0.652***
(0.063)
ROA 7.887***
(1.092)
Leverage -2.348***
(0.612)
R&D intensity 0.549
(1.344)
Advertising intensityy 6.478***
(2.327)
CEO age -0.034***
(0.011)
CEO tenure 0.047***
(0.010)
Industry fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
No. of observations 7165
Pseudo R-squared 0.162
Panel B: Differences between award winners and predicted winners in the year before award
Award-winning CEOs Predicted winners Difference in means t-statistic
Main CSR variables
CSR Net 1.114 0.778 0.336 (0.59)
CSR Strengths 2.943 2.593 0.351 (0.79)
CSR Concerns 1.830 1.815 0.015 (0.04)
Firm variables
Firm size 8.853 8.985 -0.132 (-0.70)
Leverage 0.188 0.208 -0.020 (-0.75)
ROA 0.094 0.102 -0.008 (-0.72)
R&D intensity 0.047 0.052 -0.005 (-0.48)
Advertising intensity 0.018 0.029 -0.012 (-1.64)
CEO variables
CEO age 57.170 55.945 1.225 (0.96)
CEO tenure 10.170 9.709 0.461 (0.37)
Panel A presents results of a logit regression of an indicator of award winning on observable firm and CEO
characteristics used to predict winning an award. The binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if the com-
pany’s CEO received an award in the respective year, and equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the natural
logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. ROA (return on as-
sets) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure
divided by total sales. Advertising intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales.
CEO age and tenure are measured in years. All financial controls are lagged by one period. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. To obtain a control sample of predicted winners, firms without award-winning CEOs
are matched to firm-year observations with award-winning CEOs based on same year and closest predicted
probabilities estimated from the logit regression in Panel A. Panel B compares firm and CEO character-
istics between award-winning CEOs and predicted winners in the year before the award. The (t-statistic)
column shows the t-statistics of t-tests that the differences in means between award winners and predicted
winners are zero. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
trast, models testing the DiD in CSR concerns show a significant negative difference
between the reduction in CSR concerns among winners compared to the change in
the sample of predicted winners. The DiDs in CSR concerns remain significantly
negative across all matching methods, with five out of six reporting significance at
the 5% level and the most restrictive method (one-to-on without replacement) show-
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ing significance at the 10% level. These findings provide further assurance that the
observed reduction in negative social actions among award winners following status
increase is not driven by endogenous firm-related characteristics. The lack of a sig-
nificant DiD in the net CSR between the two groups of CEOs appears to be related
to a slightly slower increase in CSR strengths among award winners compared to
predicted winners.
Panels B and C describe the DiD in the core and peripheral CSR measures be-
tween award winners and predicted winners. As expected, there are no significant
differences (at the 10% level) within social investments aimed at the greater com-
munity (Panel C), suggesting that achieved status is not particularly related to this
aspect of social performance. The DiDs in the core CSR measures, on the other hand,
confirm that, following a positive status shift, CEOs reduce core CSR concerns by
a magnitude significantly beyond that which can be explained by firm-related char-
acteristics (p-value<0.05 in most models). This effect holds for approximately two
years after the status increase, and contributes to a significantly higher DiD in the
net core CSR (at least at the 10% level) in the first year following award conferral.
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Table 4.20: Robustness tests: Within-firm changes in CSR ratings among predicted winners
Panel A: Overall CSR ratings in firms with predicted winners
CSR net CSR strengths CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.498 -0.684 -0.861 0.419 -0.824 -0.628 -0.087 -0.140 0.233
(0.466) (0.637) (0.510) (0.351) (0.644) (0.437) (0.198) (0.577) (0.399)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.258 0.394 0.492 0.303 0.562 0.634 0.349 0.186 0.069
Panel B: Core CSR ratings in firms with predicted winners
Core CSR net Core CSR strengths Core CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.215 -0.738 -0.554 0.195 -0.892* -0.588 -0.036 -0.153 -0.034
(0.277) (0.458) (0.392) (0.191) (0.492) (0.377) (0.148) (0.274) (0.219)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.369 0.238 0.304 0.38 0.246 0.413 0.25 0.241 0.11
Panel C: Peripheral CSR ratings in firms with predicted winners
Peripheral CSR net Peripheral CSR strengths Peripheral CSR concerns
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award 0.284 0.055 -0.308 0.229 0.068 -0.040 -0.052 0.013 0.267
(0.297) (0.396) (0.334) (0.261) (0.272) (0.181) (0.093) (0.359) (0.265)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.369 0.636 0.641 0.369 0.804 0.742 0.351 0.012 0.072
The table reports the within-firm change in firm’s CSR ratings before and after a CEO is predicted to win an award.
Panel A reports results for the overall CSR ratings. Panel B reports the results for the core CSR ratings. Panel C
reports the results for the peripheral CSR ratings. Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the definition of
the different CSR measures. Post award is a dummy variable set to 1 in the period after a CEO is predicted to win
an award. Firm and CEO controls are included in all models and are not reported for brevity. Firm size is the nat-
ural logarithm of total assets. Firm and CEO controls are included in all models and are not reported for brevity.
Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. ROA (return on assets) is calculated as net income di-
vided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Advertising intensity
is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total sales. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. Compar-
isons for 2 and 3 years include both firm and year fixed effects. For the 1 year comparison, firm fixed effects are not
estimated because of insufficient observations required to estimate fixed effects. All financial controls are lagged by
one period. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.21: Robustness tests: Difference-in-differences between winners and predicted winners
Panel A: DiD between winners and predicted winners in overall CSR ratings
CSR net CSR strengths CSR concerns
DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD
(t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3) (t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3) (t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3)
One-to-one
Without replacement 0.605 0.310 0.933 -0.026 -0.069 0.333 -0.632 -0.379 -0.6
( 1.24) ( 0.45) ( 1.10) (-0.09) (-0.15) ( 0.56) (-1.68)* (-0.85) (-1.12)
With replacement 0.756 0.542 0.586 -0.295 -0.237 0.034 -1.051 -0.78 -0.552
( 1.40) ( 0.69) ( 0.60) (-0.82) (-0.42) ( 0.06) (-2.53)** (-1.59) (-0.83)
k-nearest neighbours
Nearest neighbours (n=5) 0.603 0.595 0.655 -0.217 -0.067 0.034 -0.82 -0.663 -0.621
( 1.22) ( 0.87) ( 0.70) (-0.67) (-0.14) ( 0.06) (-2.24)** (-1.58) (-0.97)
Nearest neighbours (n=10) 0.660 0.595 0.655 -0.159 -0.067 0.034 -0.819 -0.663 -0.621
( 1.35) ( 0.87) ( 0.70) (-0.50) (-0.14) ( 0.06) (-2.26)** (-1.58) (-0.97)
Kernel
Gaussian kernel 0.667 0.586 0.648 -0.201 -0.106 0.035 -0.869 -0.692 -0.613
( 1.36) ( 0.86) ( 0.69) (-0.63) (-0.21) ( 0.06) (-2.38)** (-1.64) (-0.96)
Epanechnikov kernel 0.705 0.352 0.566 -0.123 -0.231 0.004 -0.828 -0.584 -0.562
( 1.38) ( 0.50) ( 0.58) (-0.37) (-0.46) ( 0.01) (-2.19)** (-1.35) (-0.84)
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Panel B: : DiD between winners and predicted winners in core CSR ratings
Core CSR net Core CSR strengths Core CSR concerns
DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD
(t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3) (t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3) (t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3)
One-to-one
Without replacement 0.737 0.517 0.933 0.237 0.241 0.667 -0.500 -0.276 -0.267
(1.93)* (1.00) (1.31) (0.95) (0.68) (1.15) (-1.96)** (-0.99) (-0.72)
With replacement 0.872 0.864 0.483 0.103 0.169 0.345 -0.769 -0.695 -0.138
(2.18)** (1.51) (0.63) (0.42) (0.44) (0.65) (-2.74)*** (-2.22)** (-0.32)
k-nearest neighbours
Nearest neighbours (n=5) 0.697 0.766 0.517 0.115 0.188 0.345 -0.583 -0.578 -0.172
(1.96)** (1.52) (0.70) (0.54) (0.54) (0.67) (-2.25)** (-2.09)** (-0.41)
Nearest neighbours (n=10) 0.706 0.766 0.517 0.137 0.188 0.345 -0.569 -0.578 -0.172
(2.00)** (1.52) (0.70) (0.65) (0.54) (0.67) (-2.22)** (-2.09)** (-0.41)
Kernel
Gaussian kernel 0.729 0.788 0.514 0.120 0.174 0.345 -0.609 -0.613 -0.169
(2.06)* (1.55) (0.69) (0.56) (0.50) (0.67) (-2.37)** (-2.21)** (-0.40)
Epanechnikov kernel 0.737 0.682 0.373 0.122 0.088 0.220 -0.615 -0.594 -0.153
(1.99)** (1.29) (0.50) (0.55) (0.24) (0.43) (-2.31)** (-2.07)** (-0.35)
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Panel C: DiD between winners and predicted winners in peripheral CSR ratings
Peripheral CSR net Peripheral CSR strengths Peripheral CSR concerns
DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD
(t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3) (t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3) (t-1, t+1) (t-1, t+2) (t-1, t+3)
One-to-one
Without replacement -0.132 -0.207 0.000 -0.263 -0.310 -0.333 -0.132 -0.103 -0.333
(-0.49) (-0.58) (0.00) (-1.34) (-1.18) (-0.97) (-0.70) (-0.39) (-1.16)
With replacement -0.115 -0.322 0.103 -0.397 -0.407 -0.310 -0.282 -0.085 -0.414
(-0.36) (-0.81) (0.19) (-1.55) (-1.27) (-0.88) (-1.41) (-0.31) (-1.07)
k-nearest neighbours
Nearest neighbours (n=5) -0.095 -0.171 0.138 -0.332 -0.255 -0.310 -0.237 -0.085 -0.448
(-0.34) (-0.49) (0.27) (-1.50) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-1.43) (-0.36) (-1.20)
Nearest neighbours (n=10) -0.046 -0.171 0.138 -0.296 -0.255 -0.310 -0.250 -0.085 -0.448
(-0.17) (-0.49) (0.27) (-1.35) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-1.52) (-0.36) (-1.20)
Kernel
Gaussian kernel -0.061 -0.202 0.134 -0.321 -0.280 -0.310 -0.260 -0.078 -0.444
(-0.22) (-0.57) (0.26) (-1.46) (-0.97) (-0.89) (-1.57) (-0.33) (-1.19)
Epanechnikov kernel -0.032 -0.329 0.192 -0.245 -0.319 -0.217 -0.213 0.010 -0.409
(-0.11) (-0.92) (0.36) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-0.61) (-1.23) (0.04) (-1.03)
This table reports the results from difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis of how winning an award affects CSR ratings. To
obtain a control sample of predicted winners, firms without award-winning CEOs are matched to firm-year observations with
award-winning CEOs based on same year and closest predicted probabilities estimated from the logit regression of an indicator
of award winning on observable firm and CEO characteristics used to predict winning an award. Panel A shows the differences
between award winners and predicted winners in the net CSR, CSR strengths and CSR concerns. Panel B shows the differ-
ences between award winners and predicted winners in the core net CSR, core CSR strengths and core CSR concerns. Panel C
shows the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the peripheral net CSR, peripheral CSR strengths and
peripheral CSR concerns. Please refer to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the definition of the different CSR measures. Abso-
lute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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4.6 Discussion and conclusions
Issues related to executives’ social background, prestige and standing within the
elite circles are increasingly recognised as important factors that can affect not only
firm performance (Chen et al., 2008; Hitt et al., 2001; Jian and Lee, 2011; Pollock
et al., 2009) but also the level of risk CEOs are willing to accept, and the choices
they make on behalf of their corporations (Certo and Hodge, 2007; Kish-Gephart
and Campbell, 2015; Palmer and Barber, 2001). This study demonstrates that,
consistent with the upper echelons theory, CEO social status characteristics can
also influence decisions regarding socially responsible policies.
Building on the premise that high ascribed status CEOs value their membership
within the inner circle of the corporate elite, I theorised that the effect of ascribed
status can impact CSR decisions through two mechanisms. First, while embedded-
ness within the elite networks can provide a multitude of benefits, it can also exercise
social pressures for members to conform to its normative expectations. Due to the
value of the shared reputational capital within this elite network and the use of
charitable giving as a form of "social currency", CEOs belonging to the inner circle
are likely to be motivated to increase their social performance in order to preserve
their prestigious social standing. Second, the prestige associated with upper-class
background and membership within the inner circle is likely to elevate executives’
power within their organisation, making it easier for them to adopt their corporate
strategy to creating goodwill within their prestigious networks and maintain their
social ties to the elite.
Using attendance at prestigious Ivy League universities as an indicator of high
ascribed status, my results shows that upper-class origin can indeed exert influence
on executives’ decisions regarding their CSR strategy. Consistent with my primary
hypothesis, I find that high ascribed status CEOs are associated with superior net
CSR ratings. However, the effect of ascribed status on different CSR dimensions
appears to be more nuanced than expected. In particular, high ascribed status
executives tend to focus on improving social strengths associated with the core
company stakeholders, while somewhat reducing social concerns related to peripheral
stakeholders. This strategy suggests that these CEOs aim to balance the impact of
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their CSR strategy by engaging in actions that are more beneficial to the financial
firm value (such as increasing CSR strengths and core CSR activities) as well as those
that have a more prominent impact on the company’s responsible image and moral
capital (such as reducing CSR concerns and contributing to the greater community)
(Bermiss et al., 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Servaes and
Tamayo, 2013).
Using a range of prestigious business awards to indicate exogenous shocks to CEO
achieved status, I find that this dimension of social status is also positively related to
the firm’s overall CSR performance. In contrast to the influence of having an upper-
class origin, an increase in achieved social status results in a more focused CSR
strategy that is primarily aimed at reducing negative social impacts related to the
firm’s core stakeholders. However, this approach is also likely to result in a balanced
outcome that has positive impacts on firm performance (through addressing the
needs of primary stakeholders), as well as contribute to building a lasting image of
a responsible corporation (through focusing on reducing social concerns) (Bermiss
et al., 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Servaes and Tamayo,
2013).
The findings in this study add to the upper echelons literature and the research
on determinants of CSR by showing that, similar to factors such as age (Oh et al.,
2016), gender (Manner, 2010) and hubris (Tang et al., 2015), CEO’s social sta-
tus characteristics can have an impact on the firm’s propensity to engage in social
activities, and can have a significant role in shaping specific CSR strategies.
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CHAPTER 5
CEO social status, CSR and firm
performance
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5.1 Introduction
A popular topic within the CSR literature has been concerned with the link between
the social and financial performance of a firm, as well as the underlying processes that
might drive this relationship. Despite the vast amount of theoretical and empirical
research on the subject, the question of the exact relationship between CSR and firm
financial performance remains open, with studies still producing mixed results (for
reviews, see Aguinis and Glavas, 2012; Beurden and Gössling, 2008; Margolis and
Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). The majority of studies find evidence of a positive
link between firms’ social and financial performance, which seems to be facilitated
by a number of positive organisational outcomes associated with engagement in CSR
activities, including reputational benefits, higher goodwill, and increased customer
loyalty (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Maignan et al., 1999; Orlitzky et al., 2003).
With the evidence about the relationship between social and financial performance
generally positive, it remains to find out whether CSR decisions motivated, at least
in part, by CEO personal status concerns can influence this relationship. That is,
does the fact that CSR investments and decisions might be driven not purely by
firm value maximization rationale, but also by CEO personal attributes, influence
the relationship observed.
In this chapter, I consider the financial performance implications of CSR initia-
tives by CEOs with high ascribed and high achieved social status. Building on exist-
ing research on executives with upper class background, I expect ascribed status to
negatively moderate the relationship between social and financial firm performance,
because CSR initiatives by high ascribed status CEOs are likely to be motivated
by the class-wide interests of their elite social circles rather than considerations of
firm-level economic benefits (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Useem, 1984).
Within the achieved status dimension, I develop two contrasting hypotheses in
order to empirically address the conflicting theory and findings regarding the in-
fluence of CEO achieved social status on organisational strategy and outcomes.
Specifically, if executives increase social performance for personal reasons following
a positive shift in status, I expect a negative moderating effect from achieved status.
Alternatively, if superior CSR performance is part of a business strategy aimed at
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addressing higher social demands following the increase in firm visibility, I expect a
neutral moderating status influence.
I test these hypotheses using the same sample of S&P 500 CEOs as in the previous
chapter. I find no evidence of moderating impact within either status dimension,
despite the fact that the motivation for higher CSR among high status executives is
likely to be, at least partially, driven by their personal interests, particularly within
the ascribed status dimension. This finding is important and adds to the argument
that strategic or opportunistic use of CSR, whether for corporate or personal reasons,
does not necessarily lead to poorer organisational outcomes (Petrovits, 2006)1.
5.2 Theory and hypotheses
5.2.1 Ascribed status
In recent decades, for-profit corporations have substantially increased the amount of
corporate resources devoted to improving stakeholder relationships and promoting
social welfare. Meanwhile, there is a continuing debate in academic literature on the
instrumental relationship between social initiatives and organisational performance.
Some researchers argue that CSR is an unnecessary cost imposed on shareholders
which is inconsistent with the goal of profit maximisation (Friedman, 1970; Jensen,
2010; Karnani, 2011; Rappaport, 1986). Under this view, social initiatives are con-
sidered an inefficient use of managerial time and effort as well as a waste of valuable
resources. Therefore, increased engagement in CSR can put firms at a disadvantage
compared to less socially responsible firms (Aupperle et al., 1985; Vance, 1975). In
line with these arguments, there is some empirical evidence of a neutral or even nega-
tive association between the level of social and financial firm performance (Brammer
et al., 2006; Guerard, 1997; Seifert et al., 2004b).
Conversely, other scholars argue that there is intrinsic value in promoting social
welfare and developing key stakeholder relations. Under this view, socially respon-
sible firms are compensated through a range of direct and indirect benefits such
as improved goodwill (Knauer, 1994), increased customer loyalty (Maignan et al.,
1It is worth noting, however, that the influence of other personal CEO characteristics can be less
favourable and Petrenko et al. (2016), for example, find that CEO narcissism does diminish the positive
influence of CSR on firm performance.
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1999), lower risk premiums (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987) and protection against litiga-
tion and regulation costs (Kacperczyk, 2009). Thus, this line of argument suggests
that corporate social responsibility should have a positive effect on financial firm
performance, and multiple empirical investigations provide support to these predic-
tions (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Beurden and Gössling, 2008; DiSegni et al., 2015;
Lindgreen et al., 2009; Orlitzky et al., 2003).
As the literature within this area develops, more research has shifted from exam-
ining the general link between CSR and organisational performance to trying to un-
derstand the specific channels through which social initiatives affect firm value, and
considering how different CSR strategies might translate to firm performance. The
findings in this area indicate that investments in social responsibility can have vary-
ing implications for organisational outcomes, and factors such as customer awareness
(Servaes and Tamayo, 2013), industry dynamism (Wang et al., 2008) and institu-
tional environment (Wang et al., 2016) can affect the relationship between CSR
and firm value. In addition, researchers have examined various aspects of CSR
engagement strategies, revealing that factors such as consistency, relatedness and
stakeholder focus can influence the profitability of social initiatives (Hillman and
Keim, 2001; Tang et al., 2011).
Industry surveys and academic studies indicate that CEOs have a significant in-
fluence in shaping firm’s social engagement strategy, and executives’ preferences, val-
ues and perceptions can be reflected in CSR-related decisions of their firms (Bonini
and Chênevert, 2008; Muttakin et al., 2016; Werbel and Carter, 2002). In particular,
recent evidence shows that factors such as age (Oh et al., 2016), gender (Manner,
2010), political ideology (Chin et al., 2013), hubris (Tang et al., 2015) and narcis-
sism (Petrenko et al., 2016) can affect both the level and the focus of firms’ social
initiatives. Since the relationship between social and financial performance is de-
pendent on the specific strategies adopted by firms, CEOs’ personal attributes can
determine how social efforts translate into firm value.
Consistent with this line of argument, Petrenko et al. (2016) find that CEO
narcissism reduces the otherwise positive effect of CSR on firm performance. The
authors argue that narcissistic CEOs use social initiatives as means to satisfy their
personal need for attention and image reinforcement, and their strong sense of per-
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sonal ability and lower responsiveness to performance indicators leads to CSR de-
cisions with less positive effects on operational performance. As a result, when net
CSR increases one standard deviation above the mean, firms with less narcissistic
CEOs benefit from 2.16% higher return on assets compared to companies with more
narcissistic executives.
Similar to narcissistic CEOs, I find that high ascribed status executives engage in
more social initiatives, compared to lower status CEOs. I expect ascribed status to
negatively moderate the relationship between social and financial firm performance
for three main reasons. First, executives with elite origins who have been socialised
into upper class norms and behaviours are likely to use corporate social initiatives
to promote the common interests of the business and cultural elite, regardless of the
relevance of such activities to the company’s primary operations (Galaskiewicz, 1985,
1997; Useem, 1984). This is likely to result in CSR decisions not supportive of the
company’s mission, and such social initiatives have been shown to have an adverse
impact on firm value (Masulis and Reza, 2015). In addition, CSR decisions driven
by personal social considerations of powerful high status CEOs can indicate a less
than optimal governance structure, and such internal issues serve as an indicator
of whether the company is hypocritical in its social engagements, reducing their
positive affect on organisational outcomes (Janney and Gove, 2011).
Second, the use of corporate giving as a type of "social currency" among high
ascribed status CEOs is likely to translate into widely varied social initiatives, par-
ticularly because upper class executives are unlikely to reject appeals for charitable
giving from other members of their elite network (Useem, 1984). This can reduce the
consistency of CSR engagement, making it harder to create economic value through
social projects. Specifically, an irregular CSR strategy diminishes firms’ ability to
build complementary resources and efficiently plan the financing of social activities
(Tang et al., 2012). In addition, inconsistency in social initiatives makes it harder
to keep CSR activities aligned with firms’ overall strategies, and can give the im-
pression that a company is engaging in CSR in an opportunistic manner (Basu and
Palazzo, 2008; Tang et al., 2012). In line with these arguments, several studies show
evidence of a positive link between the consistency of the CSR engagement strategy
and firm value (Husted et al., 2015; Rivera et al., 2017; Tang et al., 2012; Wang and
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Choi, 2013).
Finally, the findings in the previous chapter show that high ascribed status CEOs
primarily focus on proactive social initiatives, and display preference for targeting
primary company stakeholders. While this strategy might have a more pronounced
immediate positive effect on firm performance (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Servaes
and Tamayo, 2013), focusing on improvements of social strengths without prevent-
ing irresponsible behaviours might be perceived as a benefit-seeking activity rather
than a genuine attempt to increase the social good, particularly when firm’s CSR
concentrates on core stakeholders (Godfrey et al., 2009; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2016;
Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). Therefore, concentrating on preventing irresponsible be-
haviour as well as investing in social issues that benefit a wider community can have
greater reputational benefits and provide firms with a moral capital to withstand
the consequences of future crises, creating greater long-term economic value from
CSR engagement (Bermiss et al., 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009; Lin-Hi and Blumberg,
2016; Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013).
Therefore, high CEO ascribed status may diminish or negate the mechanisms
that link social engagement with firm outcomes, particularly through lower credibil-
ity of their CSR strategy and the inefficient use of company resources. As a result,
I expect the presence of a high ascribed status CEO to lead to social initiatives that
are less likely to have a positive impact on the firm’s financial performance.
Hypothesis 1: CEO ascribed status will negatively moderate the relationship
between social and financial firm performance.
5.2.2 Achieved status
The examination of various perspectives on the risks and benefits related to in-
vestments in socially responsible behaviours suggests that, on balance, executives
are more likely to increase social performance following a positive shift in achieved
status and the associated increase in their reputation. The analysis in the previous
chapter provides empirical support for this perspective. However, it remains unclear
whether the motivation behind higher CSR stems from the desire to increase CEOs’
own private benefits, or whether it is a part of a sound business strategy aimed at
increasing shareholder value through building a responsible image and addressing
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diverse stakeholder demands. In order to distinguish between these two conflicting
channels, I examine the moderating effect of a positive achieved social status shift
on the relationship between CSR and firm performance.
The first possibility is that award-winning CEOs increase companies’ social per-
formance in order to build their personal reputations and enjoy the benefits asso-
ciated with engagement in social actions. This effect can be supported by the fact
that winning an award is likely to increase CEOs’ influence within a company (Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2009), providing them with more power to affect board decisions,
including those related to the firm’s CSR investments (Muttakin et al., 2016). In
addition, higher power can lead executives to underestimate their dependence on
resources and support provided by their stakeholders, resulting in a lower focus on
meeting their social demands (Tang et al., 2015). Finally, Malmendier and Tate
(2009) argue that positive reputational shifts can distract CEOs from their core
corporate responsibilities and divert their attention to finding ways to preserve their
personal reputations.
There are several examples of opportunistic behaviour among highly reputed
CEOs. Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Wade et al. (2006) document an increase
in compensation among award winners without a corresponding increase in per-
formance, suggesting that, following a positive status shift, CEOs often engage
in rent extraction activities. Kim and Park (2014) investigate the effect of CEO
awards on investor’s earnings predictability and find that award-winning CEOs pro-
duce lower quality financial reporting. Francis et al. (2008) uses an alternative,
media-based measure of CEO reputation and reports a similar pattern of poorer
discretionary earnings quality as well as lower overall earnings quality. Finally, Mal-
mendier and Tate (2009) find an increased incidence of earning management among
award-winning executives, arguing that these CEOs are inclined to inflate earnings
in order to maintain their "superstar" status.
If award-winning CEOs increase CSR primarily in order to improve their per-
sonal reputation, it will likely result into varied social initiatives that are poorly
aligned with considerations of organisational outcomes. Despite a generally positive
link between CSR and financial performance, such social projects are unlikely to
create firm value due to inefficient use of company resources and the diminishing ef-
195
fect of inconsistent CSR engagement on the perceived credibility of company’s social
efforts (Basu and Palazzo, 2008; Rivera et al., 2017; Tang et al., 2012). Therefore,
if the motivation behind higher CSR among CEOs with increased achieved status
stems from a desire to improve their personal reputation, I expect to find a neg-
ative moderating effect of achieved status on the link between social and financial
performance.
An alternative possibility is that award winners invest in CSR as a part of a
sound business strategy, as executives realise the presence of higher stakeholder
demands associated with increased firm visibility, and use social actions in order to
meet these demands. This pattern of behaviour could be observed if award-winning
CEOs realise the value of aligning their actions with stakeholder interests, which
can be more beneficial to their reputational capital in the long term. Consistent
with this argument, Koh (2011) finds that award-winning CEOs are less likely to
use earnings management to meet short-term expectations and are more likely to
use conservative accounting practices2. In addition, Yoo and Pae (2016) investigate
the patterns in charitable contributions of award-winnings firms in Korea, and find
that corporate giving in such companies is more indicative of a business strategy
aimed at maximizing firm value rather than opportunistic CEO behaviour.
If award-winning CEOs align their actions with stakeholder interests and in-
crease CSR investments as a part of a sound business strategy, the resulting social
performance should not have a negative impact on firm value, as it is more likely to
reflect the company’s mission and signal the firm’s intention to promote social wel-
fare. However, since higher social participation in this case is likely simply meeting
increased stakeholder demand, it would not be expected to create additional value
either. Therefore, if a positive achieved status shift incentivises executives to align
their interests with those of their company’s stakeholders, I expect to find a neutral
moderating effect of achieved status on the relationship between social and financial
performance.
The conflicting theory on the influence of CEO status and reputation on organ-
isational strategy and outcomes makes it unclear which effect is more likely to be
2Some of the results presented in Koh (2011) contradict those reported by Malmendier and Tate (2009),
and Koh (2011) argues that the results presented by Malmendier and Tate (2009) are highly specific to
their methodological approach of using a matched control sample.
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observed. In addition, the empirical findings appear to provide some support to
both views, suggesting that different effects might be observed depending on the
examined aspect of corporate behaviour. Therefore, I address the question of the
moderating effect of achieved status on CSR and firm performance empirically.
Hypothesis 2a: CEO achieved status will negatively moderate the relationship
between social and financial firm performance.
Hypothesis 2b: CEO achieved status will have a neutral moderating effect on
the relationship between social and financial firm performance.
5.3 Data and methodology
To analyse the financial performance implications of CSR initiatives by high status
executives, I start with the same sample of S&P 500 CEOs as in the previous
chapter that examined the role of CEO social status in strategic decisions related to
corporate social responsibility. I then collect additional data for constructing firm
performance measures from Compustat. The usable dataset is comprised of 5,031
firm-year observations from 469 companies and includes all observations for which
financial and CSR information is available.
I proxy firm performance using return on assets (ROA), a common measure
of financial performance that has been widely used in recent studies examining
the performance implications of CSR initiatives (Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Petrenko
et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Following Petrenko et al. (2016), ROA is
calculated as net income divided by book assets. Additionally, I include two other
measures of firm performance in supplementary analysis: return on sales (ROS),
computed as net income divided by sales, and return on equity (ROE), calculated
as net income divided by shareholder’s equity. These measures are also commonly
used to assess firm profitability (Jian and Lee, 2011; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013).
Consistent with the methodology in the previous chapters, I use the level of
educational prestige to indicate CEO ascribed social status, and define a CEO as
having high ascribed status if he or she received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy
League universities. I use prestigious business awards to indicate exogenous shocks
to CEO achieved social status, utilising a selection of ten national publications that
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are prominent enough to affect CEO status, and are not subject to any constraints
such as CEO age, gender or industry3.
To measure corporate social responsibility performance, I utilise data from MSCI
ESG Stats (formerly known as Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini, and Company or
KLD). For tests in this chapter, I use the aggregate CSR measures (total CSR
strengths, total CSR concerns and net CSR) as independent explanatory variables,
and also include interaction variables between the indicators of CEO status and the
measures of CSR (similar to Petrenko et al., 2016). The construction of different
CSR variables is described in detail in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2) and is summarised
in Table A.11 in the Appendix.
5.4 Ascribed status, CSR and firm performance
5.4.1 Empirical specification
I analyse the moderating effect of CEO ascribed status on the link between social
and financial firm performance using linear regression models with the following
specification:
Performanceft = α + β1CSRft−1 + β2Statusft + β3CSRft−1 ∗ Statusft+
β4Firmft−1 + β5CEOft + FixedEffectsft + εft
(5.1)
Performanceft is the level of performance in firm f at time t, where performance
is proxied by the return on assets, return on sales and return on equity. CSRft−1 is
the measure of social performance. I use the net CSR ratings in the main model, and
also consider total CSR strengths and total CSR concerns separately in additional
models4. Statusft is the indicator of CEO ascribed status which equals to one if
a CEO received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League universities, and
equals to zero otherwise. CSRft−1 ∗ Statusft is the interaction term between CSR
performance and the indicator of CEO ascribed status.
Firmft−1 and CEOft represent a set of firm and CEO-related control variables.
3Chapter 2, Section 2.3 contains detailed discussion on the status measurement methodology adopted
in this thesis.
4Table A.11 in the Appendix provides a description of how different CSR variables are constructed.
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I employ a similar set of controls to those used in recent studies that examine
the relationship between financial and social firm performance (see, for example,
Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Petrenko et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Firm
controls include firm size, leverage, R&D intensity and capital intensity. Since firm
performance might be subject to previous trends idiosyncratic to a firm, the models
also include a measure of firm performance in the previous year. CEO-specific
controls include CEO age and CEO tenure, measured in years and a binary indicator
of CEO gender that equals to one if a CEO is female and equals to zero otherwise. All
financial and CEO-related variables are summarised in Table A.10 in the Appendix.
FixedEffectsft include year and firm fixed effects to account for time trends as
well as industry and firm-specific drivers of financial performance.
The results of the Cook-Weisberg tests show that the tests associated with the
relationship between firm and social performance also suffer from the presence of
heteroskedasticity (p < 0.001). Therefore, I use robust standard errors clustered
at the individual firm level. The VIF scores for all of the predictor variables are
below 1.5, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in this analysis. In
addition, similar to the models used to predict CSR, I address potential endogeneity
concerns by using models with a fixed effects estimator and verifying that all inde-
pendent variables pre-date the dependent measures of financial performance (similar
to Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Oh et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013).
To address the existing theoretical concern that the effect of CSR on firm perfor-
mance might show up with some lag, I examine the pairwise correlations between the
main CSR variables and ROA, with CSR lags ranging between t-4 and t+2 relative
to ROA at time t5. Table 5.1 reports these correlation coefficients, showing that the
unconditional correlation between CSR variables and ROA is generally quite low
and does not appear to vary considerably depending on the lag (coefficients remain
within |0.1| across all CSR measures and all examined lags). Therefore, I lag the
explanatory CSR measures by one period, consistent with the timing of other inde-
pendent variables and in line with the approach adopted in similar studies (Harjoto
and Laksmana, 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013).
5I include correlations with future values of CSR to check how firm performance is related to future
CSR and whether this relationship shows any notable differences compared to past CSR.
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Table 5.1: Pairwise correlations between ROA and CSR with different time lags
CSR, t-4 CSR, t-3 CSR, t-2 CSR, t-1
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
ROA, t 0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.09
CSR, t CSR, t+1 CSR, t+2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
ROA, t 0.08 0.01 -0.10 0.07 -0.00 -0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.09
The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients between return on assets (ROA) at time t and CSR mea-
sures at times t-4, t-3, t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and t+2. Columns with the heading 1 represent net CSR. Columns
with the headings 2 and 3 represent total CSR strengths and total CSR concerns, respectively. Please refer
to Table A.11 in the Appendix for the description of CSR measures.
5.4.2 Empirical findings
Hypothesis 1 posits that CEO ascribed status will negatively moderate the rela-
tionship between social and financial firm performance. The results of testing this
hypothesis are presented in Table 5.2.
The coefficient on the ascribed status indicator remains insignificant at the 10%
level across all models, suggesting that elite background in itself has no significant
relationship with firm performance. Models with fixed firm effects also show no
evidence of a significant relationship between firm’s financial and social performance,
as well as no moderating effect of ascribed status. Indeed, the coefficients on the
interaction terms between ascribed status and CSR variables are not significant
at the 10% level in models that use net CSR as well as estimations that model
CSR strengths and CSR concerns separately. Specifically, the magnitude of the
coefficients does not exceed |0.001| with p-values greater than 0.10. These findings
provide sufficient evidence to reject Hypothesis 1 as ascribed status does not appear
to lower the effect of social initiatives on firm performance, indicating that CSR
decisions motivated by CEO status concerns do not result in lower firm benefits
from social actions.
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Table 5.2: The effect of CSR and ascribed status on firm performance
[1] [2]
ROA ROA
Ascribed status 0.005 0.011
(0.007) (0.009)
CSR net -0.001
(0.001)
Ascribed status x CSR net -0.000
(0.001)
CSR strengths -0.002
(0.001)
CSR concerns 0.000
(0.001)
Ascribed status x CSR strengths -0.001
(0.001)
Ascribed status x CSR concerns -0.001
(0.002)
Firm size -0.055** -0.054**
(0.021) (0.021)
R&D intensity -0.116 -0.114
(0.149) (0.148)
Capital intensity -0.101** -0.102**
(0.043) (0.043)
Leverage 0.013 0.013
(0.023) (0.023)
Lagged DV 0.138 0.137
(0.088) (0.088)
CEO age -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO tenure 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender -0.033** -0.032**
(0.016) (0.016)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 5031 5031
No. of firms 469 469
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 0.108
The table presents results of regression models testing the moderating effect of CEO ascribed status on the
relationship between firm performance and CSR. The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA),
calculated as net income divided by book assets. CSR strengths (concerns) are the aggregate CSR strengths
(concerns) across all CSR dimensions. CSR net is the difference between CSR strengths and CSR con-
cerns. Ascribed status * CSR net, ascribed status * CSR strengths and ascribed status * CSR concerns
are the interaction terms. Lagged DV is the lagged dependent variable. Firm size is the natural logarithm
of total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Capital intensity is
calculated as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total sales. Leverage is calculated as total
debt divided by total assets. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable
that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All models include year and firm fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
5.4.3 Robustness
To verify that the absence of a moderating ascribed status influence is not specific
to the choice of the measure of firm performance, I perform supplementary analysis
employing two additional commonly used indicators of firm profitability (Jian and
Lee, 2011; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Table 5.3 presents the results, with Panel A
showing the effect of CSR by high ascribed status executives on the return on sales,
and Panel B reporting results of similar estimations using the return on equity as
the dependent variable.
Consistent with the main results, the coefficients on the ascribed status indicator
and the interaction terms between ascribed status and various measures of CSR are
not significant at the 10% level across all models. These findings provide further
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evidence that social initiatives by high ascribed status CEOs do not necessarily
translate into lower firm performance, despite being motivated in part by CEO
status concerns.
Table 5.3: Robustness tests: Alternative performance measures and ascribed status
Panel A: Return on sales (ROS)
[1] [2]
ROS ROS
Ascribed status 0.005 0.012
(0.015) (0.017)
CSR net -0.003
(0.003)
Ascribed status x CSR net 0.000
(0.002)
CSR strengths -0.004
(0.003)
CSR concerns 0.002
(0.003)
Ascribed status x CSR strengths -0.000
(0.002)
Ascribed status x CSR concerns -0.002
(0.002)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 5031 5031
No. of firms 469 469
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.126
Panel B: Return on equity (ROE)
[1] [2]
ROE ROE
Ascribed status -0.156 -0.304
(0.150) (0.188)
CSR net 0.016
(0.036)
Ascribed status x CSR net -0.013
(0.026)
CSR strengths -0.031
(0.049)
CSR concerns -0.090*
(0.052)
Ascribed status x CSR strengths -0.003
(0.025)
Ascribed status x CSR concerns 0.050
(0.037)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 5031 5031
No. of firms 469 469
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.006
The table presents results of regression models testing the moderating effect of CEO ascribed status on the
relationship between firm performance and CSR. All models in Panel A employ return on sales (ROS) as
the dependent variable, calculated as net income divided by total sales. All models in Panel B employ re-
turn on equity (ROE) as the dependent variable, calculated as net income divided by shareholder’s equity.
CSR strengths (concerns) are the aggregate CSR strengths (concerns) across all CSR dimensions. CSR net
is the difference between CSR strengths and CSR concerns. Ascribed status * CSR net, ascribed status *
CSR strengths and ascribed status * CSR concerns are the interaction terms. All models include a set of
firm and CEO controls that are not reported for brevity. Firm controls include firm size, R&D intensity,
capital intensity, leverage, and a lagged dependent variable. CEO controls include CEO age, tenure and
gender. All models include year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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5.5 Achieved status, CSR and firm performance
5.5.1 Empirical specification
Next I analyse the moderating effect of achieved status on the link between social
and financial firm performance by comparing within-firm changes in financial perfor-
mance before and after CEOs receive their first high-profile award. Linear regression
models are applied with the following specification:
Performanceft = α + β1CSRft−1 + β2PostAwardft+
β3CSRft−1 ∗ PostAwardft + β4Firmft−1 + β5CEOft + FixedEffectsft + ε
(5.2)
Performanceft is the level of firm performance proxied by the return on assets,
return on sales and return on equity. CSRft−1 is the measure of CSR performance.
Net CSR score is used in the main model, with additional estimations also dis-
aggregating the overall social performance into CSR strengths and CSR concerns6.
PostAwardft is a binary variable set to one in the period after a CEO wins an award,
indicating high achieved social status. CSRft−1 ∗ PostAwardft is the interaction
term between CSR performance and the indicator of high achieved status.
Firmft−1 and CEOft represent a range of firm and CEO-related control vari-
ables, similar to those used in tests of ascribed status influence. Firm controls
include firm size, leverage, R&D intensity, capital intensity, and a measure of firm
performance in the previous year. CEO-specific controls include CEO age and CEO
tenure, measured in years7. All financial and CEO-related variables are summarised
in Table A.10 in the Appendix. FixedEffectsft include year and firm fixed effects
to account for time trends as well as industry and firm-specific drivers of financial
performance.
Similar to the tests within the ascribed status dimension, I control for het-
eroskedasticity by using robust standard errors clustered at the individual firm level.
The VIF scores for the predictor variables are slightly higher in tests related to CEO
6Table A.11 in the Appendix provides a description of how different CSR variables are constructed
7CEO gender is not included in tests related to the achieved status dimension because it is a time-
invariant characteristic within this sample, and it is accounted for by including firm fixed effects.
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achieved social status, but remain below 3 across all variables, suggesting that mul-
ticollinearity is still not of particular concern. In order to attenuate endogeneity,
I verify that independent variables, including measures of CSR, pre-date the de-
pendent measure of financial performance (similar to Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Oh
et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013).
5.5.2 Empirical findings
This analysis is aimed at developing an understanding of the likely motivations that
drive higher social performance among executives that experience a positive achieved
status shift. In order to discern whether award-winners increase CSR for their
personal benefits or as part of a sound business strategy, I analyse the moderating
effect of a positive status shift on the link between social and financial performance.
I developed two contrasting hypotheses: if executives increase CSR for personal
reasons, there will be a negative moderating effect from achieved status (Hypothesis
2a); if higher CSR is part of a business strategy that addresses higher social demands
following the increase in firm visibility, there will be a neutral moderating status
influence (Hypothesis 2b). The results are presented in Table 5.4, with Models 1 -
3 employing the net CSR measure as the proxy for social performance and Models
4 - 6 using CSR strengths and CSR concerns separately.
I begin by considering the direct impact of an achieved status shift on firm fi-
nancial performance. The coefficient on the Post award variable is negative in the
pre/post 1 year period and positive in the two subsequent periods, but remains in-
significant at the 10% level in all models, suggesting there is no direct relationship
between an increase in status and firm financial performance. These results might
appear to contradict those reported by Malmendier and Tate (2009), who also ex-
amine the influence of prestigious awards on firms’ return on assets (ROA), as the
authors argue that firms with award-winning CEOs experience a significant decline
in ROA following an award. However, the argument in Malmendier and Tate (2009)
is primarily based on the results from an unconditional comparison of the difference
in ROA among award winners between the year before the award and one to three
years after the award. These findings do not hold when the variation among award
winners is compared to the difference among predicted winners, suggesting that the
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observed results might be related to firm characteristics other than increased CEO
status 8. Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2009), I also find a significant decrease
in financial performance among award winners when considering the unconditional
changes in ROA, but these results do not hold when controlling for other firm and
CEO characteristics.
Turning to the relationship between social and financial performance among
award winners, there are some significant results. The coefficient on the net CSR
is significantly negatively related to the firm’s ROA in Model 2 (p-value<0.05),
and CSR strengths load significantly negatively on ROA in Models 5 and 6 (p-
value<0.10). These findings suggest that there might be a general negative relation-
ship between social and financial performance among award-winning firms. However,
the results do not appear consistent in different evaluation periods, indicating that
the observed pattern might be specific to a particular set of observations.
The coefficients on the interaction terms between the indicator of the post-award
period and various measures of social performance are insignificant at the 10% level
across all models. These results provide support to Hypothesis 2b, and are consistent
with the view that award winners align their interests with company stakeholders
following a positive status shift, increasing social performance as part of a sound
business strategy rather than in pursuit of personal benefits. The evident focus on
core CSR among award-winners (see Table 4.16) is also consistent with this view
as social actions targeting primary stakeholders are more likely to be related to
company strategy (Dupire and M’Zali, 2016; Flammer, 2015).
8Malmendier and Tate (2009) show that the difference-in-differences in ROA is significant when the
trend among award winners is compared to that among all non-winning firms rather than a matched
sample of predicted winners. However, these results should be taken with caution as award-winning firms
are likely to be systematically different from other companies, and these differences could be driving the
results.
205
Table 5.4: The effect of CSR and achieved status on firm performance
ROA ROA
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award -0.009 0.011 0.002 -0.009 0.008 0.005
(0.011) (0.018) (0.031) (0.014) (0.021) (0.035)
CSR net 0.000 -0.009** -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Post award * CSR net -0.003 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
CSR strengths 0.002 -0.015** -0.014*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
CSR concerns 0.004 0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Post award * CSR strengths -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Post award * CSR concernce 0.004 0.000 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Firm size -0.012** -0.058** -0.049** -0.018*** -0.054** -0.047**
(0.005) (0.027) (0.022) (0.006) (0.027) (0.022)
Leverage 0.020 -0.087 -0.038 0.039 -0.082 -0.022
(0.052) (0.069) (0.048) (0.053) (0.068) (0.049)
R&D intensity 0.241** 0.703*** 0.243* 0.252** 0.697*** 0.232*
(0.112) (0.091) (0.122) (0.112) (0.091) (0.124)
Capital intensity -0.039* -0.081 -0.122 -0.031 -0.079 -0.117
(0.022) (0.097) (0.120) (0.023) (0.097) (0.117)
Lagged ROA 0.200*** 0.061 0.060 0.213*** 0.054 0.058
(0.060) (0.050) (0.086) (0.059) (0.051) (0.091)
CEO age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002)
CEO tenure 0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.001* -0.004 -0.000
(0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002)
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.461 0.362 0.185 0.480 0.368 0.193
The table reports the within-firm change in return on assets (ROA) before and after a CEO wins an award.
The dependent variable in all models is ROA, calculated as net income divided by total assets. Post award
is a dummy variable set to 1 in the period after a CEO wins an award. CSR strengths (concerns) are the
aggregate CSR strengths (concerns) across all CSR dimensions. CSR net is the difference between CSR
strengths and CSR concerns. Post award * CSR net, post award * CSR strengths and post award * CSR
concerns are the interaction terms. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calcu-
lated as total debt divided by total assets. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by
total sales. Capital intensity is calculated as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total sales.
CEO age and tenure are measured in years. Comparisons for 2 and 3 years include both firm and year fixed
effects. For the 1 year comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insufficient observations
required to estimate fixed effects. All non-CEO controls are lagged by one period. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
5.5.3 Robustness
Similar to the approach within the ascribed status dimension, I supplement the
analysis of achieved status influence on the link between social initiatives and return
on assets with tests that employ two additional commonly used measures of firm
performance: return on sales and return on equity (Jian and Lee, 2011; Servaes and
Tamayo, 2013). Table 5.5 reports the results of these estimations, providing further
206
evidence of no significant effect (at the 10% level) of CSR efforts by high achieved
status executives on firm performance.
One notable feature emerging from the additional tests is the presence of negative
and significant (p-value<0.5) coefficients on the Post award variable. In particular,
the results in Panel A show that the indicator of higher achieved social status is
significantly negatively related to the return on sales in the pre/post 1 year period.
While this finding could be interpreted to suggest a lower overall performance among
award-winning executives following the increase in status, the absence of a similar
pattern across other measures of firm performance indicates that this effect is not
consistent, and is not robust to using alternative specifications for measuring firm
profitability.
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Table 5.5: Robustness tests: Alternative performance measures and achieved status
Panel A: Return on sales (ROS)
ROS ROS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award -0.034** -0.018 0.019 -0.045** -0.032 0.003
(0.015) (0.050) (0.056) (0.023) (0.051) (0.059)
CSR net -0.003 -0.017*** -0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.010)
Post award * CSR net -0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
CSR strengths -0.004 -0.031*** -0.024**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.010)
CSR concerns 0.001 0.000 -0.016
(0.004) (0.007) (0.015)
Post award * CSR strengths 0.000 -0.000 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Post award * CSR concernce 0.005 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.270 0.173 0.136 0.273 0.185 0.147
Panel B: Return on equity (ROE)
ROE ROE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post Pre/post
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Post award -0.050 -0.508 -1.040 0.055 -0.352 -1.286
(0.099) (0.370) (0.846) (0.156) (0.327) (0.971)
CSR net 0.070 0.045 0.215
(0.059) (0.053) (0.138)
Post award * CSR net -0.126 -0.084 -0.069
(0.082) (0.072) (0.111)
CSR strengths 0.096 0.066 0.256
(0.079) (0.090) (0.210)
CSR concerns -0.016 -0.045 -0.206
(0.041) (0.047) (0.128)
Post award * CSR strengths -0.139 -0.107 -0.037
(0.098) (0.093) (0.129)
Post award * CSR concernce 0.093 0.028 0.198
(0.063) (0.042) (0.125)
Firm and CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 176 260 258 176 260 258
No. of firms 88 65 43 88 65 43
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.240 0.128 0.172 0.238 0.122
The table reports the within-firm change in firm performance before and after a CEO wins an award. All
models in Panel A employ return on sales (ROS) as the dependent variable, calculated as net income di-
vided by total sales. All models in Panel B employ return on equity (ROE) as the dependent variable,
calculated as net income divided by shareholder’s equity. Post award is a dummy variable set to 1 in the
period after a CEO wins an award. CSR strengths (concerns) are the aggregate CSR strengths (concerns)
across all CSR dimensions. CSR net is the difference between CSR strengths and CSR concerns. Post
award * CSR net, post award * CSR strengths and post award * CSR concerns are the interaction terms.
All models include a set of firm and CEO controls that are not reported for brevity. Firm controls include
firm size, R&D intensity, capital intensity, leverage, and a lagged dependent variable. CEO controls in-
clude CEO age and tenure. Comparisons for 2 and 3 years include both firm and year fixed effects. For
the 1 year comparison, firm fixed effects are not estimated because of insufficient observations required to
estimate fixed effects. All non-CEO controls are lagged by one period. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
208
5.6 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, I consider the potential moderating role of CEO social status charac-
teristics on the relationship between social and financial firm performance. Although
prior research suggests that decisions regarding CSR strategy among high ascribed
status CEOs are likely to be, at least partially, motivated by personal considerations
related to their standing within the corporate elite, I find no evidence of a negative
moderating effect from CSR initiatives by high ascribed status CEOs on the rela-
tionship between social and firm performance. This suggests that, with regards to
the firm’s CSR, personal motivations of elite executives do not necessarily misalign
their interests with those of other stakeholders, and the adopted CSR strategy might
be beneficial to the firm as well as its CEO.
Within the achieved status dimension, I develop two contrasting hypotheses and
address the question of the moderating effect of achieved status on CSR and firm
performance empirically. I find no evidence of a negative impact from social actions
by high achieved status CEOs on firm performance, consistent with the view that
positive shifts in achieved CEO status result in a better alignment of CEO and
stakeholder interests (Koh, 2011; Yoo and Pae, 2016).
Overall, my findings suggest that despite the partially personal rather than or-
ganisational motivation behind some of the social initiatives, the presence of high
status executives does not diminish the impact of their CSR activities on firm perfor-
mance, lending some support to the argument that strategic or opportunistic use of
CSR does not necessarily lead to poorer organisational outcomes (Petrovits, 2006).
Therefore, despite the net effect of CSR on shareholder value still being debated,
CSR initiatives motivated by executives’ social status do not appear to result in
additional agency concerns.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
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The theoretical and empirical analysis in this thesis establishes the importance of
CEO social status influence on corporate behaviour and firm-level outcomes. My
overall findings are consistent with the hypothesis that executives value their so-
cial status position and associated membership within elite social groups, leading to
strategic decisions that reflect a desire to preserve their social standing. In particu-
lar, I find that both high ascribed and elevated achieved social status are associated
with reduced M&A activity, and the effect is strongest among executives who pos-
sess both status types simultaneously. In addition, both types of CEO status are
positively related to the firms’ social performance, although the specific strategies
are different between executives with high ascribed and high achieved social status.
Several important distinctions between the influences of ascribed and achieved
status emerge from this thesis, indicating the importance of considering social status
origin. First, the effect of ascribed status is constant while the influence of achieved
social status follows changes in the status position and the impact is limited to sev-
eral years. Second, while ascribed status has no significant impact on firm value,
possessing high achieved social status can have negative performance implications,
as suggested by the negative market response to acquisition deal announcements
by executives with recently elevated status. Finally, the behavioural hypotheses
developed from the review of diverse literature on social status suggest unique moti-
vations for the observed behavioural patterns among executives with high ascribed
and high achieved social status. While the difference in motivations related to sta-
tus origin was not particularly reflected in executives’ approach to M&A and CSR
strategies, it does not necessarily imply that the influence of ascribed and achieved
social status will be similar for other corporate policies.
Thus, one natural avenue for future research is to examine other firm-level out-
comes that might be influenced by CEO social status. For example, ascribed status
might play a role in determining firms’ decisions regarding strategic alliances, such as
joint ventures. Lower status individuals might be more likely to view such alliances
as advantageous due to the networking benefits they provide, and the social status
of alliance partners may also differ between executives with different ascribed status
characteristics. It would also be beneficial to explore whether the lower observed
risk taking among executives with high achieved social status manifests itself in a
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similar fashion in decisions related to the firms’ financing strategy.
One of the limitations in this thesis is related to the measurement of CEO social
status, particularly within the ascribed status dimension. While the level of univer-
sity prestige has been linked with social class origins in prior literature (Domhoff,
1970; Useem and Karabel, 1986; Westphal and Khanna, 2003), the research in this
area generally suggests that using prestige of preparatory or secondary school might
be a better indicator of ascribed status (Lucey et al., 2013; Palmer and Barber,
2001). My problem in implementing such a measure was data availability, but this
is likely to be a time-specific limitation given the general growth in alternative data
available for finance.
A beneficial direction for future research would, therefore, be to develop addi-
tional measures of ascribed and achieved social status using more detailed personal
information on CEOs. Within the ascribed status dimension, measures could be
improved through incorporating educational information prior to college degrees
(Lucey et al., 2013; Palmer and Barber, 2001), or using more direct measures of
perceived social class background (Kish-Gephart and Campbell, 2015). Measuring
achieved social status could also benefit from incorporating factors such as executive
perks and corporate affiliations (McDonald and Westphal, 2010; Rajan and Wulf,
2006). Furthermore, ascribed and achieved social status characteristics could po-
tentially be indicated by identifying relevant patterns in CEO speech, similar to one
of the approaches to determining the level of CEO overconfidence (Liu and Taﬄer,
2008).
Another limitation of my analysis that results from the data availability issues
is the focus on the CEO alone. While the theoretical and empirical research on
the role of corporate executives points to a substantial CEO effect on corporate
policies and firm performance (Baxamusa and Jalal, 2016; Benmelech and Frydman,
2015; Chen et al., 2014), other literature also highlights the importance of directors’
characteristics in determining strategic decisions (Levi et al., 2014; Tang et al., 2011).
Thus, examining the influence of directors’ social status as well as considering the
interaction between CEO and board members’ social characteristics can provide a
richer understanding of the role of social status in corporate decision making.
Finally, the findings in this thesis are limited to the North American context.
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Considering the documented differences in the relative importance of status across
different cultures (see, for example, Huberman et al., 2004), it would be beneficial
to explore how my findings translate to other social settings, and investigate the
potential variation in social status influence internationally.
I see these limitations as opportunities. Social status represents an evolution in
our understanding of influences on financial decision making behaviour. It moves
us beyond the cognitive psychology derived influences, such as overconfidence, that
began behavioural investigations of CEO financial behaviour. The field of social in-
fluences on behaviour, including that of belonging to certain social groups, is a more
dynamic, complex, and potentially much more rewarding approach to understanding
behaviour given that it brings financial researcher’s conceptualization of the CEO
much closer to that of a real person with real (and often competing) influences on
their decision making.
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A.1 Appendix for Chapters 2 and 3
Table A.1: Description of CEO and company awards
Publication Title Award Title Award Details
CEO awards
Business Week Top Managers of the Year Annual award with winners chosen by Business Week’s ed-
itorial staff. The award was conferred to about 15 winners
between 1992 and 1995, 25 winners between 1996 and 2002,
roughly 15 winners between 2003 and 2005, and 12 winners in
2009. Awards were given between 1988 and 2009.
Financial World CEOs of the Year Annual award with winners chosen by Financial World’s edi-
torial staff. CEOs of the Year were classified into "Gold", "Sil-
ver" and "Bronze" winners. Due to a relatively large number
of Bronze winners, only Gold (one winner per year) and Silver
(about ten winners per year except in 1995 and 1996 when the
number increased to around 70) are considered as indicators
of high status. Awards were conferred between 1975 and 1997.
Forbes Best Performing CEOs Annual award with winners chosen by Forbes’ editorial staff.
The list includes five winners in 2001 and ten winners per year
thereafter. Awards have been conferred from 2001 to 2012.
Forbes World’s Most Powerful People Annual award with winners chosen by Forbes’ editorial staff.
The award is given to about 70 winners each year (one winner
for every 100 million people on Earth). Awards have been
conferred from 2009 to 2012.
Industry Week CEO of the Year Annual award based on a CEO survey. There were three win-
ners in 1994, five winners in 1995 and one winner per year
thereafter.
Chief Executive CEO of the Year Annual award with one winner chosen by a panel of CEOs
since 1987.
Electronic Business
Magazine
CEO of the Year Annual award with winners chosen by Electronic Business
Magazine’s editorial staff. One winner per year was chosen
between 1997 and 2006.
Morningstar.com CEO of the Year Annual award with one winner chosen by editorial staff since
1999.
Time Person of the Year Annual award with one winner chosen by editorial staff. Only
one sample CEO has received this award between 1992 and
2012.
Time & CNN 25 Most Influential Global Ex-
ecutives
A one-time list of 25 most influential executives published in
2002.
Harvard Business Re-
view
Best-Performing CEOs in the
World
A one-time list of 50 world’s best performing CEOs published
in 2010.
Company awards
Fortune America’s Most Admired Com-
panies
Annual award with ten winners per year until 2005, 20 winners
between 2006 and 2008, and 50 winners between 2009 and
2012.
Business Week Top 50 Performers Annual award with 50 winners each year.
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Table A.2: CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness: Post-crisis period
[1] [2] [3]
5% M&A 5% M&A invest. 5% M&A invest.
frequency (scaled by market cap) (scaled by assets)
Ascribed status -0.039 -0.027** -0.022***
(0.032) (0.013) (0.007)
Firm size -0.016 -0.009 -0.005
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
Past returns 0.006 -0.001 0.001
(0.029) (0.015) (0.016)
Tobin’s Q -0.034*** -0.011 -0.011
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
ROA 0.312** 0.145 0.237**
(0.156) (0.100) (0.113)
Cash holdings 0.130 0.055 0.048
(0.115) (0.033) (0.038)
Book leverage -0.006 0.011 -0.041
(0.092) (0.043) (0.026)
CEO age -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
CEO tenure 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.042 0.085 0.032
(0.049) (0.077) (0.025)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1230 1230 1230
No. of firms 380 380 380
Adjusted R-squared 0.129 0.057 0.090
The table presents results of OLS regressions testing the effect of possessing high ascribed social status on
CEO acquisitiveness during the post-crisis period (2009 - 2012). The dependent variable in Model 1 is the
number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent variable in
Models 2 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a
given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction.
The dependent variable in Model 3 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of ac-
quirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book assets at the beginning of the
year. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Ascribed status
indicator equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group
Universities, and equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization, calculated as
share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound returns for two
years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus
book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as operating income
before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments di-
vided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. All fiscal controls
are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that
equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions include year and industry
fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table A.3: CEO ascribed status and acquisitiveness: Sub-period analysis with firm fixed
effects
Before the crisis start (1992 - 2006) After the crisis start (2007 - 2012)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Ascribed status -0.056 0.001 -0.021 0.001 -0.009 -0.019
(0.035) (0.010) (0.019) (0.070) (0.014) (0.021)
Firm size -0.005 -0.012* -0.017 0.005 -0.027* -0.043**
(0.028) (0.007) (0.040) (0.035) (0.015) (0.018)
Past returns -0.014 0.007 0.056 -0.040 -0.021* -0.022
(0.018) (0.005) (0.049) (0.032) (0.013) (0.016)
Tobin’s Q 0.004 0.001 0.058** -0.010 0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.001) (0.028) (0.015) (0.006) (0.012)
ROA 0.260 0.142* -0.035 0.936*** 0.328** 0.472***
(0.160) (0.079) (0.256) (0.287) (0.137) (0.180)
Cash holdings 0.385*** 0.073 0.030 1.139*** 0.258** 0.516*
(0.141) (0.045) (0.453) (0.233) (0.113) (0.271)
Book leverage -0.338*** -0.085* -0.071 -0.424** -0.105 -0.191**
(0.121) (0.046) (0.101) (0.178) (0.066) (0.083)
CEO age 0.008*** 0.001** 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO tenure -0.005** -0.002*** -0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO gender 0.178** 0.032 0.073 0.145 0.002 -0.018
(0.084) (0.023) (0.054) (0.121) (0.028) (0.066)
Industry fixed effects No No No No No No
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 4130 4130 4130 1857 1857 1857
No. of firms 522 522 522 411 411 411
Adjusted R-squared 0.215 0.149 0.135 0.190 0.076 0.107
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of possessing high ascribed social status
on CEO acquisitiveness. The sample is split into two sub-periods: models 1 - 3 use observations from 1992
to 2006 and models 4 - 6 use observation from 2007 to 2012. The dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is
the number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent variable
in models 2 and 5 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value
made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to the
transaction. The dependent variable in models 3 and 6 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth
more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book assets at
the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s
shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy
League or Russell Group Universities, and equals to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of market capi-
talization, calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total
compound returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus
market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is cal-
culated as operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and
short-term investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book
assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions
include year and firm fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.4: Ascribed status vs. education with firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3]
5% M&A 5% M&A invest. 5% M&A invest.
frequency (scaled by market cap) (scaled by assets)
Prestigious universities -0.023 -0.003 -0.028*
(0.026) (0.007) (0.015)
Top 100 universities -0.008 -0.009 -0.017
(0.020) (0.006) (0.013)
Firm size -0.010 -0.014** -0.019
(0.024) (0.006) (0.031)
Past returns -0.012 0.003 0.046
(0.015) (0.005) (0.038)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.000 0.054**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.024)
ROA 0.349*** 0.145** -0.069
(0.121) (0.057) (0.214)
Cash holdings 0.464*** 0.101*** 0.134
(0.111) (0.033) (0.278)
Book leverage -0.203** -0.051* -0.016
(0.081) (0.028) (0.060)
CEO age 0.005** 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO tenure -0.004** -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.104*** 0.032 0.034
(0.040) (0.021) (0.031)
Industry fixed effects No No No
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5987 5987 5987
No. of firms 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.199 0.116 0.114
The table presents results of OLS regressions testing the effect of education quality on CEO acquisitive-
ness. The dependent variable in model 1 is the number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value
made in a given year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the total investment in M&A transactions
worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market
capitalization two months prior to the transaction. The dependent variable in model 3 is the total invest-
ment in M&A transactions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal
is scaled by firm’s book assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are required to involve a pur-
chase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Prestigious universities is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a
CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals
to 0 otherwise. Top 100 universities is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bache-
lor degree from one of the world’s top 100 universities excluding Ivy League or Russell Group, and equals
to 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization, calculated as share price multiplied by
common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound returns for two years prior to observa-
tion year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity,
divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation di-
vided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets.
Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by one year.
CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO
is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions include year and firm fixed effect. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.5: CEO achieved status and acquisitiveness: Longer event windows
Panel A: M&A frequency
Obs. Award Predicted Difference
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P)
Event window 274 -0.066** -0.044* -0.022
[-1, 0] (2.11) (1.78) (0.58)
Event window 218 -0.069** 0.005 -0.073*
[-1, 1] (2.16) (0.16) (1.75)
Event window 175 -0.109*** 0.023 -0.131***
[-1, 2] (2.89) (0.78) (2.74)
Event window 129 -0.109** 0.109** -0.217***
[-1, 3] (2.37) (2.19) (3.29)
Event window 97 -0.103* -0.031 -0.072
[-1, 4] (1.85) (0.65) (1.07)
Event window 73 -0.096 -0.027 -0.068
[-1, 5] (1.54) (0.57) (0.77)
Panel B: M&A investment
Obs. Award Predicted Difference
winners (W) winners (P) (W - P)
Event window 274 -0.019** -0.014 -0.005
[-1, 0] (2.30) (1.57) (0.47)
Event window 218 -0.018** 0.003 -0.021**
[-1, 1] (2.16) (0.39) (1.99)
Event window 175 -0.030*** 0.017 -0.046***
[-1, 2] (2.93) (1.42) (2.98)
Event window 129 -0.031** 0.033** -0.065***
[-1, 3] (2.31) (2.40) (3.22)
Event window 97 -0.028 0.002 -0.030
[-1, 4] (1.49) (0.19) (1.43)
Event window 73 -0.040* 0.006 -0.046*
[-1, 5] (1.73) (0.44) (1.68)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and pre-
dicted winners (lower achieved status). Predicted winners sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour
propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity
leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to 7th, and 36th to 13th months before
the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as year, industry and award fixed effects.
Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before the award month. Panel A shows the dif-
ferences between award winners and predicted winners in the frequency of M&A transactions worth more
than 5% of acquirer’s value completed during the event window. Panel B displays the differences between
award winners and predicted winners in the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 5%
of acquirer’s value during the event window, where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capi-
talization two months prior to the transaction. Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.6: CEO achieved status and acquisitiveness: Multiple neighbours
Panel A: M&A frequency
Two neighbours Three neighbours Four neighbours
Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj.
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 272 -0.035 -0.024 271 -0.055 -0.044 270 -0.051 -0.041
[-1, 0] (1.00) (0.67) (1.63) (1.31) (1.54) (1.25)
Event window 217 -0.069* -0.060 214 -0.070* -0.061 214 -0.060 -0.051
[-1, 1] (1.83) (1.59) (1.86) (1.62) (1.63) (1.41)
Event window 172 -0.108** -0.098** 169 -0.103** -0.091** 165 -0.089** -0.079*
[-1, 2] (2.43) (2.22) (2.30) (2.06) (1.98) (1.76)
Event window 122 -0.152*** -0.149*** 115 -0.151*** -0.147*** 113 -0.135*** -0.131**
[-1, 3] (2.84) (2.82) (2.86) (2.80) (2.67) (2.62)
Panel B: M&A investment
Two neighbours Three neighbours Four neighbours
Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj. Obs. Difference Bias-adj.
(W-P) difference (W-P) difference (W-P) difference
Event window 272 -0.008 -0.003 271 -0.010 -0.005 270 -0.010 -0.006
[-1, 0] (0.77) (0.33) (1.06) (0.58) (1.09) (0.63)
Event window 217 -0.017* -0.012 214 -0.021** -0.016 214 -0.018* -0.013
[-1, 1] (1.67) (1.24) (2.00) (1.58) (1.74) (1.35)
Event window 172 -0.036*** -0.032** 169 -0.032** -0.027** 165 -0.031** -0.026**
[-1, 2] (2.74) (2.40) (2.47) (2.06) (2.39) (2.01)
Event window 122 -0.055*** -0.053*** 115 -0.057*** -0.055*** 113 -0.054*** -0.052***
[-1, 3] (2.97) (2.91) (2.98) (2.87) (3.20) (3.07)
The table presents the differences in acquisitiveness between award winners (high achieved status) and
predicted winners (lower achieved status) using two, three or four neighbors. Predicted winners sample is
constructed using a nearest-neighbor propensity score match controlling for market capitalization, book-
to-market ratio, cash holdings, equity leverage, Tobin’s Q, returns from 3rd to 2nd, 6th to 4th, 12th to
7th, and 36th to 13th months before the award month, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, as well as
year, industry and award fixed effects. Year prior to award (year -1) ends exactly six months before the
award month. Panel A shows the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the fre-
quency of M&A transactions worth more than five percent of acquirer’s value completed during the event
window. Panel B displays the differences between award winners and predicted winners in the total in-
vestment in M&A transactions worth more than five percent of acquirer’s value during the event window,
where each deal value is scaled by company’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction.
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.7: CEO dual status and acquisitiveness: Including company awards in achieved
status identification
Industry fixed effects Firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A 5% M&A inv. 5% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Achieved status -0.015 -0.008* -0.047** -0.008 -0.005 -0.052*
(0.016) (0.005) (0.021) (0.020) (0.006) (0.029)
Ascribed status -0.014 -0.010** -0.026*** -0.014 0.002 -0.024
(0.018) (0.005) (0.010) (0.026) (0.007) (0.015)
Achieved x Ascribed -0.037 -0.003 0.003 -0.050 -0.014 0.009
(0.029) (0.007) (0.022) (0.035) (0.009) (0.030)
Firm size -0.017*** -0.008*** -0.012* -0.009 -0.014** -0.013
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.025) (0.006) (0.031)
Past returns 0.024* 0.010** 0.055* -0.011 0.003 0.049
(0.012) (0.005) (0.030) (0.015) (0.005) (0.039)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 -0.001 0.055*** 0.001 0.000 0.054**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.018) (0.004) (0.001) (0.024)
ROA 0.002 0.027 -0.356** 0.353*** 0.147*** -0.053
(0.076) (0.034) (0.175) (0.121) (0.057) (0.211)
Cash holdings -0.024 0.000 -0.082 0.463*** 0.100*** 0.124
(0.060) (0.021) (0.096) (0.110) (0.032) (0.276)
Book leverage -0.078 0.023 0.022 -0.202** -0.050* -0.011
(0.049) (0.018) (0.038) (0.081) (0.028) (0.060)
CEO age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO tenure 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender 0.060** 0.036 0.034** 0.105** 0.031 0.035
(0.027) (0.026) (0.014) (0.041) (0.021) (0.030)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987
No. of firms 616 616 616 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.130 0.061 0.112 0.199 0.116 0.116
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of possessing dual (ascribed and achieved)
social status on CEO acquisitiveness, including company awards in achieved status identification. The de-
pendent variable in model 1 is the number of deals worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given
year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than
5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two
months prior to the transaction. The dependent variable in model 3 is the total investment in M&A trans-
actions worth more than 5% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s
book assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are required to involve a purchase of at least
51% of target’s shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a CEO has received a bachelor degree from
one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals to 0 otherwise. Achieved status indicator
is equal to 1 if a CEO received a prestigious CEO or firm-level award within two years prior to observa-
tion year. Achieved x Ascribed is the interaction term. Firm size is the log form of market capitalization,
calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns are the total compound
returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets plus market value
of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as op-
erating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings represent cash and short-term
investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt divided by book assets. All
fiscal controls are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in years. CEO gender is a dummy
variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero otherwise. All regressions include year
fixed effect. Models 1 - 3 include industry fixed effect, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Mod-
els 4 - 6 include firm fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
221
Table A.8: CEO dual status and acquisitiveness: Alternative M&A specification
Industry fixed effects Firm fixed effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1% M&A 1% M&A inv. 1% M&A inv. 1% M&A 1% M&A inv. 1% M&A inv.
frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets) frequency (scaled: mkt cap) (scaled: assets)
Achieved status -0.100** -0.013** -0.067* -0.084* -0.008 -0.093*
(0.046) (0.006) (0.039) (0.046) (0.006) (0.056)
Ascribed status -0.003 -0.010** -0.027*** -0.006 0.002 -0.024
(0.032) (0.005) (0.010) (0.044) (0.006) (0.016)
Achieved x Ascribed 0.013 0.001 0.016 -0.009 -0.013 0.051
(0.077) (0.008) (0.038) (0.080) (0.010) (0.051)
Firm size 0.015 -0.007*** -0.013* 0.024 -0.013** -0.015
(0.011) (0.002) (0.007) (0.029) (0.006) (0.030)
Past returns 0.070*** 0.011** 0.058* 0.009 0.003 0.047
(0.021) (0.005) (0.030) (0.022) (0.005) (0.039)
Tobin’s Q -0.007 -0.001 0.059*** -0.007 0.000 0.058**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.018) (0.005) (0.001) (0.024)
ROA -0.046 0.023 -0.367** 0.564*** 0.151*** -0.017
(0.127) (0.034) (0.172) (0.186) (0.057) (0.210)
Cash holdings -0.209* -0.005 -0.083 0.453*** 0.100*** 0.114
(0.111) (0.021) (0.098) (0.156) (0.033) (0.276)
Book leverage -0.123 0.023 0.027 -0.375*** -0.055** -0.017
(0.085) (0.019) (0.038) (0.127) (0.028) (0.061)
CEO age -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO tenure 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO gender -0.037 0.033 0.030** 0.043 0.030 0.030
(0.041) (0.026) (0.015) (0.067) (0.021) (0.030)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987 5,987
No. of firms 616 616 616 616 616 616
Adjusted R-squared 0.228 0.073 0.131 0.331 0.130 0.137
The table presents results of regression models testing the effect of possessing dual (ascribed and achieved)
social status on CEO acquisitiveness. The dependent variable in model 1 is the number of deals worth
more than 1% of acquirer’s value made in a given year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the total in-
vestment in M&A transactions worth more than 1% of acquirer’s value made in a given year, where each
deal is scaled by firm’s market capitalization two months prior to the transaction. The dependent variable
in model 3 is the total investment in M&A transactions worth more than 1% of acquirer’s value made in a
given year, where each deal is scaled by firm’s book assets at the beginning of the year. All M&A deals are
required to involve a purchase of at least 51% of target’s shares. Ascribed status indicator equals to 1 if a
CEO has received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy League or Russell Group Universities, and equals
to 0 otherwise. Achieved status indicator is equal to 1 if a CEO received a prestigious CEO award within
two years prior to observation year. Achieved x Ascribed is the interaction term. Firm size is the log form
of market capitalization, calculated as share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Past returns
are the total compound returns for two years prior to observation year. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Return on assets
(ROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Cash holdings rep-
resent cash and short-term investments divided by book assets. Book leverage is calculated as total debt
divided by book assets. All fiscal controls are lagged by one year. CEO age and tenure are measured in
years. CEO gender is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is a female, and equals to zero other-
wise. All regressions include year fixed effect. Models 1 - 3 include industry fixed effect, defined based on
Fama-French 48 industries. Models 4 - 6 include firm fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.9: Achieved status and market response to acquisition announcements: Alternative
CAR specifications
Panel A: Market-adjusted 5-day CARs
Market-adjusted CAR [-2, +2]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.023*
(0.013)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.021*
(0.012)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.019*
(0.011)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.017*
(0.009)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.010
(0.010)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.057
Panel B: Market-adjusted 7-day CARs
Market-adjusted CAR [-3, +3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Award winners:
- M&A deals within 1 year after award -0.027*
(0.016)
- M&A deals within 2 years after award -0.024*
(0.013)
- M&A deals within 3 years after award -0.021*
(0.012)
- M&A deals within 5 years after award -0.023**
(0.010)
- M&A deals any time after award -0.010
(0.011)
Firm and deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.042
The table presents results from regression models testing the effect of CEO achieved social status on the
announcement returns to M&A deals greater than 5% of acquirer’s value. CEOs are defined as having high
achieved social status in the period after they win an award. All models use CRSP equal-weighted index as
the proxy for market returns. In Panel A, CARs are calculated over a 5-day event window using market-
adjusted returns. In Panel B, CARs are calculated over a 7-day event window using market-adjusted re-
turns. Firm and deal controls are included in all models and are not reported for brevity. Controls include
firm size, relative deal size, Tobin’s Q, book leverage, cash financing indicator, equity financing indicator,
deal relatedness indicator, hostile deal indicator and toehold. All regressions include year and industry
fixed effects, defined based on Fama-French 48 industries. Robust standard errors are clustered by event
date to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns, and are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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A.2 Appendix for Chapters 4 and 5
Table A.10: Description of status, firm and CEO-related variables
Variable Description Data Source
Status variables
Ascribed status A binary indicator that equals to one if a CEO
received a bachelor degree from one of the Ivy
League universities, and equals to zero other-
wise
Marquis Who’s Who, Thomson One
Banker, EDGAR listings, Notable
Names Database, annual reports
Post award A binary indicator that equals to one in the
period after a CEO wins an award and ex-
periences a positive achieved status shift, and
equals to zero otherwise
Business Week, Financial World,
Forbes, Industry Week, Chief Exec-
utive, Electronic Business Magazine,
Time, Time & CNN, Harvard Business
Review, and Morningstar.com
Firm variables
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat
Leverage Ratio of the sum of total long term debt and
debt in current liabilities to total assets
Compustat
ROA Ratio of operating income before depreciation
to total assets
Compustat
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales Compustat
Advertising intensity Ratio of advertising expenditures to total sales Compustat
Capital intensity Ratio of net property, plant and equipment to
total sales
Compustat
Corporate governance The difference between CSR strengths and
concerns within the corporate governance di-
mension
MSCI ESG Stats (former KLD)
CEO variables
CEO age CEO age in years Compustat ExecuComp
CEO tenure CEO tenure in years Compustat ExecuComp
CEO gender A binary indicator that equals to one if a CEO
is a female, and equals to zero otherwise
Compustat ExecuComp
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Table A.11: Description of CSR-related variables
Variable Description
Overall CSR variables
CSR strengths Aggregate strengths within six dimensions (excludes corporate governance)
CSR concerns Aggregate concerns within six dimensions (excludes corporate governance)
CSR net The difference between CSR strengths and CSR concerns
Core CSR variables
Core strengths Sum of "diversity", "employee relations" and "product quality" strengths
Core concerns Sum of "diversity", "employee relations" and "product quality" concerns
Core net The difference between core strengths and core concerns
Peripheral CSR variables
Peripheral strengths Sum of "community", "environment" and "human rights" strengths
Peripheral concerns Sum of "community", "environment" and "human rights" concerns
Peripheral net The difference between peripheral strengths and peripheral concerns
Individual CSR dimensions
Community strengths (concerns) Sum of all community strengths (concerns)
Diversity strengths (concerns) Sum of all diversity strengths (concerns)
Environment strengths (concerns) Sum of all environment strengths (concerns)
Employee relations strengths (con-
cerns)
Sum of all employee relations strengths (concerns)
Human rights strengths (concerns) Sum of all human rights strengths (concerns)
Product strengths (concerns) Sum of all product strengths (concerns)
Scaled CSR variables
Scaled CSR strengths Aggregate strengths within six dimensions divided by the maximum possible
number of strengths in the given year
Scaled CSR concerns Aggregate concerns within six dimensions divided by the maximum possible
number of concerns in the given year
Scaled CSR net The difference between scaled CSR strengths and scaled CSR concerns
Industry-adjusted CSR variables
Industry-adjusted CSR strengths Aggregate strengths within six dimensions minus the average CSR strengths
within the firm’s industry
Industry-adjusted CSR concerns Aggregate concerns within six dimensions minus the average CSR concerns
within the firm’s industry
Industry-adjusted CSR net The difference between industry-adjusted CSR strengths and industry-
adjusted CSR concerns
All data used to construct CSR measures is obtained from from MSCI ESG Stats (formerly known as
Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini, and Company or KLD).
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Table A.12: Description of firm performance measures
Variable Description Data Source
Return on assets (ROA) Ratio of net income to total assets Compustat
Return on sales (ROS) Ratio of net income to total sales Compustat
Return on equity (ROE) Ratio of net income to shareholder’s equity Compustat
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Table A.13: KLD social rating items within each dimension
KLD dimension Strength items Concern items
Community Charitable giving (from 1991 through 2011) Investment controversies (1991 to 2009)
Innovative giving (from 1991) Community impact (from 1991)
Support for housing (1991 to 2009) Tax disputes (1991 to 2009)
Support for education (1994 to 2009) Other concerns (1991 to 2009)
Non-US charitable giving (1994 to 2009)
Volunteer programs (2005 to 2009)
Community engagement (from 2010)
Other strengths (from 1991 through 2011)
Diversity CEO (1991 to 2009) Workforce diversity (from 1991)
Promotion (from 1991 through 2011) Non-representation (from 1993 through 2011)
Board of directors - gender (from 1991) Board of directors - gender (from 1991)
Work-life benefits (from 1991 through 2011) Board of directors - minorities (from 1991)
Women and minority contracting (from 1991) Other concerns (1991 to 2009)
Employment of the disabled (1991 to 2009)
Gay and lesbian policies (from 1995 through
2011)
Employment of uderrepresented groups (from
2010)
Other strengths (from 1991)
Employee relations Union relations (from 1991) Union relations (from 1991)
No-layoff policy (1991 to 1993) Employee health & safety (from 1991)
Cash profit sharing (from 1991) Workforce reductions (1991 to 2009)
Employee involvement (from 1991) Retirement benefits concern (1992 to 2009)
Retirement benefits strength (1991 to 2009) Supply chain (from 1998)
Employee health and safety (from 2003) Child labor
Supply chain labor standards (from 2002) Other concerns
Compensation & benefits
Employee relations
Professional development
Human capital management
Controversial sourcing (from 2013)
Other Strength (from 1991 through 2011)
Environment Environmental opportunities (from 1991) Hazardous waste (1991 to 2009)
Waste management (from 1991) Regulatory compliance (from 1991)
Packaging materials & waste (from 1991) Ozone depleting chemicals (1991 to 2009)
Climate change (from 1991) Toxic spills & releases (from 1991)
Property, plant, equipment (1991 to 1995) Agriculture chemicals (1991 to 2009)
Environmental management systems (from
2006)
Climate change (from 1999)
Water stress Impact of products & services (from 2010)
Biodiversity & land use Biodiversity & land use (from 2010)
Raw material sourcing Operational waste (from 2010)
Natural resource use (from 2013) Supply chain management
Environmental opportunities - green buildings
(from 2013)
Water management
Environmental opportunities in renewable en-
ergy (from 2013)
Other concerns (from 1991)
Waste management - electronic waste (from
2013)
Climate change - energy efficiency (from 2013)
Climate change - product carbon footprint
(from 2013)
Climate change - insuring climage change risk
(from 2013)
Other strengths (from 1991)
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Human rights Positive record in S. Africa (1994 to 1995) South Africa (1991 to 1994)
Indigenous peoples relations strength (from
2000)
Northern Ireland (1991 to 1994)
Labor rights strength (2002 to 2009) Support for controversial regimes (from 1994)
Human rights policies & initiatives (from 1994) Mexico (1994 to 2001)
Labor rights concern (1998 to 2009)
Indigenous peoples relations concern (2000 to
2009)
Operations in Sudan (from 2010 to 2011)
Freedom of expression & censorship
Human rights violations
Other concerns (from 1994)
Product Quality (from 1991) Product quality & safety (from 1991)
R+D, innovation (1991 to 2009) Marketing & advertising (from 1991)
Social opportunities (from 1991) Anticompetitive practices (from 1991)
Access to finance (from 1991) Customer relations
Social opportunities - access to communica-
tions (from 2013)
Privacy & data security (from 2015)
Social opportunities - opportunities in nutri-
tion and health (from 2013)
Other concerns (from 1991)
Product safety - chemical safety (from 2013)
Product safety - financial product safety (from
2013)
Product safety - privacy and data security
(from 2013)
Product safety - responsible investment (from
2013)
Product safety - insuring health and demo-
graphic risk (from 2013)
Other strengths (1991 to 2009)
Corporate Governance Limited compensation (1991 to 2009) High compensation (1991 to 2009)
Ownership strength (1991 to 2009) Ownsership concern (1991 to 2009)
Reporting quality (From 1996 - 2012) Accounting concern (2005 to 2009)
Political accountability strength (2005 to
2009)
Reporting quality (from 1996 - 2012)
Public policy strength (from 2007 through
2011)
Political accountability concern (2005 to 2007)
Corruption & political instability Public policy concern (from 2007 through
2011)
Financial system instability Governance structures (from 2010)
Other strengths (1991 to 2009) Controversial investments
Business ethics
Other concerns (from 1992)
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